UNRAVELLING THE POPULATION TURNAROUND IN RURAL CANADA

This paper attempts to unravel the rural population turnaround in Canada through a disaggregation and analysis of rural growth rates by (1) two decades, 1961–71 and 1971–81, (2) the farm and non-farm components of rural population, (3) provincially based regions, and (4) area types based on proximity to urban centres. Following a discussion of the various definitional and boundary-matching issues arising from the use of the Census of Canada, results are presented in tabular and map form. Although rural growth rates did in all likelihood exceed urban rates in the 1970s, the extent of this turnaround is undoubtedly exaggerated in the census data, primarily because of definitional and reclassification effects. Moreover, setting aside data-related anomalies, there is strong evidence that much of this rural population growth was in fact ‘spillover’ from urban centres. Cet essai traite du virage pris par la population rurale au Canada au moyen d'une décomposition et d'une analyse des taux de croissance rurale où interviennent(1) les deux décennies 1961–71 et 197 1–81, (2) les com-posantes agricoles et non-agricoles de la population rurale, (3) les régions définies sur une base provinciale, et (4) les types de zones établies à partir de la proximité par rapport aux centres urbains. Les problèmes de définition et de démarcation d'aires comparables soulevés par I'utilisation des données du Recensement du Canada sont abordés en premier lieu. Puis, les résultats sont présentés sous forme de cartes et de tableaux. Bien que les taux de croissance rurale aient, selon toute vraisemblance, dépassé les taux urbains dans les années 70, I'ampleur de ce virage réulte sans doute d'exagérations dans les données du recensement, prin-cipalement attribuables aux effets de délimitation et de reclassification. De plus, mises à part les anomalies relatives aux données, il y ade bonnes raisons de croire que cette croissance de la population rurale provient en grande partie du décongestionnement des centres urbains.     

PITS, PRECONCEPTIONS and PROPITIATION IN the BRITISH IRON AGE

Summary: Large pits have long been known to be a characteristic of the British Iron Age. Originally they were thought to be habitations but since the 1930s they have been assumed to have served as grain silos. This paper reviews our changing conceptions and then considers a range of new data for special burials within the pits. A model is developed which sees the storage of seed grain in pits as a deliberate act designed to place the grain in the protection of the chthonic deities. the chronological and spatial implications of pit storage in Britain are briefly considered.     

AFTER HILLFORTS

Summary. Hillforts constitute a dominant element in the settlement pattern of Iron Age Wessex. This paper examines the nature of hillforts in the light of recent excavations, and seeks to demonstrate how, over the Early and Middle Iron Age (c. 600–100 BC), these focal places acquired a range of functions central to the articulation of the socio-economic system. At developed hillforts, cycles of exchange were orchestrated by the elite. The demise of hillforts about 100 BC is considered in the light of indigenous developments and external factors. Explanations are sought for this transformation from which the very-different Late Iron Age system emerged.     

PREFERENCES FOR RURAL LAND SEVERANCE POLICIES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The increasing demand for residential land in rural Ontario has generated a widespread interest in land severance activity and policy. This paper examines resident preferences for alternative land severance policies using a paired comparison experiment. The analysis identifies those severance policies most preferred by township residents and characterizes groups of residents with similar preferences. Differences in policy preferences are more closely associated with residents' property size, income, and length of residence in the area than with whether they are farmers, countryside non-farmers, or village dwellers.
La demande croissante d' espace résidentiel en Ontario rural est responsable pour l' intérêt grandissant envers le phénomène de détachement en parcelles et les politiques qui s'y rattachent. Le présent article examine les préférences des résidents d' un township ontarien envers différentes politiques de parcellement au moyen d' une méthode comparative. L' analyse des résultats identifie quelles sont les politiques de parcellement préférées et détermine des groupes de résidents qui ont des préférences semblables. Les différences au niveau des préférences des résidents en matière de politiques de parcellement sont plus particulièrement reliées à la grandeur des propriétés, le revenu, et la durée de résidence dans la région plutôt qu'avec leur statut résidentiel tel qu'exploitant agricole, habitant rural non-fermier, ou villageois.     

STABLE ISOTOPE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE DANEBURY HILLFORT PIT BURIALS

Carbon and nitrogen isotope analyses were performed on human and animal bones recovered from pits within Danebury Iron Age hillfort. All results are within the range expected for European Holocene specimens and are similar to those from other Iron Age sites in central southern Britain. Our results indicate that the human diet included a significant amount of animal protein (meat and/or dairy products) consumed on a regular basis, but do not preclude a diet based heavily on cereal consumption. In comparison with the extensive heterogeneity visible in the animal isotope values, the homogeneity of the human values is rather striking. This may be a reflection of the much slower turnover rate of adult human collagen and may also indicate that the humans consumed a much greater variety of food than the fauna (thus averaging many isotopic sources). This is consistent with the role of hillforts as central places and locations for food distribution and exchange.     

Capitalism and the emergent world order

The two‐centuries‐old hegemony of the West is coming to an end. The ‘revolutions of modernity’ that fuelled the rise of the West are now accessible to all states. As a consequence, the power gap that developed during the nineteenth century and which served as the foundation for a core–periphery international order is closing. The result is a shift from a world of ‘centred globalism’ to one of ‘decentred globalism’. At the same time, as power is becoming more diffuse, the degree of ideological difference among the leading powers is shrinking. Indeed, because all Great Powers in the contemporary world are in some form capitalist, the ideological bandwidth of the emerging international order is narrower than it has been for a century. The question is whether this relative ideological homogeneity will generate geo‐economic or geopolitical competition among the four main modes of capitalist governance: liberal democratic, social democratic, competitive authoritarian and state bureaucratic. This article assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these four modes of capitalist governance, and probes the main contours of inter‐capitalist competition. Will the political differences between democratic and authoritarian capitalists override their shared interests or be mediated by them? Will there be conflicting capitalisms as there were in the early part of the twentieth century? Or will the contemporary world see the development of some kind of concert of capitalist powers? A world of politically differentiated capitalisms is likely to be with us for some time. As such, a central task facing policy‐makers is to ensure that geo‐economic competition takes place without generating geopolitical conflict.     

Democracy and Disenchantment

The victory of democracy in its ideological battle with communism has coincided with widespread voter disaffection in established democracies and with the rapid emergence of disillusion in recently 'democratised' societies. These developments raise at least two more general problems concerning the democratic dream of a self-governing community. First, there is the problem of democratic deficit: the fact that democratic arrangements are invariably constrained by arrangements of a non-democratic kind. Second, there is the problem of corruption. While such problems arise for any form of politics they have a particular significance for regimes which claim to be democratic. Following the recent victories of democracy in much of the world, it is now more difficult to appeal to the remedy of a more inclusive political system. Those of you who come in with me now will get big pieces of pie. Those who come in with me later will get smaller pieces of pie. Those who dont come in at all will get-Good Government.1 (attributed to Huey Long, Governor of Louisiana)