Introduction: not a normal election: roots and consequences

The March 2018 Italian general elections can be described as a historic turning point, another watershed moment in the turbulent history of contemporary Italian politics. After a stormy and complex legislative term, characterized by a variety of institutional and political phenomena, Italy has faced one of the most important electoral challenges since the return of democracy in the mid-1940s. After examining the major political events that led to the latest general elections, this introductory article presents and analyses the rules, the actors and the outcomes of the electoral contest that has seen the victory of two anti-establishment parties: the Five Star Movement and the League. In the concluding section, the article discusses the potential tensions that may emerge from the clash between the populist attitude of the new governing parties and the constitutional constraints of a liberal democratic regime.     

The Italian political system after the 9 – 10 April 2006 elections

Abstract

All recent Italian elections have produced important electoral consequences. In this brief introduction, the author highlights some of the problems, difficulties and perspectives for the Italian political system following the electoral victory of the centre-left. More precisely, he suggests that there are two complex issues in need of being analyzed and politically tackled: the revisions to be introduced into the Italian Constitution and the transformation of some Italian parties and the reorganization of the party system. In conclusion, at least in this phase, the Italian political system is bound to remain in a situation that can still be defined as an ongoing political and institutional transition.     

The Democratic Party and the restructuring of the Italian party system

Abstract

Out of a quickly performed merger between the Left Democrats and the Daisy, a new party has made its appearance in Italy: the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico – PD). In the summer of 2007 three candidates, Walter Veltroni, Rosy Bindi and Enrico Letta campaigned in order to convince sympathizers and supporters of that, yet non-existing party, that they were worthy of the office of Secretary of the PD. The election of Veltroni contributed to the already existing tensions within the centre-left governmental coalition that led to the demise of Prodi's government and to early elections. In April 2008, though receiving 33 per cent of the vote, the Democratic Party suffered a serious defeat. This article explores the reasons of the defeat and analyses its consequences on the restructuring of the Italian party system and the future of the Italian political system. Unless the Democratic Party is capable of finding an adequate organizational model and of expanding its electoral support beyond the areas of the traditional entrenchment of the former Communist party, the centre-right seems destined to guide Italian politics for some time to come.     

Recursive Estimation of the Spatial Error Model

In this paper, we propose a recursive approach to estimate the spatial error model. We compare the suggested methodology with standard estimation procedures and we report a set of Monte Carlo experiments which show that the recursive approach substantially reduces the computational effort affecting the precision of the estimators within reasonable limits. The proposed technique can prove helpful when applied to real-time streams of geographical data that are becoming increasingly available in the big data era. Finally, we illustrate this methodology using a set of earthquake data.     

The direct election of mayors: an assessment of the institutional reform following the Italian municipal elections of 2001

On 13 May 2001, the same day as the general elections, municipal elections were held in more than 1,000 municipalities, including all the major Italian cities (Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin). Incumbents already re-elected once could not stand because of the two-term limit. This in many cases opened the way for a renewal of mayoralties. This article aims to provide a balanced assessment of the process of direct mayoral elections by using data relating to electoral behaviour, stability and mayoral recruitment inside the 103 Italian provincial capitals (the capoluoghi ) to complement an analysis of the reform of 1993. On the basis of the theoretical analysis and the empirical evidence provided, it is argued that the direct election of mayors, and more generally the neo-parliamentary system of government, represents an example of a successful institutional reform.     

The government,the opposition and the President of the Republic under Berlusconi

This article assesses the behaviour of three actors, the government, the opposition and the President of the Republic, in the first two years of Berlusconi's government. Though solidly controlled by Berlusconi, his government has already had to replace two important ministers and some under-secretaries and has often behaved like a traditional coalition government. Moreover, it has so far achieved virtually none of the promises made in the 'Contract with the Italians'. It is feebly challenged by a divided opposition, unorganized, leaderless, unable to create a shadow government and just waiting for Romano Prodi's return from Brussels. Precisely because of its weakness, the opposition has often tried to rely on the President of the Republic as a check on Berlusconi's exorbitant power. Indeed, Ciampi has intervened in a more or less controversial way in the drafting of some government bills and has sent a solemn message to parliament asking for a more impartial and pluralist information system; to no avail. However, Ciampi's role and behaviour suggest that the problem of the powers of the President of the Republic has not been solved. Berlusconi's own preference for a popularly elected president and his unsolved conflict of interests indicate that the political and institutional transition in Italy is not yet over.     

Italian politics: no improvement in sight

Abstract

The victory of the center left in the April 2006 elections was the product of a small numerical majority that has been translated into a slim parliamentary majority in the Senate. However, the difficulties of Prodi's government have deeper roots. This article explores the structural factors of Italy's never ending political and institutional transitions, both in the political and in the social sphere. Electoral and institutional reforms may help, but the crisis runs deeper because it also affects the authorities, their origin, their quality, their performance and the political community, its fragmentation and its anti-political beliefs.     

Reforming the Italian constitution

Abstract

The third parliamentary Bicameral Committee established to reform the Italian constitution conducted its business from January to June 1997. The results have been controversial and have attracted a great deal of criticism. The Committee's recommendations are subject to amendment by parliament and must then be approved (or rejected) in a general referendum. The Committee ended up recommending what is essentially a French‐style semi‐presidential system. It is accompanied by an electoral law that offers a premium of an additional 20 per cent of the seats to the majority, 55 per cent to be elected in simple majority electoral districts, and 25 per cent to be distributed nationally on a proportional basis. PDS leader Massimo D'Alema, chair of the Committee, has claimed victory since the Commitee produced a positive outcome, yet in fact he has certainly lost since he preferred a strong ‘premier’ model and a majority runoff electoral system. The Committee demonstrated that small parties, especially the former Christian Democrats, can exert influence over larger ones, that the parries retain firm control over the process of institutional reform, that the three major party leaders — D'Alema, Berlusconi and Fini — preferred their own reciprocal legitimization over the attainment of any major reform, and that Italy's political‐institutional transition is not yet over. Indeed, the proposed reforms are likely to prove neither sufficient nor adequate.