Communicating with the European Resistance: an assessment of the Special Operations Executive’s wireless facilities in the UK during the Second World War

Summary: This article presents for the first time an examination of the Special Operations Executive’s (SOE) UK-based communication facilities. Established in 1940, SOE was responsible for coordinating all acts of sabotage against the enemy overseas. This was only possible with the aid of a reliable communications link with the Resistance. By examining SOE’s Home Stations, this article will demonstrate the value the organization placed in reliable wireless communications.     

Anthropology in the UK: Never Mind the Biographies,Here's the Reflexive Symbols

Focusing on the concept of the intellectual biography, I explore the relational and symbolic importance of life histories for the reflexive history of anthropology. Legacies of questioning disciplinary self-awareness exist for fieldwork, data analysis, writing up, and academic social networks. The intellectual biography, as a newly developing self-conscious genre, is becoming central to the way in which the discipline writes its own history. This article situates five recent biographies of “British” anthropologists into a theoretical, methodological, and intellectual landscape that encompasses the international development of a century of social anthropology in the United Kingdom.     

The Historiography of Deir Yassin

This article describes Israeli and Arab historiography concerning the events in the Arab village of Deir Yassin in April 1948, during the first Israeli–Arab war, of 1948. It begins with the internal, left–right Israeli controversy during 1969–71 about the alleged massacre and then describes and analyses what “really” happened at Deir Yassin on the basis of the Israeli (and, to a smaller extent, British) documentation from 1948 that has been declassified over the last few years. It then concludes by describing the evolution of the Israel and Palestinian histographical narratives on the event.     

Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle

The reasons for the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf are highly contentious. While some scholars have focused on short-term considerations, especially the devaluation of sterling towards the end of 1967, in the British determination to quit the Gulf, others have concentrated on longer-term trends in British policy-making for the region. This article sides with the latter. Britain's Gulf role came under increasing scrutiny following the 1956 Suez crisis as part of an ongoing debate about the costs and benefits of Britain's Gulf presence. In this sense, British withdrawal fitted into a wider pattern of British decolonisation. By the 1960s, the Treasury, in particular, strongly questioned the necessity and cost-effectiveness of the maintenance of empire in the Gulf to safeguard British economic interests there. Recent interpretations which seek to disaggregate the British decision to leave Southeast Asia from the decision to depart from the Gulf are also questionable. By mid-1967, it had already been determined that Britain would leave both regions by the mid-1970s, the only difference being that this decision was formally announced with respect to Southeast Asia, but not with regard to the Gulf. The devaluation of sterling in November 1967, therefore, merely hastened and facilitated decisions which had already been taken. Despite the end of formal empire in the Gulf, Britain did seek, not always successfully, to preserve its interests into the 1970s and beyond.     

William Ogilvie,the Klondike Borderlands and the Making of the Canadian West

This article focuses on William Ogilvie, the Canadian Dominions Surveyor and Commissioner of the Yukon during one of the most formative periods in Canadian history—the opening of the Yukon Territories during the Klondike Gold Rush. By the mid-1890s, Canadian and American miners flooded the Yukon–Alaska border in search of gold. The mass migration of American miners created anxieties among Canadian officials who believed Americans would forcibly annex the Yukon Territories. In light of this, Ogilvie was tasked with clarifying the contested boundary line and establishing economic links across the Atlantic to Great Britain in order to secure the Canadian boundary and maintain Canadian authority on the frontier. In 1898, Ogilvie left for Great Britain to tie Canada more closely to the British Empire and, effectively, sell the Yukon to potential British investors. This article thus speaks to issues in the North American borderlands and Atlantic history.     

Exploring normative whiteness: ensuring inclusive pedagogic practice in undergraduate fieldwork teaching and learning

Higher education commentators have become concerned about how learning and teaching praxis across the sector may unwittingly advantage White British (WB) compared to Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) students. Adopting critical race theory, this article explores these issues in relation to field teaching in geography and related subjects. It reports on primary data collected from students about to attend their first residential field trip. The research shows that WB and BME students approach their first field trip with diverse geographical experiences. The findings indicate a need to reflect critically on our fieldwork routines in order to promote inclusivity in field learning.     

‘Postponing the Evil Day’: Sir Edward Grey and British Foreign Policy

ABSTRACT

Sir Edward Grey is remembered largely as Britain's Foreign Secretary when ‘the lights went out all over Europe’ in the summer of 1914. His record remains contested. From David Lloyd George's crafty deception in his wartime memoirs to more recent revisionist historians, writers have sought to blame Grey for the outbreak of the First World War. Drawing on substantial research in private and official, British, and foreign archives, this paper will reconstruct Grey's career as Foreign Secretary with an emphasis on his objectives and the means which he employed to obtain them. Crucially, it places Grey's stewardship of British foreign policy within the broader international context, defined by the steep decline and subsequent renaissance of Russian power in the years between 1905 and 1912/13, with the aim of establishing the limitations of British power. More especially the shift in the international balance around 1913/14 shaped towards Russia, and away from Germany, shaped Grey's calculations during Europe's last summer. The July Crisis showed both the strengths and the limitations of Grey's diplomacy, this persistent and subtle pressing for mediation, but also his misreading of Austro-Hungarian policy.     

British Diplomatic Attitudes towards Europe, 1801–4Ignorant and Indifferent?

Recent decades have seen a rehabilitation of the reputation of Henry Addington's and Lord Hawkesbury's foreign policy during the course of the former's government, 1801–4. Nevertheless, the existing historiography has done little to place their actions in the wider context of British foreign policy in the early nineteenth century, nor to assess them in light of the debate around the arguments of Paul W. Schroeder's systemic theories and his attacks on eighteenth-century balance-of-power politics. This article argues that Schroeder's theories need qualifying in relation to this period and shall demonstrate that Addington and Hawkesbury conducted a logical, consistent, and Euro-centric balance-of-power policy, and one rooted in rules and assumptions governing their conduct, rather than a pell-mell free-for-all diplomatic system. It furthermore raises questions as to the continuity in British foreign policy and the need for additional research in this area.     

Importing fascism: reappraising the British fascisti, 1923–1926

This article re-evaluates the ideology and significance of Britain’s first self-proclaimed fascist party, the British Fascisti (BF) between 1923 and 1926. It challenges the dominant scholarly perception of BF ideology as a virulent form of conservatism or ‘Conservatism with Knobs On’ by demonstrating that they represent a hybrid movement consisting of both domestic conservative and continental fascist ideas. Thus, the chief purpose of this article is to demonstrate the dynamics of what scholars refer to as ‘fascistisation’ – the adoption and re-contextualisation of fascist features by non-fascist political movements and regimes. The BF’s ideology represents an, at times, contradictory attempt to replicate the Italian Fascist movement and repackage it for a British audience – they were a ‘fascistized’ right-wing pressure group seeking a new, authoritarian state. Abstract notions of the ‘success’ of Mussolini’s fascist experiment in stemming a Bolshevik revolution and his achievements in bringing order and a new sense of patriotism were re-adapted to the British context. These ideas were manacled to British conservative ideas of Christianity, anti-Socialism and imperialism typically associated with Edwardian Die Hards. Ultimately, the BF’s ideology will be proved to be far more complex than scholars have been prepared to acknowledge during a period in which fascism was ill-defined.