A Once and Future Greatness: Raymond Aron,Charles de Gaulle andthe Politics of Grandeur

Charles de Gaulle devoted his life to cultivating French grandeur, a politics that attempted to carve out an equal and independent role for France among the great powers of the world. One who frequently criticized de Gaulle's ideas of grandeur was the eminent social theorist, Raymond Aron. Although Aron was generally supportive of de Gaulle and supported him ‘every time there was a crisis’, he never hesitated to criticize de Gaulle, sometimes quite sharply. Aron's lifelong friendship with de Gaulle was thus marked by alternating bouts of mutual irritation and respect: Aron worried that de Gaulle's theatrics were sometimes detrimental to French national interests while de Gaulle fretted that Aron's commitment to French greatness was less enthusiastic than it should havebeen.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate Aron's reaction to de Gaulle's politics of grandeur. Despite his reputation for ‘lucidity’, Aron was often ambivalent about de Gaulle's ambitions for France. We argue that Aron's ambivalence stemmed from his political creed, or from his commitment to a political philosophy that - as de Gaulle sensed - allowed for few settled convictions. This paper reviews Aron's assessment of two issues at the heart of de Gaulle's politics of grandeur, namely, the effort to promote a sense of national unity and the effort to create a nuclear force. In both areas, we witness a remarkably ambivalent Aron, one who struggled to soften the harsher edges of the excesses of what he considered to be the excesses of grandeur and find his way to a more moderate and coherent position.     

Cables in Cipher,the Raoul Wallenberg Case and Swedish–Soviet Diplomatic Communication 1944–1947

In 2011, the Russian government, in order to mark the 100th anniversary of Swedish Diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, decided to allow one Swedish researcher to go through the diplomatic correspondence in cipher between the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm and the Soviet Foreign Ministry during the years 1944–1947. This article presents some of the major findings on Wallenberg and discusses whether parallel paths of Soviet encrypted communication between Moscow and Stockholm may still be harbouring additional information on his case. The ciphers cannot provide us with any conclusive answers on the Soviet motives for arresting Wallenberg, or his ultimate fate. They do, however, provide us with unique insights into how the matter was handled on both the Soviet and Swedish sides.     

The clash of great powers and revolution in the Baltic Sea?

The Soviet party leadership claimed repeatedly after the mid-1920s that the Soviet Union was under an acute threat of intervention. The interpretation was based on different views regarding the development of socialism in the USSR. The role of Finland in the Soviet policy towards other border-states offers a case for observing the relation of ideology and practice in Soviet foreign policy, especially in the Baltic Sea context in 1925. The main interests for the Soviets were plans for military alliances and spheres of influence and intelligence. Contrary to the ideological worldview, the Peoples’ Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) did not see the western great powers, Great Britain and France, as being behind the Baltic alliance plan. Instead, the alliance attempt was primarily seen as an independent Polish initiative, especially lacking British support. The Soviet foreign administration was able to evaluate the grounds for eventual Finnish non-alliance accurately, despite Baltic sympathies and the lack of an active Scandinavian orientation. The results suggest the NKID observed international relations from the traditional viewpoint of Soviet state interests, and on the basis of quite accurate information, not reflecting the needs of ideological interpretation or domestic power struggles.     

THE GOVERNMENT’S BUSINESS?

The engagement of Swedish industry in the Liberian American–Swedish Minerals Company (LAMCO), which mined iron in Liberia between 1963 and 1989, was the largest Swedish commercial investment in Africa during the Cold War. In this paper I investigate how political and administrative actors of the Swedish government conceptualized the link between private and public interests in the context of LAMCO’s operations, and how this shaped Swedish government policy towards the company and Liberia. I identify two phases: a phase of almost unanimous political support for LAMCO and close Swedish–Liberian relations from ca. 1955 to 1965, and a more fragmented phase following 1965, during which LAMCO was increasingly understood as a political liability. My findings show how business interests could figure into Swedish foreign policy during the Cold War, highlighting the coherence with which Swedish industry and government acted in relation to the commercial interests in Liberia before ca. 1965, but also the lack of coherence – between government and industry as well as within the state apparatus – that followed the turn to a more activist policy after the mid-1960s.     

A delicate balance: Australia's ‘tilt’ to Pakistan and its impact on Australia–India relations

The Australia–India relationship has pivoted on more than the sale of uranium, and is not purely a narrative of neglect. While there have been some periods where bilateral relations received inadequate attention, the years 1947 to 1980 tell of a more complex story. During this time, many Australian diplomats and leaders worked hard to include India in Australia's foreign policy calculations. However, it proved difficult, arguably impossible, to negotiate a path for the Australia–India connection through the complexities of the India–Pakistan relationship and the strategic uncertainties of this most fragile of regions. Indian leaders, not without cause, constantly accused Australia of a ‘tilt’ to Pakistan. An examination of the Australian archives for this period reveals the inhibiting effects of the India–Pakistan conflict, particularly over Kashmir, on the development of a more fruitful Australia–India collaboration.     

