The Politics of Crisis Policymaking: Chernobyl and Swedish Nuclear Energy Policy

Public policy scholars often accentuate the key role of crises in explaining policy change; however, much empirical work still remains to be done in order to explain crisis‐induced policy outcomes. This article explores the prediction of the Advocacy Coalition Framework that stable coalitions and impediments to learning reduce the likelihood for policy change after a crisis. Strategic action is emphasized as a supplementary variable focusing on the role of political motivations in post‐crisis policymaking. Sweden's decision not to accelerate the nuclear power phaseout following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster provides a case study to assess the utility of these explanations. Findings corroborate theoretical expectations about stable minority coalitions, cast doubts over the presumed rigidity of policy core beliefs, and emphasize strategic action and cognitive heuristics as important motivations for policy choice. The article concludes by outlining three sector‐specific variables (ideological salience, level of conflict, and previous crisis experiences) that add to the explanation of crisis‐induced policy outcomes.     

美国对1962年中印边界冲突的反应

美国对1962年中印边界冲突反应与它的南亚政策息息相关。从印巴分治直到中美和解前夕,美国的南亚政策始终有服务于全球冷战的两个目标：力促印巴和解以防止共产主义集团乘机介入;以一切可能的手段使印度放弃中立政策并加入到西方集团。中印边界冲突在美国政府的南亚政策渐入困境时发生,给了美国决策者以莫大的期望,他们企图以其所谓的天赐良机达至以上主要针对中国的冷战目标。然而,中国正确政策及出神入化的实践大大强化了美国在南亚地区既有的结构性困境,使肯尼迪政府利用中印冲突的图谋以失败而告终。     

汉代对西南边疆的经营

本文论述了汉代经营西南边疆的政策措施及其效果。汉代在西南边疆地区实行“以其故俗治”的政策,适应中央集权制统治的需要,符合边疆民族地区实际,有利于汉朝统治秩序的稳定和西南边疆经济文化的发展;另一方面,汉代边疆战略重点始终在北方和西北,对西南边疆的经营规模和力度仍然是很有限的,边远山区尤其如此。     

布罗代尔的地中海叙事诗学

叙事主义历史哲学认为,一切历史都是叙事,但是布罗代尔的《地中海与菲利普二世时代的地中海世界》作为非事件史学的代表对此构成了严峻的挑战。本文在梳理不同学者观点的基础上,试图证明《地中海》亦属于叙事的范畴。首先,《地中海》在采用多种辞格的情况下呈现出一种圆形叙事结构,但是由于这种叙事风格的解读未能与内容分析相结合,所以挑战仍然存在;其次,《地中海》凭借新式历史话语大体上实现了总体史学、结构史学和问题史学的主张;最后,利科的历史叙事理论可以将以上两种分析结合起来,并且在该书中梳理出一条清晰的情节线索。它有助于打破将叙事等同于讲故事或事件史学的成见,颠覆以往对历史叙事的理解,拓展叙事主义历史哲学的解释空间。     

Territorial cohesion storylines in 2014–2020 Cohesion Policy

The purpose of this paper is to elaborate the concept of territorial cohesion in the context of 2014–2020 Cohesion Policy. The main goal is to investigate how European Union (EU) Member States (MSs) are coping with territoriality in their policies and to assess whether they are only fulfilling the minimum standards of a place-based approach or whether they are moving towards a new paradigm of policy-making characterized by a more territorially sensitive approach. This paper analyses Partnership Agreements which were signed between the European Commission and EU MSs and identifies the perception of territorial cohesion in the Cohesion Policy in the programming period 2014–2020. The analysis shows that different MSs choose different ways of addressing territoriality of their policies. It is thus possible to categorize countries into several groups sharing similar features and to discuss underlying ideas and approaches, which could shed some light on the still rather fuzzy concept of territorial cohesion.     

