A Treaty too Far? Britain, France, and Concorde, 1961-1964

The 1964 Labour government inherited a substantial balance-of-paymentsdeficit. In an effort to deal with the attendant economic crisis,the government sought to cancel a number of costly, high-prestigeprojects, including the Franco-British supersonic airliner Concorde.When the possible ramifications of this were considered, however,it was discovered that the agreement covering the aircraft wasnot commercial but carried the full force of an internationaltreaty. The clear implication of this was that a withdrawingparty could be subject to heavy financial penalties. Cancellation,therefore, it was argued, was likely to cost even more thancontinuing with the project would. The question remains as tohow such a remarkable situation had come about. This articleanalyses the negotiations between Britain and France concerningConcorde, particularly in the early 1960s, which eventuallyled to the signing of the treaty in 1962. It examines the political,technological, and economic imperatives which underpinned thenegotiations and the relationships between the two governmentsand their respective aviation industries. It also considersthe motives of both the British and French governments in theprocess, and concludes that in each case that the technologicaland political motives overrode economic considerations.