In defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia's new strategic map

The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper categorically termed Australia's zone of strategic interest the Indo-Pacific, the first time any government has defined its region this way. This raises questions about what the Indo-Pacific means, whether it is a coherent strategic system, the provenance of the concept and its implications for Asian security as well as Australian policy. Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on South-East Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific subregions will retain their own dynamics too. It suits Australia's two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China's expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia. Questions about Australia's ability to implement an effective Indo-Pacific strategy must account for force posture, alliance ties and defence diplomacy, as well as constraints on force structure and spending.     

Strengthening gender justice in the Asia-Pacific through the Rome Statute

Many conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region have included sexual violence crimes targeted primarily against women. However, in comparison to other regions, Asia-Pacific states have been reluctant to embrace international law innovations to end impunity for such crimes into the future, as evidenced by their unwillingness to become signatories to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Of the 39 countries constituting the Asia-Pacific region, only 17—less than half—have joined the Rome Statute. This article initially surveys some of the reasons for non-ratification of the Statute. It further examines the role of civil society and the potential normative impact of the Statute to enhance national sexual violence legislation and prosecutions. Finally, it identifies some practical steps that the Australian government could take to encourage regional states to ratify, implement and enforce the Rome Statute in order to further protect all victims of international crimes and bolster the broader Women, Peace and Security framework.     

冷战后亚太地缘政治格局与中国安全利益

冷战后,亚太地区地缘政治格局发生重大变化,中国的主导作用和地位进一步加强,中国在亚太的安全利益向纵深发展。同时,随亚太格局变化产生的国际矛盾斗争,对中国的安全利益构成严峻挑战。政治安全利益、军事安全利益、经济安全利益是中国在亚太地区安全利益的核心成分。政治安全利益内容广泛,包括国家统一、民族关系稳定、反对宗教势力渗透、维护政治稳定等;军事安全利益着重表现为捍卫祖国统一、维护领土完整、防范军事威胁以及军控和防止核扩散;经济安全利益涵盖金融安全、稳定的资金来源和良好的投资环境、资源安全特别是能源安全、市场安全、运输线安全、海外投资安全等。     

论近代中国对外贸易地理方向的变动及其原因

学术界对近代中国对外贸易地理方向变动的探讨多采国别分析模式,本文采用新的分析方法.认为近代中国外贸方向变动的趋势是中国与亚太地区的经贸联系逐渐加强,尽管列强在华势力消长是近代中国外贸方向变动的重要原因,但世界体系下的霸权转移和列强对华贸易的比较利益则决定了近代中国贸易取向的转变,同时近代中国外贸方向的变动仍遵循经济学规律,受地缘和传统因素的制约.以亚太为外贸重心的变动体现出中国参与国际经济的一种长期趋势.     

The Japan-Australia contribution to a liberal and inclusive regional order: beyond the ‘China gap’

This article discusses how Japan and Australia could contribute to a liberal and inclusive order in the Asia-Pacific region. Critics argue that closer ties between Japan and Australia could undermine the stability of regional security, dividing Asia into ‘mutually hostile armed blocs’ consisting of US allies and China. Contrary to such a view, this article argues that deepening and enhancing Japan–Australia security cooperation could, if carefully managed, help to maintain an inclusive regional order based on institutions, norms and values, as well as a stable balance of power relations. In particular, the article contends that Japan and Australia can contribute to regional order by strengthening their ‘middle-power cooperation’ through regional capacity-building, institution-building, rule-making or norm-setting, and coalition-building, while supporting the US military presence in the region. It then concludes that, despite differing attitudes towards Beijing, Tokyo and Canberra can further contribute to the longevity of the current regional order by inclusive institutional architecture and liberal norms and values.     

Exploiting Sino-US Geostrategic Competition: The View from Seoul and Singapore

The mainstream literature on weak status quo states’ diplomacy tends to identify their regional security roles in terms of dealing with non-traditional security issues. This article argues that such a limited approach is not sufficient to explain the current security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. This article reviews the literature on weak status quo states’ influence on regional order. It then identifies a security environment in which they are more likely to exert some impact on maintaining and building a regional order. After contextualising these discussions in the Asia-Pacific setting, the article examines the experience of South Korea and Singapore as secondary powers in the East Asian region. Although both countries enjoy high levels of security cooperation with the US, both have also been able to exercise a certain amount of influence in advancing their own geostrategic interests amidst the growing Sino-US geostrategic competition. Yet their exploitation of Sino-US geostrategic competition is neither a simple balancing strategy against China nor a simple bandwagoning with the US, since both South Korea and Singapore have been increasing bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with China.     

The limits of civil society in militarised regimes: evidence from the Asia-Pacific

The nature of civil society is transformed by a strong military presence, which occurs in the Asia-Pacific region. While modern civil society survives under military rule through co-optation, veiled resistance or geography, traditional organisations may continue to threaten the state's dominance of political society. This article examines the nature of civil society in two countries in the Asia-Pacific that have recently emerged from direct military rule—Burma and Fiji. It considers the independence of civil society under military rule, how militaries take steps to safeguard their roles in political society, and how democratic postures change during transitions away from military rule. Understanding how militaries preserve their influence provides a better perspective of authoritarian resilience in the region and the limits to democratic reforms.     

Towards Asian regional functional futures: bringing Mitrany back in?

In the early years of the twenty-first century, Asian regionalism is at a crossroads. While the region is home to a broad array of multilateral organisations, the record of these bodies in fostering effective and legitimate cooperation has been decidedly weak. Drawing on insights from the work of David Mitrany on international cooperation, this article contends that the key problem facing Asian regionalism is a predilection for ‘top-down’ rather than ‘bottom-up’ regionalism strategies. These top-down strategies have involved efforts to find a single institutional design for regional cooperation (similar to the experience of Europe), which has been hindered by geopolitical rivalries and a lack of shared consensus around what constitutes the ‘Asian region’. By considering the contours of interstate competition in Asia, the track record of its existing regionalism efforts and insights from comparative regional studies, it is instead argued that Asia's future is one of regions rather than a single region. As Mitrany suggests, the unique geopolitical context in Asia means that functionally discrete and variegated strategies are likely to provide a more effective basis for regional cooperation. Indeed, trends towards such a functional approach to regionalism are already becoming evident in Asia today.     

The impotence of being earnest? Avoiding the pitfalls of ‘creative middle power diplomacy’

This article critically evaluates Australia's ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, encapsulated in the three pillars of the Labor government's foreign policy platform. It notes that each pillar has been accorded specific roles in the implementation of Australian foreign policy and makes particular reference to the government's preference for multilateral engagement. The article subsequently demonstrates that such an agenda actually impedes a creative approach to key issues such as trade, climate change and non-proliferation challenges, as well as Australia's participation in Asia-Pacific order-building. It then offers some suggestions for a more flexible posture that is not inconsistent with past Labor approaches, but which also better appreciates regional and global complexities.     

Invasion by invitation: the role of alliances in the Asia-Pacific

Alliances continue to occupy a prominent place in the Asia-Pacific's security architecture. For many regional states such as Australia and Japan, their respective alliances with the USA are the unchallenged foundations of their security. But when the rise of China is causing major change in the region, and when many countries are increasingly reliant on China economically, is the region's network of alliances any longer appropriate or useful? This article reviews alliances in theory and practice, and argues that, while alliances are unlikely to disappear, their utility is nothing like as clear-cut as many of their supporters would have one believe.