Symposium: Australia–US Economic Relations and the Regional Balance of PowerAustralia,the United States and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Diverging Interests and Unintended Consequences

When the talks for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) were launched in 2010, there appeared to be a coincidence of interests between the American and Australian governments in negotiating a high-quality, ‘21st-century’ trade arrangement that would multilateralise the bilateral and minilateral trade agreements that have proliferated in the Asia-Pacific region in the last 15 years. As the negotiations progressed, however, a divergence between American and Australian interests became apparent. Protectionist interests in the United States have prevented the administration from improving on market access agreements in the current preferential trade agreements with TPP partners, thereby undermining the multilateralisation objective. Some of the elements of the US template for 21st-century trade agreements, notably enhanced protection for intellectual property, and the inclusion of investor–state dispute resolution, clash with Australian trade priorities. Moreover, the central role of the TPP in the US ‘pivot to Asia’ has led to perceptions that it is part of a strategy to encircle China: consequently the TPP may force Australia to make the very choice between China and the United States that the government wishes to avoid.

当2010年启动跨太平洋伙伴关系时,在谈判高质量、“21世纪”的贸易安排时美国和澳大利亚政府的利益似乎走到了一起。这种贸易安排会使过去十五年里亚太地区繁荣的双边及微关系多边化。在谈判进行的过程中,美澳之间的分歧却变得明朗了。美国的保护主义利益集团阻碍政府在现行的与亚太伙伴的最惠贸易协定中改善贸易准入协定,因此损害了多边化的目标。美国21世纪贸易协议的模式,明显加强了知识产权的保护,而且包含了投资者—国家争端解决的内容,与澳大利亚贸易优先的考虑发生了冲突。但亚太伙伴关系在美国重心移往亚洲的计划中至关重要,让人觉得就是包围中国战略的一部分。因此亚太伙伴关系会迫使澳大利亚在中美之间做澳政府并不愿意做的选择。     

The institutional odyssey of the Italian Parliamentary Republic

This article examines the Italian foreign policy of the second Berlusconi government. The first section focuses on the episodes that critics have used to argue that, under the second Berlusconi government, there has occurred a process of ‘Americanization’ of Italian foreign policy, and provides an interpretation of their significance. The second section looks at these episodes against the historical background of Italian?–?American relations since the end of World War II and argues that, from this perspective, very little, if anything, has changed in Italian?–?American relations or Italian foreign policy in general.     

Silvio Berlusconi and the traditions of Italian foreign policy: a comment on Ambassador Romano's presentation

Abstract

While open to criticism on many levels, the foreign policy of Italy under Silvio Berlusconi does not deviate in many significant ways from traditional approaches, especially on its management of Italy's relations with the United States and the European Union. Italy's ‘exceptionalism’ is also similar to that of many other European states.     

Italy's foreign policy toward China: missed opportunities and new chances

Abstract

This essay provides an account of the erratic and troubled history of the relations between Italy and the People's Republic of China since the 1950s. After reaching their highest point in the two years immediately following the Tiananmen events – when Italy, more than any other Western country, worked to break China's international isolation – they have considerably frozen for a long time. The reason has to be found not only in the crisis that, since 1992, has overcome the Italian political system, but even more so in the structural limits of Italy's economic foreign policy and in the lack of a coherent strategy aimed at promoting Italian goods in world markets that provide huge opportunities – opportunities mostly neglected by the political-economic Italian establishment. The Berlusconi government replaced this negligence with fear-mongering behavior and recurring and outspoken protectionist remarks of various centre-right leaders, who feared the potential damage caused by China's increased competitiveness (which represented, in their opinion, an unfair trade practice) to the national industry. Though too recent to say if it will bear fruit, Prodi has made a desperate attempt for Italy to make up lost ground by leading to China what has been emphatically defined ‘the greatest institutional and business mission ever organized by Italy’ just a few months after his comeback to Palazzo Chigi.     

The foreign policy of First Republic Italy: new approaches

This introductory article deals with the most recent contributions by Italian historians on the Italian Republic's international role. It aims mainly to demonstrate that a new generation of younger Italian historians is successfully offering new views and interpretations on First Republic Italy's role in the international system, and is also focusing on aspects such as the culture of Italy's political parties, the economic dimension, the role of public opinion, and the influence of external actors on domestic Italian politics – in short, that there has been a turn away from traditional diplomatic history based upon the archives of the Foreign Ministry.