红外光谱在传统年画红蓝色料分析中的应用研究

年画是中国特有的民间艺术形式。本研究介绍了传统年画印制所用红蓝色料的发展历史,选取15种中国古代与近现代常用红蓝色料进行红外光谱分析,并归纳总结了标准样品的化学结构与红外谱图特征。在此基础上,利用衰减全反射傅里叶变换红外光谱仪对三幅清末民初时期的传统年画开展无损检测。结果显示三幅年画的红蓝色料均为合成颜料或染料,包括酸性大红G、酸性墨水蓝G、普鲁士蓝等。本研究扩展了红外光谱在书画文物分析检测中的应用范围,为传统年画色料的无损鉴定提供科学依据。     

Hegel,Analytic Philosophy’s Pharmakon

In this article I argue that Hegel has become analytic philosophy’s “pharmakon”—both its “poison” and its “cure.” Traditionally, Hegel’s philosophy has been attacked by Anglo-American analytical philosophers for its alleged charlatanism and irrelevance. Yet starting from the 1970s there has been a revival of interest in Hegel’s philosophical work, which, I suggest, may be explained by three developments: (1) the revival of interest in Aristotelianism following Saul Kripke’s and Hilary Putnam’s work on natural kinds, and Elizabeth Anscombe’s, Philippa Foot’s, and Putnam’s opposition to the fact-value distinction; (2) the rehabilitation of Hegel’s theories by various philosophers, including Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, Fred Beiser, Robert Stern, and Stephen Houlgate; and (3) the Sellars-inspired philosophy of mind of John McDowell and of Robert Brandom. The first and third of these reasons, I argue, have led several analytic theorists to cast Hegel in a more positive light as the “cure” for analytic philosophy. The combined outcome of these changes, both ironic and fitting, is that the Hegelian principle of internal critique has played a significant role not only in analytic philosophy’s rapprochement with Hegel’s philosophy but also in overcoming the Analytic-Continental philosophical divide.     

THE WORDS OF HISTORY

In From History to Theory, Kerwin Lee Klein writes a history of the central terms of the discipline of theory of history, such as “historiography,” “philosophy of history,” “theory of history,” and “memory.” Klein tells us when and how these terms were used, how the usage of some (“historiography” and “philosophy of history”) declined during the twentieth century, and how other terms (“theory” and “memory”) became increasingly popular. More important, Klein also shows that the use of these words is not innocent. Using words such as “theory” or “historiography” implies certain specific ideas about what the writing of history should be like, and how theoretical reflection on the nature of history and its writing relates to the practical issues of the discipline. In the second half of his book, Klein focuses more on the concept of memory and the memory boom since the later part of the 1980s. He observes that “memory” came to be seen as a kind of “counterhistory,” a postcolonial, fragmented, and personal alternative to the traditional mainstream discourse of history. Klein does not necessarily disagree with this view, but he does warn us about unwanted side effects. More specifically, he argues that the discourse of memory is surprisingly compatible with that of extremist right‐wing groups, and should be treated with suspicion. Although Klein certainly has a point, he presents it in a rather dogmatic fashion. However, a more nuanced version of Klein's criticism of memory can be developed by building on Klein's suggestion that there is an intimate connection between memory and identity.     

Intellectual History and the History of Philosophy

Summary

The issue which I wish to address in this paper is the widespread tendency in Anglophone philosophy to insist on a separation between the history of philosophy and the history of ideas or intellectual history. This separation reflects an anxiety on the part of philosophers lest the special character of philosophy will be dissolved into something else in the hands of historians. And it is borne of a fundamental tension between those who think of philosophy's past as a source of ideas and arguments of interest to the present, and those who hold that the philosophy of the past should be studied on its own terms, in relation to its immediate context, without reference to the present. The challenge, then, is to re-historicise the history of philosophy, and to keep the philosophers onside.     

胡适与庄子研究

胡适在20世纪中国庄学研究史上占有重要地位.他尝试运用西方哲学体系研究<庄子>,推动了庄子研究范式的转换.胡适对庄子人生哲学展开了激烈批判,对庄子反科学主义思想既有所批判,又努力挖掘庄书中所包含的生物进化论思想.最近20余年来,庄子研究范式又得到了新的救正.     

