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951.
CLYVE JONES 《Parliamentary History》2011,30(3):414-427
By the late 17th century it had been largely established as a part of the ‘constitution’ that the house of commons played the leading role in proposing financial legislation and that the house of lords by convention could not amend such bills, but only accept or reject them. From the late 1670s, the practice developed of the Commons ‘tacking’ money or supply bills to other, controversial legislation, to try to ensure that the Lords would pass the whole bill. This underhand proceeding sometimes worked, but at other times the Lords amended the non‐monetary parts in such a way as to render the bill unacceptable to the Commons, but such actions sometimes resulted in the loss of financial legislation necessary for the king's government. From the 1690s, the whig‐dominated Lords attempted to ‘outlaw’ tory‐backed tacking by protesting at its unparliamentary nature. This culminated in a formal declaration by the House in 1702 of the unconstitutionality of tacking. The last major attempt at tacking took place over the Occasional Conformity Bills of 1702–4. The final bill of 1704 essentially failed, however, because of the party strengths in the Lords when the tories were outvoted by the whigs. The Lords, however, continued to condemn tacking until at least 1709. 相似文献
952.
953.
CHAN Ying-Kit 《Journal of Modern Chinese History》2020,14(1):66-85
ABSTRACT This article establishes a link between Qing-dynasty official Deng Huaxi (1826–1916) and comprador Zheng Guanying’s (1842–1922) political treatise Shengshi weiyan (Warnings to a Prosperous Age). It suggests that Deng Huaxi’s reforms as provincial governor of Anhui and Guizhou were inspired by Shengshi weiyan. The work did not come to be applied in the 1898 Hundred Days Reform but saw at least partial success in the modernization of the two landlocked provinces. This interpretation supports the scholarly consensus that the geographical extent of the late Qing self-strengthening reforms was contingent on various persons and places and being far more focused on coastal provinces. It also suggests that the nature, pace, and scope of reforms lay at the discretion of governors-general and provincial governors, many of whom possessed few resources with which to implement them fully. The story of Deng Huaxi challenges a common idea about late Qing China: that meaningful reforms relied only on men with deep political connections to the central court and access to private fortunes. It also shows how effectively messages by Zheng Guanying and other theorists could reach local administrators and leaders and how, in provinces not so dominated by conservative literati elites, Western-style reforms garnered much appeal without too much resistance. 相似文献
954.
Petro Kuzyk 《Eurasian Geography and Economics》2019,60(6):709-735
ABSTRACTThis article addresses the question of Ukraine’s societal polarization along the East-West line and the state of cohesion and endurance of its political community. In both political and academic discourses, Ukraine is often characterized as a country split between Western and Eastern regional and societal parts belonging to some wider geopolitical and cultural entities. Moreover, the recent upheavals in the life of the country – Euromaidan Revolution, illegal annexation of Crimea and Russian-Ukrainian war in Donbas – have actualized the allegations about Ukraine as a feeble state structure on the brink of disintegration and collapse. The findings in this study challenge both of these claims and it is argued that Ukraine is not a deeply divided or failed state. In practice, the East-West political polarization line is not clearly defined, but to the extent that it does surface in the political and electoral contests, this line has been moving from west to east since the early 1990s. The shifting of the polarization line implies that political and cultural identities in Ukraine are not fixed and, at the same time, reflects a strengthening cohesion of Ukraine’s political and cultural space. These findings are confirmed by the improved and ever-increasing convergence of Ukrainian society following the Euromaidan and Russian military aggression. 相似文献