New Interpretations of Early Modern England

Reformation and Revolution 1558–1660. By Robert Ashton. (The Paladin History of England.) London: Granada. 1984. xx, 503 pp. £18.00.
Authority and Conflict: England 1603–1658. By Derek Hirst. (The New History of England, Volume 4.) London: Edward Arnold. 1986. viii, 390 pp. Hardback £27.50; paperback £9.95.
The Emergence of a Nation State: The Commonwealth of England 1529–1660. By Alan G.R. Smith. (Foundations of Modern Britain.) London: Longman. 1984. xiii, 479 pp. Paperback £8.50.     

FELLOW CITIZENS AND IMPERIAL SUBJECTS: CONQUEST AND SOVEREIGNTY IN EUROPE'S OVERSEAS EMPIRES

This article traces the association between the European overseas empires and the concept of sovereignty, arguing that, ever since the days of Cicero—if not earlier—Europeans had clung to the idea that there was a close association between a people and the territory it happened to occupy. This made it necessary to think of an “empire” as a unity—an “immense body,” to use Tacitus's phrase—that would embrace all its subjects under a single sovereign. By the end of the eighteenth century it had become possible, in this way, to speak of “empires of liberty” that would operate for the ultimate benefit of all their “citizens,” freeing them from previous tyrannical rulers and bringing them under the protection of more benign regimes. In such empires sovereignty could only ever be, as it had become in Europe, undivided. The collapse of Europe's “first” empires in the Americas, however, was followed rapidly by Napoleon's attempt to create a new kind of Empire in Europe. The ultimate, and costly, failure of this project led many, Benjamin Constant among them, to believe that the age of empires was now over and had been replaced by the age of commerce. But what in fact succeeded Napoleon was the modern European state system, which attempted not to replace empire by trade, as Constant had hoped, but to create a new kind of empire, one that sought to minimize domination and settlement, and to make a sharp distinction between imperial ruler and imperial subject. In this kind of empire, sovereignty could only be “divided.” Various kinds of divided rule were thus devised in the nineteenth century. Far, however, from being an improvement on the past, this ultimately resulted in—or at least contributed greatly to—the emergence of the largely fictional and inevitably unstable societies that after the final collapse of the European empires became the new states of the “developing world.”     

SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Contained mostly within one brief chapter of his The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer's philosophy of history has long been considered either hostile or irrelevant to nineteenth‐century philosophy of history. This article argues that, on the contrary, Schopenhauer maintained what would become a widely accepted criticism of the methodological identity of historiography and the natural sciences. His criticism of Hegel's teleological historiography was more philosophically rigorous than is commonly acknowledged. And his proposal of a “genuine” historiography along the model of art became a major influence on the historiography of Burckhardt, Emerson, and Nietzsche. This article accordingly aims to restore Schopenhauer to the conversation of nineteenth‐century philosophy of history.     

How many Gs are there in ‘global governance’ after the crisis? The perspectives of the ‘marginal majority’ of the world's states

The G20 summit has recently emerged as the dominant agency of global governance. It claims that its economic weight and broad membership give it a high degree of legitimacy and influence over the management of the global economy and financial system. But the G20 still excludes from membership some 150 other countries, all of which have interests at stake within the contours of contemporary global governance. In the financial arena these excluded countries contributed significantly to the alternative agenda for dealing with the global financial crisis proposed by the United Nations conference that met in June 2009. In the trade arena they engaged extensively in a variety of coalitions within the World Trade Organization during the so‐called Doha Round and played a part in preventing a deal emerging that was unsatisfactory from their perspective. Questions are raised about the legitimacy of the G20 by the active presence of so many other country voices outside its remit and it can be expected that the excluded ‘G150’ will increasingly explore different ways to engage with the members of the G20 over the next few years.