James Buchanan's normative theory of the state

This paper examines James Buchanan's normative theory of the state and in particular his attempt to establish a legitimating linkage between the individual and the state. It begins by outlining Buchanan's consent‐based theory of the state and the distinction he draws between the explanatory and justificatory roles of his theory. It proceeds to examine the role of his conceptual contract as a justificatory argument for existing and proposed political institutions. It finds that while the conceptual contract may provide an account of the contingent rationality of the state, it fails to have normative significance in terms of Buchanan's value individualism and subjectivism. Buchanan has also failed to address some of the problems associated with securing and enforcing contractual agreement. These conclusions point to wider problems with rational choice theories of the emergence of the state.     

ZONE PRICING*

ABSTRACT. Our purpose is to study a spatial price policy often encountered in the real world, known as zone pricing. This price policy consists in determining simultaneously several delivered prices together with the geographical zones in which they apply. It is shown that zone pricing approximates perfect spatial price discrimination and that the firm's profit increases with the number of zones. Furthermore, the number of markets supplied by the firm rises with the number of zones. Finally, zone pricing is compared to other standard spatial price policies and possible extensions are discussed.