美国国会“涉藏立法”的历史考察

近二十年来,美国国会通过立法活动提出并通过了一系列干涉中国西藏事务的"涉藏议案"。其主要内容包括:要求美国政府将对华政策与"西藏问题"挂钩;以"西藏人权"为借口干涉西藏事务;为"藏独"势力提供援助,等等。作为美国对华人权外交的组成部分,这些"涉藏议案"对中美关系产生了不容忽视的负面影响,不仅使美国对中国所谓侵犯"西藏人权"问题的干涉长期存在,而且也在很大程度上助长了西藏分裂势力在国外的分裂活动。     

清末民初"国民外交"一词的形成及其含义述论

清末民初＂国民外交＂一词的提出,既是中国人民在严重的民族危机下寻求自强独立的现实需要,在一定程度上也是受到了日本的影响,将本意为国家外交的＂national diplomacy＂译为＂国民外交＂。中国的＂国民外交＂概念的内涵主要表现为三个方面：一是将人民主权思想应用于外交领域,含有视外交为国民的外交,政府应尊重民意办理外交的意思;二是指国民可通过国会参与外交,以舆论监督外交,将自己的意志反映贯彻于外交事务;三是通过国际民间交往增进友谊,进而改善邦交,促进世界和平。虽然今天的＂国民外交＂概念主要是从国际民间交往的外交意义上来说的,但不容忽视其原来政府外交须尊重民意,而国民有权监督政府外交的含义所具有的现实借鉴作用。     

论日本共产党的在野党外交

随着全球化趋势的加强,政党外交成为国际政治中不可忽视的现象。上世纪90年代后期开始,日本共产党力图通过积极开展外交活动彰显其生命力。本文认为日本外交的困境和共产主义运动面临的现实压力是日共推动在野党外交的主要原因。在野党外交作为日共的一种政策和理论,有其形成过程,在实践中也取得了很多成果。然而,在野党外交的成功并不能从根本上改变日共在日本政坛的地位。     

郭嵩焘的近代外交意识

郭嵩焘是中国第一位驻外公使,在中国由传统外交向近代化外交的转型时期,以其独特和前瞻眼光来看待中外关系。其外交思想中的近代意识表现为对传统夷夏观的突破、对近代西方外交观念、外交礼仪的吸收、接纳,以及创办近代外交机制的努力等内容。郭嵩焘的近代外交意识,对晚清外交的近代化产生了深刻而广泛的影响。     

故宫藏明清名家篆刻伪讹丛考(二)

本文针对故宫博物院藏明清名家篆刻中有问题的印作进行了单体研究与考证,纠正了以往鉴定工作中的错误,为进一步科学、系统地研究明清篆刻艺术提供了必要的参考。     

The disjunction of image and word in US and Chinese soft power projection

This article compares US and Chinese national soft power strategies, using the cases of the US Shared Values Initiative for the Middle East in the aftermath of 9–11 and the present operation of Chinese Confucius Institutes in the US. Comparing these two national programs, I describe a consistent disjunction between visual image and spoken word for each. Regardless of variations in national approaches to soft power, this disconnect between seeing and talking is a limitation of soft power as a cultural tool of diplomatic communication. First, public diplomats’ unexamined folk theories about culture’s instrumental role in messaging emphasize spectacle in ways inimical to reciprocal engagement. Second, as a cultural policy of display, soft power image projection discourages opportunities for inter-cultural dialogue. Third, government-sponsored national image management and branding are often controversial elsewhere, in the process touching off boundary-patrolling public debates instead of helping to build international relationships.     

Cultural diplomacy: beyond the national interest?

The field of cultural diplomacy, which looms large in present-day cultural policy and discourse, has been insufficiently analysed by the cultural disciplines. This special issue engages with the task of filling the gap. The present essay sets out the terms in which the authors have taken up this engagement, focusing principally on Australia and Asia. Distinguishing between cultural diplomacy that is essentially interest-driven governmental practice and cultural relations, which is ideals-driven and practiced largely by non-state actors, the authors pursue a twofold aim. First, to demystify the field, especially when it is yoked to the notion of ‘soft power’; second, to better understand how actually-existing discourses of cultural diplomacy and/or cultural relations operate in different national contexts. The essay seeks in particular to scrutinize the current confusion surrounding cultural diplomacy and, in the context of the changing role of the nation-state, to explore its possibilities as an instrument for going beyond the national interest.     

West Papua and the Australia-Indonesia relationship: a case study in diplomatic difficulty

This article is a study of West Papua's impact on the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. Its purpose is to enhance understanding of various diplomatic challenges emerging from West Papua, the origins of these challenges, and how they impact upon the relationship. This will be achieved through an analysis of a particular incident in 2006 in which 43 West Papuan refugees arrived in Australia. This led to a diplomatic storm between the Indonesian and Australian governments, and a highly charged public debate. Insights will be gleaned from the incident and its aftermath to broaden our understanding of West Papua's impact on the Australia-Indonesia relationship.     

Civil War heritage as American diplomacy, 1957–1965

This paper explores the role of Civil War heritage in U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War era. Especially during the celebration of the Civil War’s centennial, between 1961 and 1965, the Americans endeavoured to harness the conflict’s heritage to promote U.S. interests in Europe. How they intended to do this is demonstrated primarily through an examination of Colonel Sidney Morgan’s mission to Europe to find how the commemoration of the Civil War could be used for public diplomacy. Additionally, by exploring how Civil War heritage was spread and used in the British public sphere, the paper examines and underlines the key role saved to unofficial cultural agents, such as Civil War re-enactment clubs and private people, in heritage diplomacy. The focus on unofficial agents and networks enable this study to show how heritage diplomacy works at the un-institutionalised level and to explore the interaction between the official and unofficial level in heritage diplomacy. The historical perspective and methodology cast new light on the use of history, historical memory and heritage for diplomatic ends and introduces both historians and heritage scholars with new avenues to explore, such as the role of memory and historical consciousness in shaping international relations.     

“[T]Hose Who Had Money Were Opposed to Us,and Those Who Were Our Friends Were Not the Moneyed Class”: Philadelphia and the 1837–1838 Canadian Rebellions

In early January 1838, weeks following a disastrous military defeat at the hands of the British at Saint-Eustache, in the British colony of Lower Canada, two patriotes leaders, Dr. Robert Nelson and Dr. Edmund O’Callaghan, arrived in Philadelphia. Their mission was to find military and financial support among local residents for the 1837 Rebellion. A few days later, they left empty-handed and disappointed. According to O’Callaghan, those who supported them were incapable to help, while those who had the means to offer concrete assistance were, quite simply, opposed to their crusade. Why did Nelson and O’Callaghan leave empty-handed? Were O’Callaghan’s assumptions about the people of Philadelphia correct? This article explains why the Patirote mission to Philadelphia failed and suggests that O’Callaghan was incorrect. The mission did not fail because their allies were too poor while those with money opposed them. Instead, though many actually hoped that the rebels succeeded and offered much moral support and encouragement, all were quite simply unwilling to offer any military or financial support, citing American neutrality, economic uncertainty, and the fear of British retaliation.