稻盛经营哲学中的文化印迹辨析

稻盛和夫1997年退出经营第一线后,愈发活跃于国内外的财界、学界乃至政界,不断地著书立说,登台演讲。主题大都是谈自己的经营之道。有人说稻盛的哲学思想深受中国传统文化影响,也有人说,稻盛的哲学博采众长,是吸收多种文化的产物。这些说法哪种更贴近现实,抑或都存在片面性?本文将通过对稻盛和夫的著述、演讲以及个人访谈中所引用的中国古典、哲学以及宗教等内容的比较,分析中国古典在稻盛经营哲学中所处的地位以及发挥的作用。     

焦虑与反思:当代中国对传统文化的认同

近代文化变迁以来,“中国哲学”这个称谓一直是一个有争议的问题,。但哲学作为一件“事情”,在中国是有的,哲学本也不是件东西。“事情”,德语为Sache,意指“争执”,“论争”。自古希腊,“哲学”就是对“智慧”的“爱”,是无尽的探问与追思,是爱者与被爱者之间的互通有无,即“对话”,因此对话是哲学的最为原初最为根本的形式,其表达形式则应该是多种多样并且与生活连在一起的。     

两汉用玉思想研究之一——辟邪厌胜思想

笔者在对汉代玉器进行综合考察时,发现在丧葬、佩饰、日用及陈设用玉中,有许多玉器无论造型或纹饰都有一定的辟邪厌胜之意。本文通过对这类玉器的研究,试图从玉器角度分析看待当时社会流行的辟邪厌胜思想,辟邪厌胜意义也是汉代用玉思想中的一个重要方面。     

可持续发展文化是科学与人文融合的必然选择

“科学”与“人文”的关系表现为“分立”与“融合”,二者的分立所导致的严重后果直接表现为科技的异化和人类价值观的扭曲,间接导致了生态环境的极度恶化和日益严重的生态危机,不利于人类社会的可持续发展。从科学与人文分立的历史追溯,发现既有科学对人文的压制,又有人文对科学的反抗。随着全球性生态危机的日益凸现,科学与人文的融合是必然选择,这既是理论发展的趋势又是现实的要求。可持续发展文化融合了科学与人文的内涵,体现了人文关怀,营造了“科技人性化”发展的氛围。科学与人文必将伴随着可持续发展文化的发展而不断融合。     

The Origin of “Chinese Philosophy”

Using the analysis of a single word to launch a conceptual review of (a problem in) cultural history, the Chinese term zhexue 哲學 (wisdom-learning, tetsugaku) is not simply a translation of the word “philosophy”; its inventor, Nishi Amane (1829–97), regarded it as the (Western) counterpart of Oriental learning (Tōyōgaku). The first explicit linkage of “philosophy” with “the East” was at The University of Tokyo, where it played an important role in the work of Katō Hiroyuki (1836–1913) and Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944). Inoue’s History of Oriental Philosophy, written under Katō’s inspiration, used Western philosophy to systematize ancient Chinese thought, and transformed “philosophy” (tetsugaku) from a learning of others, or Western learning, into an important component of the spiritual world of the East, and into a kind of universal knowledge. This was completely different from earlier lectures on “China philosophy” (shina tetsugaku) by Nakamura Masanao (1832–91) and Shimada Jūrei (1838–98) which still followed the Chinese underlying structure, and in the background, it had the intent of grasping the power to control East Asian discourse. In China, when young scholars like Wang Guowei (1877–1927) embraced philosophy, they already took its universality as a self-evident premise. This kind of alignment later evolved into a situation where it seemed entirely natural to use Western systems to interpret Chinese thought, and it also induced serious scholars to reflect. However, “Oriental philosophy” and “Chinese philosophy” provide East Asia and especially China with an opportunity to reevaluate its traditional culture. In this connection, “Chinese philosophy” includes: first, using philosophical concepts to re-provision ancient thought (the so-called history of Chinese philosophy); second, the occurrence of “philosophy” and “Chinese philosophy” and their evolution after their arrival in China; third, drawing on philosophy to enrich and develop China’s thinking. When seeking out “philosophy” in the veins and arteries of China’s history, the first and second aspects must be strictly distinguished. As to what the future may hold, the effect of the third aspect is most important.