The enforcement problem in Resolution 2094 and the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime: sanctioning North Korea

This article deconstructs United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2094 through the preambulatory statements, objectives, obligations, and implementation and enforcement provisions of UNSC Resolution 2094. The article proceeds in three parts. First, it reviews the academic literature on UNSC sanctions and their application in the North Korean case. Second, it deconstructs UNSC Resolution 2094 according to the common structural components of international legal instruments to assess the level of congruence between the objectives of UNSC Resolution 2094, its enforcement mechanisms and outcomes. Third, it explores the weaknesses of UNSC Resolution 2094, focusing on the gap between the objectives and enforcement mechanisms found in the resolution. The inability of the UNSC sanctions regime to prevent North Korea reaching the cusp of becoming a nuclear weapons power is evidence of the international community's weak leverage over Pyongyang, a situation arising from the vulnerability of South Korea to a North Korean attack and the cross-cutting strategic priorities of China; the absence of economic linkages between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the primary sanctions-sender state in the USA; and North Korea's commitment to a nuclear weapons capability as the foundation of its medium-term economic development strategy, its institutional governance structure and associated ideological commitments.     

‘Nuclear Sword of the Moslem World’?: the United States,Britain, Pakistan,and the ‘Islamic Bomb’, 1977–80

There exists today considerable fear of nuclear proliferation across the ‘Islamic world.’ Despite this, an issue that - in part - set the tone for contemporary debates has largely gone under-examined in the scholarly literature. The emergence of the ‘Islamic bomb’ idea in the late 1970s created a meme that remains with us today. Analysing the roots of this meme allows us to examine its creation and the attitudes of governments towards this alleged emergent nuclear-proliferation threat. This analysis demonstrates that while the media portrayed the ‘Islamic world’ as violent, undifferentiated, and determined to gain nuclear capability, the US and British governments assessed matters evidentially and came to the conclusion that the ‘Islamic bomb’ represented a propaganda problem rather than an imminent nuclear-proliferation concern. Attitudes towards the ‘Islamic bomb’ highlight media and governmental attitudes towards the changing power balances in the Middle East and South Asia during a turbulent and troubled period.     

Economic valuation of a rise in ambient radiation risks: Hedonic pricing evidence from the accident in Fukushima

Using a combined data set of radiation levels and property prices from Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures that runs from 2009 to early 2017, the economic impact of radiation from the Fukushima nuclear accident is assessed. A 1 percent rise in radiation is associated with approximately 0.051 percentage drop in housing prices and though the level of radiation falls substantially after 2011, the estimated elasticity is broadly stable. The associated estimate of VSL (value of a statistical life) is in the region of US$4.5–6.4 million, which suggests no strong element of dread or overestimation of risks is present.     

Making of the Seventh NWS: Historiography of the Beginning of the Nuclear Disorder in South Asia

ABSTRACT

Efforts to explore Pakistan's nuclear weapons options had been underway since 1972 alongside Pakistan's quest for nuclear energy. However, the American concerns about Pakistan developing a nuclear weapons capability did not surface until after the Indian test in May 1974. The Indian nuclear test marked the beginning of the nuclear disorder in South Asia and paved way for Pakistan's nuclearization. This article assesses US non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under the Gerald Ford administration from 1974 to 1977. The administration attempted to curb Pakistan's latent proliferation potential by pressuring France and Pakistan to cancel their plutonium reprocessing agreement. Though it remained unsuccessful in its attempts to restrain Pakistan's nuclear development, the administration tried to develop a quid pro quo with Pakistan by pushing the country to choose military aid over bomb. Pakistan chose the bomb for it felt that US non-proliferation policy in South Asia was skewed in favor of India.     

Nuclear Superiority in the Age of Parity: US Planning,Intelligence Analysis,Weapons Innovation and the Search for a Qualitative Edge 1969–1976

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that between 1969 and 1976 US policy-makers actively sought to transcend nuclear parity. The Nixon and Ford administrations demonstrated increasing uneasiness toward nuclear parity and yet, proved unwilling to match the Soviet Union quantitatively. In the search for an answer to the question of what strategic superiority was in the age of parity, they came to understand it in distinctly qualitative terms, adopting a number of decisions related to nuclear planning, intelligence analysis of the nuclear balance, and nuclear weapons innovation and modernization, aimed at securing a qualitative edge over the USSR.     