基于B/S模式秦陵考古GIS系统设计与实现

针对考古调查与发掘工作过程中所获空间及属性数据的管理,基于B/S模式,采用SSH框架、Java EE平台、PostgreSQL数据库以及ArcGIS Server平台构建秦陵考古信息系统框架,开发实现了具有快速查询浏览秦陵考古文物、遗址的空间地理和属性数据、考古成果日常管理与相关表单输出等功能的基于WebGIS的秦陵考古GIS系统。为秦陵考古研究提供更加规范化的数字化、信息化管理,其系统设计与实现具有广泛的推广价值。     

杨一清的安边策及其历史价值

明代中叶著名政治家杨一清于正德初年总制陕西三边时上奏皇帝的奏章,史称其为“安边策”。这份安边策既凝聚了当时戍边将士的心血与智慧,又体现了杨一清忠心谋国的民族精神,是难得的国防文献。本文讨论了安边策产生的时代背景,分析了它的主要内容及其落实措施,特别是对它的历史文化价值做了充分肯定,着重指出其对后世的警示作用。     

日俄战争期间美国的东北亚政策

本文认为,美国在日俄战争期间的东北亚政策仍然是坚持“门户开放”,但是在实现目标的手段上有了微妙的变化:着重在东北亚推动和构建“均势”格局——挺日、拒俄,建立均势,而不再是前一时期的“追随”欧洲列强,嗣机插足的政策。     

Objectivity and the writing of history

How do historians approach objectivity? This is addressed by Mark Bevir in his book The Logic of the History of Ideas (1999) by his argument for an anthropological epistemology with objectivity in the historical narrative resting on the explanation of human actions/agent intentionality equating with meaning. The criticism of this position is at several levels. As sophisticated constructionists historians do not usually ask ‘Can history be objective?’ Rather, they work from the balance of evidence reflecting the intersubjectivity of truth and they acknowledge the problematic nature of inferring agent intentionality and the difficulties in equating this with ‘what it means’. Why Abraham Lincoln issued the 1863 emancipation proclamation is a case in point. No historian would claim to have located its true meaning objectively in effect doubting Mark Bevir's claim that ‘objective knowledge arises from a human practice in which we criticise and compare rival webs of theories in terms of agreed facts’ (The Logic of the History of Ideas, 1999, p. 98). There are also further challenges to an over-reliance on rational action theory and the problems associated with the selection of evidence. Equally, most historians in practice doubt objectivity emerges from an accurate knowledge of the motives that can be matched to weak authorial intentions and that this leads to action via decisions. Few historians today accept that their narrative mimics past intentionality and that this provides true meaning. The article offers four reasons for rejecting Bevir's position and concludes with a defence of the narrative-linguistic determination of meaning. This suggests that history is subject to the same narrative and imaginative constraints as other forms of realist writing, rather than being privileged by an access to knowable intentionality and that this constitutes objective historical knowledge.     

The Russia of the Tsar and North Norway. "The Russian Danger" Revisited

The fear of Russia in Norway goes back far beyond the Russian Revolution. It played an important role in Norwegian Swedish foreign policies towards Russia from the 1830s and up to 1905 (and in Norwegian conceptions of threat between 1905 and 1917 as well, although the threat seems to have been more down-played in that period) (Nielsen 1994 95). In particular, there has been a fear of a possible attack on North-Norway. Roald Berg, in his recently published work entitled Norsk forsvarshistorie 1814-1905 (The History of the Norwegian Defence 1814 1905) presents evidence that the conception of a Russian danger was an issue in Norwegian military considerations as far back as in the 1820s and 1830s. According to Berg, it is evident that this idea was central in Norwegian military-strategic thought in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (Berg 2001: 112 115, 307-308). My purpose in this paper is to try to establish whether there was reason for this fear, that is, if there were any plans among the Russian authorities to conquer Norwegian territory in the period between the Eidsvoll Assembly and the storming of the Winter Palace (1814 1917).