专业镇经济模式的形成机制、特征与发展策略研究--以佛山市为例

专业镇是我国沿海经济发达地区特有的一种经济现象,珠江三角洲是专业镇集中地之一,不仅数量众多、类型丰富,而且规模大,其“一镇一业,一村一品”的专业化生产方式与超10亿元的经济规模引起了政府与学术界的重视。本以佛山市为例,在对佛山市专业镇进行空间分析的基础上,探讨专业镇的产生及其本质,分析佛山市专业镇形成的动力机制、类型与发展阶段,总结了佛山市专业镇的特点及存在的问题,并针对政府与企业分别提出相应的发展策略。     

黑龙江省同日本的经贸合作与老工业基地振兴

日本一直以来都是黑龙江省的重要贸易伙伴,是黑龙江省对外开放的重要国家。随着振兴东北老工业基地国策的提出,黑龙江省如何抓住“天赐良机”,进一步加强与日本的经贸合作,对于黑龙江省全省经济的发展具有重要意义。本文从分析黑龙江省与日本经贸合作的现状出发,总结两者经贸合作中特有的优势,进而提出继续扩大黑龙江省与日本经贸合作的对策措施。     

建国53年来中国宏观经济发展的若干特点--在2003年中国现代经济史年会上的讲话

建国初期到中共十一届三中全会以前,中国的宏观经济从总的时间序列上看,可划分为第一个五年计划时期、第二个五年计划时期、调整时期和"文化大革命"时期四个阶段,每个阶段都有其各自的特点.这个历史时期的经济发展战略是以优先发展重工业为主导,强调发展速度;战略推行的结果虽然成功地建立了一个比较完整的国民经济体系,但在产业结构、积累和消费的关系、增长方式、增长的波动性方面存在不少问题.与此相适应建立起来的集中计划经济体制对于集中力量搞建设是起了作用的,但从效率上讲是失败的.十一届三中全会以来中国的经济体制和经济发展模式发生了深刻的变化,但传统计划经济体制的影响依然对今后的改革与发展构成一定的障碍.     

Platform Capitalism’s Hidden Abode: Producing Data Assets in the Gig Economy

In this article, we argue that the governance of gig work under conditions of financialised platform capitalism is characterised by a process that we call “dual value production”: the monetary value produced by the service provided is augmented by the use and speculative value of the data produced before, during, and after service provision. App-governed gig workers hence function as pivotal conduits in software systems that produce digital data as a particular asset class. We reflect on the production of data assets and the unequal distribution of opportunities for their valorisation, after which we survey a number of strategies seeking data-centric worker empowerment. These strategies, we argue, are crucial attempts to push back against platform capitalism’s domination, bankrolled by what we term “meta-platforms”. Ultimately, it is the massive wealth and synergetic capacities of meta-platforms that constitute the most formidable obstacle to worker power and social justice in increasingly data-driven societies.     

Into the arms of dolls: Japan’s declining fertility rates,the 1990s financial crisis and the (maternal) comforts of the posthuman

Abstract

Japan’s 1990s financial crisis proved psychically traumatic for many men, their trauma exacerbated by decades of falling fertility rates and related sociospatial attenuation. The crisis disrupted a range of heteronormative practices that had stabilized post-war gendered identities, especially marriage and stay-at-home motherhood. Some men consequently began seeking comfort in the company of youthful-looking, large-format, hyper-feminized commodity-dolls of which there are two psychical kinds: ‘infantile’ dolls used largely by precariously positioned young men for comfort and play; and expensive ‘Oedipal’ silicone sex dolls associated with Japanese salarymen whose jobs had become less secure. Both have worked emotionally for two reasons: dolls are evocative of the maternal – the basis of intersubjective (be) longing/Eros; and the dolls are owned, ownership allowing pleasure and control more securely to intertwine. Following the oil crisis and the de-industrialization that followed, men in racially and economically privileged terrain across the US and Europe turned to similar kinds of commodity dolls for comfort, if for differently sexed and racialized reasons. Japanese men’s doll markets therefore speak to certain particular and general conditions of masculinity and geopolitical economic trauma.     

