The Decline of the Scottish Conservatives in North‐East Scotland, 1965–79: A Regional Perspective

This article takes a fresh look at the decline of the Conservative Party in post‐war Scotland, a phenomenon that has provoked much debate. The analysis presented here is innovative in that it takes a regional approach, whereas other contributions to this field have tended to ignore the considerable regional diversity of Scottish political behaviour. By examining one particular region of Scotland – the rural north‐east – this article demonstrates that the Conservatives’ decline occurred at the hands of parties – the Liberals and the Scottish Nationalists – that did not brand themselves as left wing or right wing; the latter in particular eschewed conventional political labels. This marks another departure from the established literature, which has tended to discuss the decline in terms of the Conservative Party or the Scottish electorate moving ‘left’ or ‘right’. Furthermore, the article makes it clear that a serious decline befell the party between 1965 and 1979: before the advent of Thatcherism that has widely been held responsible for the Scottish Conservatives’ electoral woes. This analysis is conducted by examining the local press coverage of the region, as well as the national and regional records of the parties concerned. It therefore seeks to make a contribution to the wider study of post‐war British politics, by demonstrating the benefits of local and regional approaches in this period where they have been largely overlooked. This article demonstrates that even in the 1960s and 1970s, when politics seemed so nationally uniform, there is considerable diversity to be appreciated in different parts of the country.     

Radicals,Tories or Monomaniacs? The Birmingham Currency Reformers in the House of Commons, 1832–67*

Benjamin Disraeli described Thomas Attwood as a ‘provincial banker labouring under a financial monomania’. The leader of the Birmingham Political Union, Attwood's Warwickshire accent and support for a paper currency were widely derided at Westminster. However, the themes of Attwood's brief parliamentary career were shared by the other men who represented Birmingham in the early‐ and mid‐Victorian period. None of these MPs were good party men, and this article illuminates the nature of party labels in the period. Furthermore, it adds a new dimension to the historical understanding of debates on monetary policy and shows how local political identities and traditions interacted with broader party identities. With the exception of Richard Spooner, who was a strong tory on religious and political matters, the currency men are best described as popular radicals, who consistently championed radical political reform and were among the few parliamentary supporters of the ‘People's Charter’. They opposed the new poor law and endorsed factory regulation, a progressive income tax, and religious liberty. Although hostile to the corn laws they believed that free trade without currency reform would depress prices, wages and employment. George Frederick Muntz's death in 1857 and his replacement by John Bright marked a watershed and the end of the influence of the ‘Birmingham school’. Bright appropriated Birmingham's radical tradition as he used the town as a base for his campaign for parliamentary reform. He emphasized Birmingham's contribution to the passing of the 1832 Reform Act but ignored the currency reformers' views on other matters, which had often been at loggerheads with the ‘Manchester school’ and economic liberalism.     

‘The Costly Luxury of Protesting’: The Deselection of J.M. Maclean,MP

With the increase in the electorate as the result of the Second and Third Reform Acts in the latter half of the 19th century came a corresponding increase in the importance of political parties. With this increase in the importance of party came the fear that the Burkean definition of the MP as a representative, owing his electorate his judgment as well as his industry would be replaced by a narrower conception of the MP as a delegate, returned to vote according to the dictates of party or ‘caucus’, subject to rejection by his party prior to an election, rather than the electorate as a whole at an election. This article examines the case of J.M. Maclean, Conservative MP for Cardiff 1895–1900, deselected by his constituency executive for his opposition to the Boer War, using it to shed light on the reaction of constituency parties in instances where MPs were felt to have overstepped the proper bounds of party discipline. The article concentrates on the relations between Maclean and his constituency party, crucial in Maclean's deselection. The limits of political dissent in time of war are examined, and the limitations placed by party on the freedom of action of individual MPs. In addition, the article gives glimpses of the tensions present in the Conservative‐Liberal Unionist coalition which governed Britain between 1895 and 1906, particularly on perceptions of the controversial figure of Joseph Chamberlain among Conservative back benchers.     

The Liberal Party,Free Trade and the 1841 Election

It is a paradox that the Liberal Party's electoral defeat in 1841 attested to its underlying strength and vitality. This article focuses on the impact on party unity of the free trade measures advocated by the ministry in the months preceding its fall. The Liberal Party's bold electoral platform antagonised its protectionist MPs, a group previously overlooked in the historiography, but fell short of the demands of its radical wing for political reform. While all the ingredients for fragmentation existed, unity prevailed. Protestations of loyalty to the leadership could be heard from the mouths of Liberal MPs of all shades, from stalwart protectionists who coalesced around the ministry on traditional foreign policy grounds through to the most fervent radicals who celebrated its ‘new’ direction. Such findings of cohesion contradict accounts which have hitherto viewed the 1841 electoral defeat as evidence of the party's inchoateness. Indeed, this article shifts the historiographical narrative away from addressing why the Liberals lost to the more pertinent issue of why the losses suffered were not greater. In answering that question, both the sensitivity with which the financial agenda was presented by ministers and the flexibility of different sections of the Liberal Party in interpreting and presenting the free trade measures to the electorate are underlined. Above all, Lord John Russell is rehabilitated as a ‘popular’ leader and his importance in the development of the nascent Liberal Party is unearthed.     

Resisting the Inevitable? The Parliament Act 1911

The Parliament Act 1911, limiting the veto power of the house of lords, constitutes a major piece of constitutional legislation in the United Kingdom. The vulnerability of the house of lords to major change was long‐standing and to be found in the actions of prime ministers over more than a century. The constitutional crisis leading to the passage of the act was triggered by the rejection of the budget by the Lords in 1909. However, the outcome of the crisis was by no means certain, either in terms of the provisions of the Parliament Bill or its passage. It was neither a product of a clash between peers and people or a principled debate as to the place of the second chamber in the nation's constitutional arrangements. It was the result of the stances taken on the issue that had dominated British politics since the 1880s: Irish home rule. This determined that the house of lords would be subject to change, not in terms of composition but in respect of its powers. In terms of the contemporary relevance of the act, attempts at further changes to the second chamber constitute neither history repeating itself nor unfinished business.     

The Whips of the Liberal Unionist Party in the House of Commons

This note provides the most complete list of Liberal Unionist whips in the house of commons, thus contributing to our understanding of the history of the party in parliament over the entire period of its existence from 1886 to 1912, and charts the extent of the responsibility of the party whip for the organisation of the party outside the house of commons, which peaked during the tenure of Lord Wolmer as whip from 1888 to 1892. The note concludes by observing that the division of labour regarding organisation implemented in the Conservative Party in 1911 mirrors that adopted by the Liberal Unionist Party in 1892, and that this was likely the result of Wolmer, now 2nd earl of Selborne, serving on the committee that recommended the 1911 reforms.