French public attitudes towards the prospect of war in 1938 1939: 'pacifism' or 'war anxiety'?

This article challenges the received wisdom that French publicopinion was infused with pacifist sentiment during the 1930sand that this sentiment in turn contributed to the French defeatof 1940. It will suggest that French public attitudes towardsthe prospect of war can be better defined as ‘war anxiety’rather than the value-laden term ‘pacifism’. Takingas a test case the period between the Munich Agreement of September1938 and the outbreak of the Second World War less than a yearlater, the article will tease out the necessary distinctionbetween ‘pacifism’ and war anxiety. By employinga notion of ‘representations’ of public opinion,it will be shown how French opinion was demonstrably less pacifistthan many existing analyses assume. Instead, it will be contendedthat the public's anxieties with regard to a future war manifestedthemselves in a variety of ways, of which pacifism was merelyone example. Indeed, war anxiety increasingly demanded thatFrance prepare for an inevitable conflict, in stark contrastto simply retreating into a defeatist mindset. War anxiety wasfar from being a contributing factor in the defeat of 1940.     

Public opinion,the press and the failed Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations of 1939

For nearly 80 years, historians have debated whether the western powers or the USSR should be blamed for the failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations in 1939. This rather tired debate features here, but only in the background. Instead, these negotiations provide a case study for exploring the interface between the press, public opinion, and foreign policymaking, identifying an example of how policymakers’ perceptions of popular opinion wielded a tangible impact on diplomacy. The article will show that, from late April through to early June 1939, British and French public opinion, as mediated by the press, demanded a ‘Grand Alliance’. The popular pressure needed to facilitate a Soviet alliance was in place, and, combined with broader diplomatic and strategic imperatives, nearly delivered one. Perceptions of public opinion also help explain why this alliance remained elusive. Emboldened by their own readings of western newspapers, the USSR increased their demands, confident that domestic pressures would compel London and Paris to yield. But this was a fatal miscalculation. From mid-June, Western opinion turned against Moscow, and familiar anti-Soviet tropes resurfaced. By charting this evolution in public sentiment, this article provides a fresh perspective on the factors contributing to the failure of these negotiations.