Who killed nuclear enlightenment?

William Walker is right to link the international nuclear order to the international political order, and to assert that the attempt to construct a rational nuclear international order around the Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty is in a shambles. But he puts too much of the blame on the Bush administration (which he is right to criticize) and tends to neglect the fl awed character of the project itself (and the recent changes in the political international order which have an inevitable bearing on the nuclear one).     

CONCEPTS OF THE INNER CITY AND RECENT TRENDS IN CANADA

This essay evaluates the explanatory power of two current models - ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ - of the evolution of inner cities. This in done in the light of data on socioeconomic trends that affect residential areas in the cores of the nine major Canadian metropolitan regions. The centrifugal model focuses on the attraction of suburbs on central city residents; the centripetal concentrates on the lure of some inner-city neighbourhoods for certain middle- and upper-income households. While the Canadian trends support some propositions of the models, they seriously challenge others, us models seem unsuitable for explaining Canadian urban reality. They fail to account for the relative socioeconomic stability of core neighourboods in major Canadian cities and the dissociation between trends in their residents' incomes and in housing values. Cet article évalue le pouvoir d'explication démontré par les ébauches théoriques qui visent à faire comprendre l'évolution des quartiers situés à l'interieur des centres urbains. Cette évaluation se sert de données relatives aux tendances socio-économiques qui marquent les secteurs résidentiels situés au coeur des neuf plus grandes zones métropolitaines du Canada. Deux modèles dominent ce champ d'étude: il y a d'abord le modèle ‘centrifuge,’ qui postule une attraction des banlieues exercée sur les résidents de la ville centrale; puis le modèle ‘centripète,’ qui explique l'attrait qu'exercent ces quartiers sur certains manages a moyens et hauls revenus. Alors que les tendances observées dans les agglomérations canadiennes viennent donner du poids à certaines propositions de ces modèles, elles présentent également un défi de taille à certaines autres. Les difficultés ressenties dans l'application de ces deux modèles paraissent relever de l'inadaptation de modèles conçus aux Etats-Unis à la réalité urbaine canadienne. Ces modèles sont considérés particulièrement inaptes à expliquer la relative stabilité socio-économique des quartiers des grandes agglomérations canadiennes et à rendre compte d'un écart grandissant entre lesrevenus de leurs résidents et la valeur des unités de logement qui s'y trouvent.     

THE TEETH OF TIME: PIERRE HADOT ON MEANING AND MISUNDERSTANDING IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS1

The French philosopher and intellectual historian Pierre Hadot (1922–2010) is known primarily for his conception of philosophy as spiritual exercise, which was an essential reference for the later Foucault. An aspect of his work that has received less attention is a set of methodological reflections on intellectual history and on the relationship between philosophy and history. Hadot was trained initially as a philosopher and was interested in existentialism as well as in the convergence between philosophy and poetry. Yet he chose to become a historian of philosophy and produced extensive philological work on neo‐Platonism and ancient philosophy in general. He found a philosophical rationale for this shift in his encounter with Wittgenstein's philosophy in the mid‐1950s (Hadot was one of Wittgenstein's earliest French readers and interpreters). For Hadot, ancient philosophy must be understood as a series of language games, and each language game must be situated within the concrete conditions in which it happened. The reference to Wittgenstein therefore supports a strongly contextualist and historicist stance. It also supports its exact opposite: presentist appropriations of ancient texts are entirely legitimate, and they are the only way ancient philosophy can be existentially meaningful to us. Hadot addresses the contradiction by embracing it fully and claiming that his own practice aims at a coincidence of opposites (a concept borrowed from the Heraclitean tradition). For Hadot the fullest and truest way of doing philosophy is to be a philosopher and a historian at the same time.