Islam and the Dutch in the East Indies: Oppression or Opportunity?

ABSTRACT

Dutch colonial ambitions in the East Indies had to contend with Islam, and this contention intensified as colonisation progressed and Islamisation deepened. The Dutch made pragmatic alliances with Muslim leaders and sultans in pursuit of trade dominance and profits. This, combined with protestant reformation in the Netherlands, allowed for significant religious freedom in the East Indies. The Dutch did proselytize Christianity, with most success in the Outer Islands to the east, mostly because of an absence of a major established religion in those areas. They favoured coexistence over religious wars. In order to improve the lives of locals, Islamic movements were permitted to establish enduring institutions. In the early twentieth century, this included the two largest Muslims groups in the world, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama and the reformist Muhammadiyah, which coincided with the emergence of political Islam in the form of the Islamic Traders Party. These formed important socio-religious structures that influenced political thought and modern state institutions, including the state ideology, the Pancasila, and the constitution, which obliged the state to accommodate religion.     

Kang Youwei’s propaganda adjustments after the Hundred Days Reform, 1898–1900

ABSTRACT

After the failed Hundred Days Reform, Kang Youwei launched a propaganda campaign in the newspapers under his control. In addition to casting himself in a favorable light, the campaign served two other purposes: to justify his own fleeing from China and to solicit foreign intervention to free Emperor Guangxu from house arrest. Immediately following the bloody coup d’etat in 1898, Kang identified Empress-Dowager Cixi as the chief instigator of the tragedy. By 1899, he turned to blaming some of her “evil ministers” as well. A year later he accused both parties. After the founding of Baohuang hui (Chinese Empire Reform Association) in 1899, Kang’s overseas propaganda began to call for an armed rescue mission and for funds from the overseas Chinese communities for this purpose. The adjustments Kang made to his propaganda campaign were echoed by progressive newspapers published inside China. Together, they created a public opinion that forced the Qing government to proceed with the political reform.     

Moshe Dayan: “Israel’s No. 1 Hero” (in America)

This study explores how and why Moshe Dayan became the symbol of the modern Israeli hero in American culture. Through an examination of variegated evidence it is possible to discern patterns that illustrate the ways Dayan’s image crystallized, first, in the American Jewish arena, and then more broadly, in wider American public consciousness. With his trademark eye patch and irreverent personal style, Dayan, who more than any Israeli military-political figure captured the imagination of American Jewry, became not only the most recognizable sabra on the American scene but also a chief exemplar of the “new Jew.” Beginning with the War of Independence (1947–49) until roughly the Six-Day War (1967), Dayan symbolized Israel’s youthful, virile, and savvy hero struggling to build a home against all odds. From the Yom Kippur War (1973) to the Camp David Accords (1978) and his death, he came to exemplify a generation of Israelis who wrestled with the Jewish state’s existential geopolitical challenges. Investigating Dayan’s public persona enhances our understanding of his impact on the American arena – the man and the myth – and the ideational linkages so critical to the developing bond between the United States and Israel in the second half of the twentieth century.     

The Importance of Status: The US–ROK Alliance Cohesion and the First Korean Nuclear Crisis, 1993–94

The US–ROK alliance during the First Korean Nuclear Crisis provides the most likely case of high alliance cohesion. Curiously, however, instead of dancing to the American tune in their joint management of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) threat, the Republic of Korea (ROK) caused frequent policy collisions – supporting the US–DPRK negotiations at one point and opposing it at another – at the risk of jeopardizing its physical security. The main finding here is that the variations in the South Korean behavior were a function of their experience of status inconsistency. In particular, the ROK became compliant with the US–DPRK talks when it believed that its desired status marker of taking the leadership role in crisis management was within reach, and unyielding otherwise. These fluctuations ended up not only eroding the US–ROK alliance cohesion but also inhibiting a successful resolution of the crisis. All this bears directly on the fundamental question of whether international politics is to be understood in essentially realist terms.