Developing a framework of Holocene climatic change and landscape archaeology for the lower Gulf region, southeastern Arabia

Geomorphological and geoarchaeological studies from the lower Gulf region of southeastern Arabia are increasing our knowledge of hydrological, ecological, and aeolian changes during the Holocene. Preliminary analyses of sediment records from two palaeolakes in the United Arab Emirates are presented, highlighting the potential of these sediment sources for providing high-resolution decadal studies of climate change and landscape evolution over the past 10,000 years. In order to study the society-environment relationship in this marginal region, a framework of environmental change is being developed against which the archaeology of the region can be set.     

A geographical analysis of the sea‐salt industry of North‐East England

This paper traces the evolution of the environmental implications. Future prospects for tourism in Malta since 1955. Data derived from a questionnaire survey of tourists are used to demonstrate the problems of the industry: discussion focuses on its uneven impact on the Maltese islands, the over‐dependence on British visitors, the seasonality problem, the inadequacies of the infrastructure and the industry are briefly assessed along with marketing strategies.     

Frustrated Great Gamesmanship: Sir Garnet Wolseley's Plans for War against Russia, 1873–1880

Abstract

In three books published in 1940, 1956, and 1961, Arthur J. Marder established what became the orthodox view of the development of the British navy in the years leading up to the First World War.1 A.J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880–1965 (New York, 1940); idem,[Fear God and DreadNought: The] C[orrespondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord] F[isher of Kilverstone: II: Years of Power, 1904–14] (London, 1956); idem, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: I: The Road to War, 1904–14 (Oxford, 1961). Building upon the work of Sir Llewellyn Woodward, who argues that, from the outset of the twentieth century, British naval policy was framed as a response to the threat posed by the rising German naval power,2 E. L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy (London, 1934). Marder makes precise claims about the nature of the response. In particular, he states that, under the leadership of the first sea lord from 1904 to 1910, Admiral Sir John Fisher, the admiralty undertook two root-and-branch reforms. First, it redeployed Britain's fleets and squadrons, reducing the number of foreign stations, scrapping obsolescent vessels, and stationing the most powerful units of the fleet in European waters. Next, at Fisher's prompting, it triggered a naval revolution by ordering the building of a new type of warship, HMS Dreadnought, the world's first turbine-powered, all-big-gun battleship. In both cases, Marder is unambiguous about the motive: the redeployment adjusted Britain's force posture to ensure a preponderance of strength in the vicinity of the North Sea, the theatre in which the expected war with Germany would be fought. The new type of ship was necessary to help to modernize the navy's matériel in keeping with advances in gunnery, propulsion, and torpedoes. If not explicitly aimed at Germany, the new ship would ensure that the navy was better prepared for a war that Fisher perceived to be ‘inevitable’s.