Morphological Impacts and Implications of a Trial Release on the Wingecarribee River,New South Wales

A trial, monitored release on the Wingecarribee River over 27 days had a peak discharge below the Wingecarribee Dam of 1090 ML/d, which had a flow duration of 0.95 per cent. Morphological impacts on 29 km of channel below the dam included bank erosion, concentrated neck overflow, bed degradation and channel widening at recent cutoffs, sedimentation in weir pools and overbank flow, particularly at discharges greater than 800 ML/d. Prolonged operational releases at bankfull discharge (400–800 ML/d) will have the greatest morphologic impacts and should be avoided. Pulses which dissipate stream power over a broad, well-vegetated floodplain should be incorporated in the operational release policy, provided such pulses are phased to facilitate channel and vegetation recovery.     

Do We Really Understand Our Rivers? or Rivers in the Pooh - Semper in Excreta!

This address is concerned with the lack of detailed understanding we have of rivers. It is argued that to manage river systems for environ- mental and ecological sustainability, there must be understanding of riverine biophysical processes. These are explored through a consideration of: (1) channel airspace and water; (2) the perimeter conditions of the channel as the boundary between erosional channel and depositional floodplain, both of which occupy the valley-floor trough; (3) ecological components of channels and (4) the human components where human interactions with catchment environments have such impacts on the biophysical systems. Finally, the implications of these four components for understanding the systems for more sustainable management are discussed.     

Nixon,Kissinger and the rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

Few would have predicted in 1969 that the new Republican administration of Richard Nixon would initiate a rapprochement between the United States and communist China during his first term as president. That he succeeded in doing so was helped by the severity of the Sino‐Soviet dispute, which erupted into armed clashes in the spring and summer of 1969. By the end of 1970 China made it clear that it would not only be willing to receive a presidential envoy, but also the president himself. Two missions to Beijing by Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger—one secret in July 1971 and the other public in the following October—paved the way for a presidential visit in February 1972. The talks in July and October 1971 and February 1972 covered a whole range of issues including the war in Indochina, the potential threat from Japan and relations with the Soviet Union. The most dif cult problem, however, proved to be that of Taiwan, where the American‐backed Nationalist government not only laid claim to be the legitimate government of the whole of China, but occupied the Chinese seat in the United Nations. A modus vivendi was eventually reached in February 1972, helped perhaps by the United Nations General Assembly vote in October 1971 which unseated the Taiwan regime in favour of mainland China. The US negotiating position was not made any easier by the intense rivalry between Kissinger and the State Department and the latter's exclusion from much of the negotiation process led to a last‐minute crisis which threatened the success of the entire project. While neither the United States nor China achieved all that they had hoped, Nixon's visit to China had an enormous symbolic impact and contributed to a reconfiguration of the global balance of power.     

The United States and the Cyprus crisis of 1974

Based upon two recently published volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States series of declassified diplomatic documents for the period of the Nixon and Ford presidencies, this article focuses upon the crisis which erupted in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 at the time of the transition between the two administrations. A Greek-sponsored coup on the island led to a Turkish invasion and the threat of war between two of America's NATO allies and culminated in the collapse of the Greek military junta and the de facto partition of Cyprus. Emphasis is placed upon the role of Henry Kissinger and his advisers in their efforts to defuse the crisis, efforts which were only partially successful. The conspiracy theories which surround the episode are found wanting and the limitations of the Anglo–American 'special relationship' highlighted.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975, Part two: January 1972–January 1973

Although anticipated, the North Vietnamese ‘Easter offensive’ against South Vietnam in 1972 created problems for the United States. Having reached a rapprochement with Communist China, President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the attack could have serious repercussions for their attempt to balance it with détente with the Soviet Union, not to mention the US's credibility as a Great Power. They also feared it would damage Nixon's prospects for re‐election in November 1972. Despite opposition from his Defense Secretary, Nixon renewed the bombing of North Vietnam which had been stopped by President Johnson in 1968. This helped to bring the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and after complex negotiations, a draft peace agreement was ready for initialling in October 1972. However, President Thieu of South Vietnam saw significant drawbacks in the agreement and refused to go along with it. The North Vietnamese chose to have one more attempt to win on the battlefield and President Nixon, who had scaled down the bombing when peace seemed closer and won a landslide victory in the presidential election, launched another eleven days of concentrated bombing raids on North Vietnam at the turn of the year. This led to the final agreement initialled on 23 January 1973, which President Thieu reluctantly acceded to. Thieu's reservations were justified, but Nixon realized that, despite his electoral victory, he could not count on the continued support of Congress and the American people for the war. Far from bringing ‘peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’, the January agreement was a fig leaf to cover American withdrawal.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975. Part one: January 1969–January 1972

