A Christian Islamist?

Abstract

In this review, the author discusses Volf’s paradigm from an Islamic perspective, and compares and contrasts some of Volf’s assertions with those of his avowed counterpart: the Muslim fundamentalist Syed Qutb. Some interesting questions are raised, and the differences between these two paradigms, it is claimed, is not as great as what might initially appear.     

Responsibility,Humility, and Intervention

Abstract

This paper proposes an analysis of The Responsibility to Protect that is rooted in the Christian realism of Reinhold Niebuhr. R2P rests on three central claims: sovereignty ought to be understood in terms of responsibility rather than control, the just cause criterion for war should include humanitarian protection, and rightful authority ought to be relocated to multilateral institutions. In turn, Niebuhr’s Christian realism proposes a dialectic of responsibility and humility that shapes our understanding of justice and coercion. While examining R2P through a Niebuhrian lens shows some compatibility between the two moral frameworks, it also reveals the insufficient understanding of humility with respect to human motivations and limitations that underlies R2P’s criteria.     

Law,Principle, and the Theologico-Political History of Sovereignty

Abstract

This article takes it cue from the debate between Carl Schmitt and Erik Peterson regarding the possibility of political theology within Christianity, and in response, offers a conceptual-historical portrait of sovereignty and its juridical dimensions. Beginning with the introduction of Roman law into the medieval Church, the article traces the logic of “legal principle” as the basis of sovereign decision and how the form of legal distinctions adopted into canon law translate the Romanitas of law into the theory of papal sovereignty. By the Romanitas of law, that is to say the principle of sovereignty in law. The article then seeks to describe the conceptual translations of Roman politics and Stoic metaphysics into theological form and the logic of this translation into medieval natural law. The article concludes by evaluating how the civic theology of Rome is conceptually inherited by the politics and legal framework of sovereignty and returns to Peterson’s critique of Schmitt, arguing that political theology can be understood as a dynamic where politics is theologized, assuming that in the history of religion, theology and politics are never fully distinct to begin with.     

The return of Xinjiang to Chinese central control during the late period of the Sino–Japanese War: a reappraisal based on Chiang Kai-shek's Diary

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, while considering taking back the Japanese-occupied areas, the Nationalist government also started to think of recovering the frontier regions, which had been somewhat out of China's control under the influence of a major ally of China, the USSR. For a long time, Xinjiang had a very close relationship with the Soviet Union under the rule of Sheng Shicai, and the central government of China had little direct control. In April of 1942, Sheng Shicai, suspicious of a Soviet conspiracy to overthrow his rule, conducted mass arrests in Xinjiang, causing a sudden deterioration in the relationship between Xinjiang and the Soviets. At first, the Soviet Union attempted to intimidate Sheng in order to prevent him from turning to the central government, but failed. Paying no heed to the alienation policy of the Soviets, the Nationalist government soon decided to buttress Sheng in an effort to place Xinjiang under centralized control. The Nationalist government first set out to take back the diplomacy of Xinjiang, followed by expropriation of formerly Soviet-controlled enterprises and forced removal of Soviet military advisors, experts, technicians and army personnel from Xinjiang. In the meantime, a large number of party, government, economic, cultural and educational personnel were dispatched by the central government to Xinjiang to infiltrate various sectors. With the weakening of his own power and increasing conflicts with the central government, Sheng Shicai planned another turn of events. By executing a new round-up, this time to cleanse Xinjiang of the central government's forces, Sheng re-oriented his regime towards the Soviet Union. Yet his gesture was turned down by the USSR because of his loss of credibility. Well prepared militarily, the Nationalist government eventually forced Sheng Shicai to leave Xinjiang, which then was almost fully restored to the authority of the central government.     

THE THERAPEUTIC STATE

State subsidy for the arts in Britain has been determined by a variety of political and social factors over the last two hundred years. This article examines the recent emergence of a therapeutic ethos that has come to shape arts policy in the United Kingdom. It begins with a survey of existing literature describing a shift in Britain’s arts policy since the 1970s. It examines the limitations of existing explanations and suggests another explanatory factor – the growing valorisation of the arts as a therapeutic tool to address social problems. This can be seen in two historically convergent trends: the challenge to cultural authority through the emergence of a therapeutic understanding of creativity, and the reorientation of political activism around issues of culture and wellbeing. Finally, the article considers how and why these ideas became institutionalised in Britain’s main arts policy body – the Arts Council.     

