Schweretheorie und Weltbild des Nikolaus von Kues: Zu ihrer vermeintlichen Modernität

Regarding his world view and his heaviness theory Nicolaus Cusanus is imputed to having used (at least to some extent) forebodings and anticipations of modern conceptions. In the dialog Idiota de staticis experimentis he imputed the quantitative points of view of modern physics programmatically. In contrast with this, this article will show that the quantitative point of view is proposed for an inapt object at least. Cusanus based his reflections on one hand on the Aristotelic theories of elements and their heaviness with ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ weight (only thus, assumed inconsistencies can be explained), on the other hand he wants to determine the essential, qualitative properties of the forma, while only their complete abstraction by reduction on the mass without properties should result in an object for comparative weighings — lately in different ways by René Descartes and Isaac Newton. The putative modernness of cusanian conceptions compared with Aristotle are based on the tradition of platonian and stoic modifications which sooner were compatible with christian ideas.     

Die Fotografie – ein neues Bildmedium im Wissenschaftspanorama des 19. Jahrhunderts. Einführung in das Symposium

Photography – a novel medium of scientific representation in the XIXth century array of arts and sciences. To delve into various nineteenth century academic disciplines under the heading ‘photography in the arts and sciences’ as did last year's annual conference of the History of Science Society – the interest in such a topic only partly stems from the ‘iconic turn’ that has generally enlarged the scope of the social sciences in recent years. A more poignant feature in any such present day study will probably be a basic scepticism facing the fact that in public use photographs have been manipulated in many respects. Yet, while shying away from any simple success story, a historically minded approach to changing ‘visual paradigms’ (Historische Bildwissenschaft) has begun to emerge. In this context, it has proved of considerable heuristic value to reconsider the role of early photography in an array of science, arts and technology: Since the reliance on the traditional ways of sketching reality persisted, in many an instance where photography was introduced, the thoughts the pioneer photographers had about their new, seemingly automated business, call for close attention. Thus scholarship sets up a parallel ‘discussion room’; the lively debate on the benefit of academic drawings as opposed to photographic portraits is a case in point. Some fairly specialised reports on photographically based analyses, such as electron microscopy, point to a borderline where the very idea of representation as a correspondence of reality and imagination gets blurred. Even though any ‘visual culture’ will have to shoulder the ‘burden of representation’, it is equally likely that it will offer a deeper sensibility for the intricacies entailed in the variegated ways of illustrating or mapping chosen subjects of scientific interest. Scholarship may thus somewhat control the disillusionment that by now has become the epitome of writing on photographic history. Provided with a renewed methodological awareness for the perception process and its photographic transition, historians may strike a better balance between the ever present tendencies of a realistic and an aesthetic way of picturing the world we live in.     

Fotografie als Wissenschaft

Photography as Science: In 1908 the English physicist Arthur Mason Worthington published A Study of Splashes, a treatise on the physical behaviour of falling drops. The photographic experiments were performed by means of an electric spark „in absolute darkness”︁. Worthington's experimental practice dealt with two different areas of knowledge production: an area the operator could perceive control from the outside and a corresponding black-box where the photographic recording itself took place. The paper discusses the epistemic challenges of this specific shift from imperceptible events to their photographic representations. It shows to what extent the information revealed by the photographic apparatus had to be converted, for it did not speak for itself. Thus, Worthington's work went beyond the classical dichotomy between objectivity and imagination.     

Spekulation und Physik im 18. Jahrhundert. Lomonossow,Kant und Lavoisier in Sachen Erhaltungsgesetz und Äther

As far as the law of preservation of matter and the existence of ether are concerned, Kant, Lomonossow and Lavoisier had very similar views. Nevertheless, according to historical evidence they worked out their theories never taking each other's results for granted. Whereas it is well known that Lavoisier did not base his experiments on the former ones by Lomonossow, it has been argued that Kant based his philosophy of nature on Lavoisier's experiments. I try to show here, that Kant had his philosophy of nature done, prior to Lavoisier's Elements of Chemistry. Further that the only one to have been able to influence Kant was not Lavoisier but Lomonossow. But Kant never mentioned Lomonossow. There is strong evidence that the similarity of views in Kant, Lomonossow and Lavoisier is not due to any kind of interaction between them. This also holds of the (same) mistakes, which Kant and Lomonossow made. The only substantial difference is that Kant thought, that some laws of nature may be logically inferred without experiments.     

Die ‚Deutsche Physik’︁ in der Selbstkritik des NS‐Ideologen Alfred Bäumler

In 1944, the Nazi ideologist Alfred Baeumler wrote a memorandum for his boss Alfred Rosenberg, Adolf Hitler's commissioner for the political education of party members. In this sensational memo, which did not become known until long after 1945, Baeumler spoke out against the promotion of under‐performing physicists who oust highly‐qualified non‐Nazi scientists at the universities without submitting adequate research results. – Rosenberg's response is not known. What is known, however, is that Baeumler did not manage to change the situation criticised by him.     

Eine handgreifliche Geschichtslüge. Wie Martin Luther zum Gegner des copernicanischen Weltsystems gemacht wurde.

Martin Luther has been severely criticized for an offhand remark about Copernicus. In the most frequently cited version of this statement, Luther is alledged to have branded Copernicus as a fool who will turn the whole science of astronomy upside down. This disparaging judgment on Luther prevails in many publications by respected historians of science of the 20th century, although since the early thirties, it has been convincingly demonstrated that the famous citation from Luther's table talk is next to worthless as an historical source, that Luther never referred to Copernicus or to the heliocentric world system in all of his voluminous writings, and that there is no indication that Luther ever suppressed the Copernican viewpoint. His attitude towards Copernicus was indifference or ignorance, but not hostility. In this paper, it is shown that the story of Luther's anti‐Copernicanism emerged in the second half of the 19th century. It was invented by Franz Beckmann and Franz Hipler, two Prussian Catholic historians who were engaged in the conflict between the German government under Bismarck and the Catholic Church (Kulturkampf), and it was disseminated by influential German and American historians like Leopold Prowe, Ernst Zinner, and Andrew D. White. In the second half of the 20th century, many historians of science relied on the authority of these authors, rather than studying the sources or the secondary literature in which it has been proved that Luther's anti‐Copernicanism is an outright falsification of history.