All the way? The evolution of German military power

German strategic decision‐makers have to reconsider their approach to the use of force. In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr is faced with the challenge of a growing insurgency. This situation requires a willingness to provide combat forces for the NATO‐led International Security Assistance Force. Hence, the conviction in German domestic politics that the Bundeswehr should only be employed for the purposes of stabilization and reconstruction is increasingly challenged by a changing operational reality in Afghanistan, and allies’ reluctance to continue to accept German policy. In essence, the issue is about German participation in counterinsurgency operations. To continue current policy undermines Germany's military credibility among allied partners and restrains Germany's ability to utilize fully military power as an instrument of policy. This article argues that while military force in recent years has become an integral part of German foreign policy to pursue national interests, political decision‐makers in Berlin and the broader German public will still have to come to terms with the reality of a new security environment in Afghanistan. For the German government the ‘small war’ in northern Afghanistan is a very politically exhausting undertaking. Both politically and militarily Germany seems ill‐prepared to sustain such an operation. Its political and strategic culture still promotes an aversion to involvement in war‐fighting. In addition, the government and the Bundeswehr lack vital strategy‐making capabilities. Still, there are indicators that the changing operational reality in Afghanistan might lead to a significant evolution of the German approach to the use of force.     

Does a multi‐tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change

This year NATO will celebrate its 60th anniversary. So far the world's most powerful military alliance has been a remarkable success story. However, as the first decade of the new century draws to a close there appears to be a widening strategic rift among the allies. ‘Two‐tier NATO’ is by now an established piece of shorthand in international strategic debate to indicate an ‘alliance à la carte’ divided into two or more factions of member states with divergent interests. Evidently, the alliance increasingly struggles to reach consensus on a whole range of strategic issues. So is NATO on a path to disintegration and, ultimately, to failure? This article argues that the organization has developed from a fixed ‘two‐tier’ into a rather fluid ‘multi‐tier’ alliance. On many issues the alliance is in fact divided into several different camps that are pushing in different directions. Thus, allies can be grouped into one of three tiers: a ‘reformist’, a ‘status‐quo’ and a ‘reversal’‐oriented one. While the evolution of such a multi‐tier alliance will not inevitably result in NATO's demise unmanaged, this manifestation of camps will continuously disrupt the organization's strategic agility. The article finds that if NATO is to maintain strategic vitality, it needs to develop new institutional mechanisms and establish a consensus on its strategic posture in the changing international order and to make ‘variable geometry’ work.     

The international monetary system: diffusion and ambiguity

This article examines the dynamics of power and rule‐setting in the international monetary system. It begins with a brief discussion of the meaning of power in international monetary relations, distinguishing between two critical dimensions of monetary power: autonomy and influence. Major developments have led to a greater diffusion of power in monetary affairs, both among states and between states and societal actors. But the diffusion of power has mainly been in the dimension of autonomy, rather than influence, meaning that leadership in the system has been dispersed rather than relocated—a pattern of change in the geopolitics of finance that might be called leaierless diffusion. The pattern of leaderless diffusion, in turn, is generating greater ambiguity in prevailing governance structures. Rule‐setting in monetary relations increasingly relies not on negotiations among a few powerful states but, rather, on the evolution of custom and usage among growing numbers of autonomous agents. Impacts on governance structures can be seen on two levels: the individual state and the global system. At the state level, the dispersion of power compels governments to rethink their commitment to national monetary sovereignty. At the systemic level, it compounds the difficulties of bargaining on monetary issues. More and more, formal rules are being superseded by informal norms that emerge, like common law, not from legislation or statutes but from everyday conduct and social convention.     

Printing Oliver Cromwell's Speeches: The Making of a Split Personality

Oliver Cromwell's speeches are used frequently by historians of the interregnum, yet all current printed editions of the speeches have significant problems. They fail to consider the variations in different versions of each of the speeches and they consequently ignore the complexity of the sources. Each speech exists in more than one early version and each source has a provenance which is often difficult to determine. Additionally, no two versions of the same speech are identical, as each version has its own unique variations. These small variations in the wording have the potential to alter the meaning. This article looks in detail at these issues in relation to Cromwell's kingship speeches of 1657; some versions portray him as a conservative gentleman who ruled similarly to a king, while others present him as a religious fanatic who sympathised with the religious sects. Such differences can often be attributed to the personal beliefs of particular authors. As a result of the variations in the sources, the historian's interpretation of Cromwell is necessarily affected by which source he or she uses for Cromwell's speeches. Cromwell's speeches are an important source, but if historians hope to make use of them, they must acknowledge the complexities of the original sources.     

PRE-COLUMBIAN METALLURGY: TECHNOLOGY,MANUFACTURE, AND MICROPROBE ANALYSES OF COPPER BELLS FROM THE GREATER SOUTHWEST*

Twenty-four cast copper crotals (commonly called bells), one 'spilled bell’, one tinkler bell and a number of minerals from locations throughout the Greater Southwest were analysed for their elemental composition by a PIXE nuclear microprobe at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, USA. Sixteen bells contained minor and trace amounts of silver, antimony, arsenic, lead, and in some cases tin, strontium, and selenium. Nine bells contained little or no detectable amounts of these elements. This suggests that several workshops throughout the Greater Southwest and Mexico might have manufactured these bells.