PUBLIC‐PRIVATE SUPPORT OF THE ARTS AND GERMAN CULTURAL POLICY

This paper provides a historical context for thinking about Germany’s recent embrace of sponsorship and private donations as a means of supporting education and the arts. The paper notes that the chief architect of a new national cultural policy, Michael Naumann, has justified a turn to public‐private collaborative arts funding with the argument that a market‐driven model of private responsibility for the arts stimulates greater citizen involvement in civic life and thus greater democracy. Yet Naumann has not reconciled this argument with Germany’s own history, in particular the fact that Germany’s Golden Age of private support of the arts coincided with the authoritarian German Empire (1871–1918). My analysis of this historical constellation, presented as a case study of one of Germany’s most important museum directors, Wilhelm Bode (1845–1929), argues that private support of the arts formed part of a larger strategy designed to wrest control of arts institutions away from traditional elites. My essay seeks to show that the rise of more responsive public forums was intended to make the fruits of German imperialism and economic domination available to more Germans, particularly middle class Germans. On this basis, the essay suggests two things. First, German imperialist society was less hierarchical and more broadly participatory than is often assumed, complicating its ability to figure as a negative foil today. Second, the harnessing of market forces to German culture was expected to deepen popular appreciation for chauvinistic conceptions of German nationalism that today seem to conflict with what German democracy might ideally be. With these points in mind, I contend not that sponsorship and private donations are incapable of promoting greater public involvement in the arts. Rather, the private sector might yield more democratic outcomes when publicly funded democratic institutions retain a strong voice in the direction of culture.     

The role of museums of contemporary art in the re‐telling of historical accounts in Lithuania and Latvia

Museums of History and Art provide accounts of the past and the transition of nations into their current situation. They follow a certain line of interpretation of past events which reflect the dominant belief system in a nation. These narratives told in this process leave room for interpretation. Which particular string of the available narratives is followed while neglecting the others, and is influenced by the current self‐understanding of a nation and its political considerations. Latvia and Lithuania, two Baltic Nations, were planning to set up museums of contemporary art in 2009 and in 2011, respectively. Due to the financial crisis at this time, however, both projects have been put on hold. Based on interviews with key personnel and experts, the paper shows how the museums in both countries interpret their Soviet past and align it with the new European master narratives.     

A centralised market orientation: the implicit determinants of Finnish cultural policy in 1990–2010

This article examines the reactions of Finnish cultural policy to the neoliberal turn in its societal environment. The analysis of cultural policy documents in 1990–2010 concentrates on three particular elements of societal change: the reforms in public management, the reorientations in international relations and the paradigm of immaterial production. It is argued here that besides the mythical democratic pluralism of the Nordic welfare states, cultural policy treats newcomers to the political arena selectively. Consequently, the system, constructed originally for protecting free artistic expression and equal distribution of cultural possibilities, has been in the front line of political market orientation in Finland. The orientation is modelled rhetorically after the ideas of cultural pluralism and economic efficiency; in practice, the fight has been a technocratic one between different notions of governmental responsibilities. This mechanism stresses formal procedures at the expense of ad hoc negotiations, leading to a centralised market orientation.     

The Threefold Logic of Papua‐Melanesia: Constitution‐writing in the Margins of the Indonesian Nation‐State

Clashes over the status of West Papua and the political future of the territory proliferated markedly following the end of Indonesia's New Order regime in 1998. Amid a wide variety of demands for justice and independence, and a series of demonstrations, mass gatherings and prayers, only a few Papuans mused on how Papua could become a state and what would constitute its nature as being distinctly Papuan and/or Melanesian. One exception is the work put into the Constitution for West Papua entitled Basic Guidelines, State of West Papua, a document edited by Don A.L. Flassy, a bureaucrat, writer and thinker, with a preface by late Theys H. Eluay, then chairman of the Papuan Council. In this article I analyse this Constitution to show how a combination of Christianity and local customs, and a mimicry of elements of Indonesian nation building and symbols of the Indonesian nation‐state are reshaped to oppose Indonesian nation‐building agendas. The Constitution shows that when Papuans imagine an independent state, forms of vernacular legality play a central role. ‘The state’ has journeyed to Papua and encouraged faith in ‘the law,’ and Basic Guidelines is partly the effect of this growing vernacular legality. My analysis shows that it is essential to see how legal mobilisations and imaginations of the state articulate with other normative systems and practices – in particular Christianity and custom (adat) – and how they mutually allow for and invite strategies.     

Resistance,Symbolism and the Language of Stateness in Timor‐Leste

On gaining independence in 2002 after a protracted struggle against Indonesian occupation, the sovereign Timor‐Leste state began to assert its sovereignty in a range of discursive and expressive media. These assertions developed a distinct ‘language of stateness’ that is the focus of this article. This East Timorese expression of state sovereignty draws heavily on the legacy of the Timorese resistance struggle and on a variety of other sources of symbolic power such as flags, buildings, logos, and uniforms. Yet these efforts have been contested by a range of non‐state actors in Timor‐Leste and the shape that this language of stateness has taken now evokes complaints from martial arts groups (MAGs), ritual arts groups (RAGs), and veterans' organisations that seek to ‘become like the state’ themselves, and who also employ a ‘national language of stateness’ in the form of flags, graffiti, and official buildings. While not challenging the idea of an independent East Timorese state per se, these groups question the prerogative of the state to use and define the language of stateness. In this article I explore the way the state and its challengers use ‘languages of stateness’ and how this shapes their ambivalent stance vis‐à‐vis each other, with both sides often drawing upon a discourse of the fulfilment of the millenarian promises that have for a long time been tied to the achievement of independence.