Peace for Atoms. US Non-Proliferation Policy and the Romanian Role in the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969–1971

ABSTRACT

By 1970, the United States had undergone a remarkable volte-face on dealing with People's Republic of China as a nuclear weapon state, from outspoken opposition to political recognition. Aware of the importance of co-opting Beijing in the emerging multipolar order, President Richard Nixon sought any possible opening to the Chinese leadership. One secret backchannel passed through Bucharest, whom Washington rewarded with sensitive atomic assistance for its good offices. If in the mid-1960s dealing with China was regarded as detrimental to the cause of non-proliferation, by the early 1970s, the United States relaxed its nuclear exports policy towards useful adversaries, such as Romania, all in pursuit of geopolitical interests.     

Pakistan,Uranium and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1970–1980

ABSTRACT

This article explores how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assisted Pakistan with exploring the front end of the fuel cycle. Drawing on new primary sources gathered from extensive fieldwork in Pakistan as well as the IAEA's archives, this article sheds new light on the changing direction and performance of the Pakistani nuclear program during the 1970s, focusing on the exploration of uranium. The analysis highlights the competing priorities faced by the IAEA at this time – specifically, how to handle the increasingly politicized balance between technology diffusion and non-proliferation – and how this affected the Agency's support for the nuclear program in Pakistan, as the program was secretly shifting away from nuclear energy toward a weapons project.     

From nuclear physics to semiconductor manufacturing: the making of ion implantation

This article examines the emergence of ion implantation as a major semiconductor manufacturing process from the early 1960s through the late 1970s. Ion implantation techniques originated in nuclear physics research and were first employed to make solar cells for military satellites at the Ion Physics Corporation (IPC). This work at IPC inspired a research group at Sprague Electric to use ion implantation techniques to make transistors. Sprague's process development work, and its key finding that ion implantation enabled the control of critical transistor characteristics, were both exploited by Mostek, a semiconductor start‐up funded by Sprague. Mostek's engineers incorporated ion implantation into their manufacturing process to produce a string of integrated circuits that other firms could not make. Mostek's market success encouraged semiconductor firms to embrace ion implantation in the early and mid 1970s. By the end of the decade, ion implantation was used in the manufacture of virtually all advanced integrated circuits. This article improves our understanding of the development and adoption of semiconductor, and more generally high technology, manufacturing processes. It also advances our knowledge of the ways in which new technologies developed in the Cold War context made their way into the manufacturing economy.     

The troublesome life of peaceful atoms in Denmark

The Danish Atomic Energy Commission (AEK) was created in 1955 with the remit to promote ‘the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy for the benefit of society.’ Between 1956 and 1963 the AEK, which had been preceded by a number of early private nuclear initiatives, established an ambitious atomic energy research facility at Risø, some 40 kilometers west of Copenhagen. For most of this period the AEK was chaired by the celebrated physicist Niels Bohr. In spite of strong support from relevant actors in Danish society and Risø’s management, Denmark never built commercial nuclear power stations. Today Risø has undergone a complete metamorphosis from atomic energy research facility to a national laboratory, doing research and development on a broad range of alternative energy sources. Using concepts and approaches like national innovation systems and technological nationalism, the present paper will explore why and how this remarkable development took place.     

Inventing traditions: interests,parables and nostalgia in the history of nuclear energy

Abstract

From the late 1960s on, light-water designs dominated the market for nuclear reactors in most Western countries. Up to that point in time, many national governments, scientists and industrialists had favoured the rival concepts of heavy-water and graphite-moderated plants. The article focuses on Sweden and West Germany, where central actors only reluctantly gave up their support for domestically developed heavy-water solutions. Studying new archival material and adopting Hobsbawm and Ranger’s concept of the ‘invention of tradition’, the authors analyze how contemporary actors mobilized both the nation and the past when arguing for plants using natural uranium and heavy water. The paper documents how autarkic arguments were superseded by nostalgic sentiments, and how-subsequently-historians have come to perpetuate apologetic parables like ‘Swedish line’ and ‘tradition’, respectively.