Reviews of books

Historical Archaeology -     

Reviews

DYNAMICS OF WORLD POLITICS: STUDIES IN THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. Linda B. Miller (ed.). Prentice‐Hall, 1968. Pp. viii + 294. $5.40.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY. Ruth B. Russell. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1968. Pp. ix + 510. $10.00 (U.S.).

THE POLITICS OF PEACE‐KEEPING. Alan James. Studies in International Security: 12. Chatto & Windus, London, for The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969. Pp. 452. £.3.3.0.

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION CENTER ON PEACE‐KEEPING OPERATIONS MONOGRAPHS NOS. 6–8. Paris, 1968. $1.00 each.

No. 6 CHARACTERISTICS AND SOME ASPECTS OF LAUNCHING U.N. PEACE‐KEEPING FORCES. Lieut.‐General P. S. Gyani. Pp. 13.

No. 7 PEACE‐KEEPING AND SELF‐DEFENCE. Dr Kjell Goldmann. Pp. 60.

No. 8 THE AUTHORIZATION OF PEACE‐KEEPING OPERATIONS IN TERMS OF THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT. Albert Legault. Pp. 62

CANADA AND THREE CRISES. Robert W. Reford. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968. Pp. xii + 246. $5.00 (Canadian).

SYSTEMS, STATES, DIPLOMACY AND RULES. J. W. Burton. Cambridge University Press, 1968. Pp. xii + 251. $7 (U.S.).

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION. BONN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. Karl Kaiser. Issued under the joint auspices of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, the Twentieth Century Fund's ‘Tocqueville Series’ and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, Oxford University Press, Oxford Paperbacks No. 159, 1968. Pp. x + 153. $2.00.

PEOPLE'S WAR. THE CONDITIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCES IN CHINA AND IN SOUTH‐EAST ASIA. J. L. S. Girling. London, Allen and Unwin, 1969. Pp. 244. $6.65.

ASIAN CONTRACT LAW. David Allan (General Editor). Melbourne University Press, 1969. Pp. xiii + 237. $9.60.

MODERN FEDERALISM. G. F. Sawer. The New Thinker's Library, No. 29. London, C. A. Watts & Co., 1969. Pp. 204. 15/‐ (U.K.).     

Could Privatization Increase the Efficiency of Tax Administration in Less-Developed Countries?

In spite of the fact that state tax collection systems in less-developed countries generally are characterized by high levels of tax evasion and official corruption, little experimentation with privatized tax collection has occurred in these countries. This is due in part to: (1) The fact that the literature on privatization has not focused on tax collection, and (2) the existence of prevalent misconceptions regarding the effects of privatized tax collection in earlier periods. This paper uses agency theory and privatization research to discover the conditions under which privatized tax collection may be an efficient alternative to state tax collection, and to show that these conditions are present in many less-developed countries.