Some have suggested that Richard Nixon's narrow victory in the US presidential election of November 1968 was due to his persuading the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) to boycott the Paris peace talks for the settlement of the Vietnam War between the US government, that of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the representatives of the communist guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. This seems doubtful. The new president had abandoned the hawkish stance he had adopted when vice‐president in the Eisenhower administration and was anxious to bring the unpopular war to an end. The question was: how? The president, together with his influential National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, adopted a policy of ‘Vietnamization’, which involved the progressive scaling down of the US military presence and the handing over of responsibility for waging the war to the GVN. At the same time, the president recognized that too precipitate an American withdrawal and, above all, one which took place under the terms of an agreement which was too favourable to the communists, would have a deleterious effect upon its allies and its own position as a Great Power. In order to bring about a satisfactory agreement with the DRV, the US employed a twin strategy: secret talks between Kissinger and senior DRV representatives in Paris, coupled with veiled threats of an escalation of the war if the communists acted unreasonably and occasional displays of military strength, such as the incursion into Cambodia in 1970. Although it seemed, briefly, that there might be a breakthrough in Kissinger's secret negotiations with the DRV later in 1971, they broke down mainly as a result of the communists' insistence that the US in effect dismantle the South Vietnamese government for them. An angry Nixon secretly considered retaliation against the DRV to force it to modify its demands and publicly revealed the existence of the negotiations and much of their content to the American people in a speech on 25 January 1972. At the same time, however, he insisted that Vietnamization would continue.     

Lyndon Johnson's war? Part 2: from escalation to negotiation

IThis second article on the Johnson administration's policy towards the war in Vietnam, based on published American documents, covers the period from July 1965 to March 1968. Although it is now clear that the Communist forces in Vietnam encountered considerable difficulties as a result of the steadily growing commitment of US ground forces, the Americans encountered difficulties of their own: notably the problem of persuading their South Vietnamese ally to implement what they regarded as the necessary political and military policies; and the increasing criticism of the war at home. The bombing of North Vietnam was a key issue for the administration. While the president's military advisers were continually pressing for further escalation, most of the civilians were sceptical. The latter felt that the bombing was not achieving its principal objective of reducing the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, was unpopular at home and abroad and, if increased, posed serious risks of Chinese and Russian involvement. Although the bombing was temporarily halted or restricted more than once during this period in an attempt to facilitate a negotiated settlement, nothing was achieved. On 1 November 1967 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's growing disillusionment with the war prompted him to send a lengthy memorandum to President Johnson arguing for the cessation of the bombing of the North and the stabilization of the American effort in the South. Rejected at the time, this policy was partially implemented as a result of the Communist Tet offensive of February 1968, when countrywide attacks were beaten back after failing to trigger the expected popular uprising against the Americans and the South Vietnamese government, while at the same time producing a surge of hostility to the war in the United States. Three men‐McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and White House aid Harry McPherson‐were largely responsible for persuading President Johnson to accept the fact that the war could not continue on the same basis as before and that de‐escalation was a better option. The president rejected the military's request for a huge increase in the number of US troops and, on 31 March 1968, announced a halt to the bombing north of the 20 th parallel and called for immediate peace talks. He also surprised the nation and his advisers by declaring that he would not run for the presidency in the election due in November 1968, preferring to concentrate on the search for peace during the remainder of his period in office.     

Secular Regime Shifts,Global Warming and Sydney's Water Supply

Sydney's water crisis has been attributed to long-term drought, a population growing at >50 000 a year, the early impacts of global warming and the demands of a 4.2 million population leading a water-thirsty lifestyle. In this paper the drought is linked with a return to a drought-dominated flow regime in eastern New South Wales. This began in 1991 and is associated with a shift from flood to drought domination that occurs every 20 to 50 years. Its impacts will be further exaggerated by global warming. The reduction of runoff into Sydney's reservoirs is due primarily to regime shift, resulting in the diminution of inflows to about 25% of their levels in the 42 years before 1991. Possible ways of managing these dwindling water resources include building more reservoirs, exploiting largely unknown sources of groundwater, constructing a desalination plant, harvesting rainwater in the city, recycling used urban water and reducing individual water use. Despite arguments against the first three of these options, a desalination plant is currently under construction and investigations of deep groundwater proceed (shelved 18th June, 2008). Given that sources of water are distant and located in areas where rainfall reductions have been significant, greater efforts should be made to use water already in the city (rainfall and recycled water). Water restrictions and better domestic management of water are also areas where great savings can be and have been made.