Notes on contributors

Australian governments are facing some confusion about public sector accountability. This paper argues that the opaque nature of accountability which persists is the result of changes being wrought, separately and together, by a number of macro factors of which public sector reform and corruption inquiries are but two. This explanation is developed by an examination of some fifteen specific issues which are symptomatic of the lack of transparency in Australian public sector accountability, and simultaneously, contribute to it. The paper contends that clarity is likely to emerge only slowly as gaps and anomalies are recognised and gradually remedied. The paper seeks to contribute to the process by offering a definition of accountability and an outline of several different types of accountability frameworks now operating in Australian governments.     

The National Competition Policy: A Study of the Policy Process and Network

In his recent work on the Australian political system, Ian Marsh argues that interest groups and issues movements should be treated as 'potential partners and collaborators with government' (1995, p. 1). He suggests that the traditional two-party system with its inherent reliance on adversarial relations may need to mutate to cope with the demands which stakeholders are placing on the policy process and a changing political culture. This paper examines evidence that collaborative and cooperative modes of interaction are developing in Australia as a feature in the strategies used by both government and non-government players.     

Partnership Networks for Urban Development: How Structure is Shaped by Risk

In delivering public policy, governments worldwide increasingly partner with diverse sets of stakeholders. This spreads commercial risk, but particularly where agendas diverge, introduces new risks related to trust in relationships. The “risk hypothesis” distinguishes between networks for “cooperation” problems, where partners have high individual payoffs for uncooperative behaviors, and “coordination” problems, where partners subscribe to a common goal and uncooperative behaviors are less rewarding. We used mixed‐methods to study networks of local and state government, developers, and consultants that center on joint‐venture partnerships for developing new urban, residential projects. Statistical network methods showed that within the mix of partners involved in development projects, only state governments displayed structural patterns associated with solving “cooperation” problems (rather than coordination). In other words, the patterns of state government interactions showed they are most exposed to risky relationships. In contrast to the state governments’ apparent exposure to risk, qualitative data showed they are not only well trusted but also overall the partnership networks reported very low levels of conflict. By exploring the distribution of “cooperation” and “coordination,” we identified which stakeholders perceived most risk. In our case, how the state governments’ structure interactions in response to risky relationships leads to an overall network characterized by trust.