Exploring the Conditions for Cooperative Energy Governance: A Comparative Study of Two Asian Pipelines

A central but often unasked question in political and sociological scholarship concerns the conditions that precipitate cooperation on large-scale transnational energy projects, especially among “developing” and “emerging” economies. Using the example of two multi-billion dollar pipeline systems – the Trans-ASEAN Natural Gas Pipeline (TAGP) Network in Southeast Asia and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline in the Caspian Sea – this article explores the factors that result in successfully completed projects, and those that lead to conflict and contention. After drawing from extensive research interviews and field research, the article approaches politics and technology through the lens of science and technology studies. It relies on the interdisciplinary concepts of “relevant social group” and “technological frame” to identify coalitions of actors associated with each pipeline project. The paper then investigates the interests and motivations behind these groups to illuminate the challenges facing the TAGP and those that accelerated the completion of the BTC. The paper concludes by offering some thoughts on the diverse elements needed to incentivise cross-border energy infrastructure, and what these may mean for energy and public policy scholars.     

Disequilibrium in Development Finance: The Contested Politics of Institutional Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank Inspection Panel

This article examines the dynamic nature with which independent accountability mechanisms operate. Focusing on the World Bank, the authors argue that its Inspection Panel evolves according to internal and external pressures. In seeking to achieve equilibrium, and protect its authority and independence, the Panel has gone through several distinct phases: negotiation, emergence, protracted resistance, assertion of independence and authority, renewed tension, and contestation. The core novelty of the article is its application of concepts from outside the field of development studies — notably institutional accountability from the governance literature, and judicialization from the legal studies literature — to the topic of the Inspection Panel. Examining the Panel in this way demonstrates that accountability mechanisms represent a hybrid of transnational governance influenced by a range of actors including project‐affected peoples, national governments, managers and development donors. Accountability in development finance is about competing interests as well as competing conceptions and expectations of accountability. In such a complex and multi‐scalar system, the Panel is not only concerned with delivering well‐researched investigation reports; it is also an entity seeking to ensure its own survival, as well as an arbiter of its own brand of legitimacy and accountability.