Spatial differences of reindustrialization in a post-socialist economy: manufacturing in the Hungarian counties

Over the past two and a half decades, the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary, have become an integral part of the global economy. Following the change of regime, the rate of foreign direct investment increased, modern industries emerged and exports became significant. However, this process was halted by the global economic crisis in many advanced and transition economies, and the concept of ‘reindustrialization’ emerged as one of the economic policy responses to the new challenges generated by the crisis. In our paper, we study whether reindustrialization is present following the lowest point of the crisis in one of the post-socialist countries of the EU, in Hungary. If so, in which regions and industries, and under what conditions? Our research indicates that reindustrialization can be generally observed only in a few rural regions after 2009, limited to only one or two industries, while, for instance, in the capital and in its agglomerations and in urban regions with large research universities, deindustrialization is more likely to take place.     

Prefiguring the State

Merging means and ends, prefigurative politics perform life as it is wished‐for, both to experience better practice and to advance change. This paper contributes to prefigurative thinking in three ways. It explores what it might mean to prefigure the state as a concept; takes its inspiration from a historical episode rather than imagined time ahead; and addresses what, if anything, prefigurative conceptions can do when practiced. Central to my discussion is the plural state—taking shape as micro, city, regional, national and global formations. Plural state thinking makes room for divergent kinds of states but does not necessarily foreground progressive ones. Thus, to explore in more detail a transformative left conception of the state, discussion turns to 1980s British municipal radicalism. Taking up this adventurous episode in governing as a “thinking tool”, an imaginary of the state as horizontal, everyday, activist and stewardly emerges.     

Lithic Production and Consumption Patterns from the Great Platform at Late Postclassic (A.D. 1350–1525) Tzintzuntzan,Mexico

Late Postclassic period (a.d. 1350–1525) Tarascan economic activities often included higher degrees of political involvement and territorial control compared with other ancient Mesoamerican societies. Here I examine Tarascan obsidian economies through an analysis of lithic production and consumption patterns from structures excavated on and near the Great Platform at the imperial capital of Tzintzuntzan. Four spatially distinct patterns are evident. Great Platform residents used high-quality obsidian blades as ceremonial items or burial offerings and scrapers for craft production. Lower elite residents of Structure F, outside the Great Platform, produced their own blade tools and consumed a higher percentage of green obsidian than residents of the Great Platform. Excavations at Yacata 3 recovered bifacial arrowheads and obsidian bloodletters associated with disturbed offerings. The spatial distributions of lapidary preforms and highly polished fragments combined with accounts from the Relación de Michoacán (a.d. 1541) suggest that lower elites produced obsidian jewelry near the Great Platform.     

Steel of Victory,Scrap of Defeat: Mobilizing the French Home Front, 1939–40

This article traces the implementation, execution, and results of the French Ministry of Armaments’ scrap iron collection drive from September 1939 to June 1940. This collection drive was a belated effort to mobilize patriotic sentiment and raw materials for France’s war effort. By the late 1930s, the French government realized that it did not have — and, more importantly, would not be able to acquire — enough metal to meet ambitious armament plans. In September 1939, Raoul Dautry, the Minister of Armaments, began moving toward a controlled economy by setting up central distribution organizations, preventing the movement of stocks, and organizing the national scrap drive, modelled, in part, on Germany. Despite a rural distrust of the state and cases of individuals hoarding metal, most people responde­d to the call. Yet logistical difficulties in finances, manpower, and transportation hampered efforts. By May 1940, half of the 85,000 tons collected remained piled on the platforms of railway stations. With the invasion, the Germans immediately confiscated this metal. With the defeat of France, this failed drive came to symbolize France’s defeat and humiliation, as well as the impotence of the Third Republic.     

The Street Corps of Changsha around 1920

The Changsha Street Corps originated in the local militia during the period of the Taiping Rebellion, and it played an important part in Changsha’s urban social management at the grassroots level. However, the role and influence of the street corps underwent changes during the process of modernization and the building of the modern nation–state. By 1920, although the street corps of Changsha still worked as the agent of the state at the grassroots level, its autonomy had been curtailed, and its social influence weakened. In the new social environment, even the maintenance of neighborhood interests became a challenge for the street corps. This article illustrates the readjustments in geopolitical and industrial relations during the process of urban modernization. It also illustrates how a new form of state power, namely the police, infiltrated the social management system, affected the traditional social structure, and complicated the interaction between modern state and society.