Italianità and internationalism: Production,design and mediation at Alessi, 1976-96

This article considers the Italian household product design company Alessi as quintessentially Italian and international. The interplay of mass-production and craft techniques at Alessi, an extended design process and the presentation of the family in company publicity exemplify the ambiguities identified within Italian design. The extent to which Alessi typifies Italian post-war design is questioned with reference to the company's international design team and the marketing of its products to foreign consumers as manifestations of italianità. The findings are based on primary research in Milan and the Alessi factory, including a series of interviews with designers, retailers, curators and media workers, combined with secondary material centred upon design history.     

Introduction

The second Berlusconi government came to power at the end of a period of unprecedented change in Italian politics to which the term 'Italian transition' is frequently applied. While the new government's arrival has not brought the transition to an end, the manner of its election powerfully symbolizes the end of much of what was 'unique' about the Italian polity. Such uniqueness derived essentially from the tripolar nature of the country's party system and the 'blocked' character of its democracy. The crisis of the early 1990s gave rise to the onset of a regime transition whose phases can be described analytically by applying Flanagan's (1973) developmental framework and Linz's (1978) breakdown and re-equilibration model. Given the transition's 'stalling', the article considers what kind of and how much change has taken place in the Italian political system and the degree to which the second Berlusconi government might represent a new departure for it. The Introduction concludes by presenting the 'aspects of the Italian transition' discussed in the following five articles.     

The government,the opposition and the President of the Republic under Berlusconi

This article assesses the behaviour of three actors, the government, the opposition and the President of the Republic, in the first two years of Berlusconi's government. Though solidly controlled by Berlusconi, his government has already had to replace two important ministers and some under-secretaries and has often behaved like a traditional coalition government. Moreover, it has so far achieved virtually none of the promises made in the 'Contract with the Italians'. It is feebly challenged by a divided opposition, unorganized, leaderless, unable to create a shadow government and just waiting for Romano Prodi's return from Brussels. Precisely because of its weakness, the opposition has often tried to rely on the President of the Republic as a check on Berlusconi's exorbitant power. Indeed, Ciampi has intervened in a more or less controversial way in the drafting of some government bills and has sent a solemn message to parliament asking for a more impartial and pluralist information system; to no avail. However, Ciampi's role and behaviour suggest that the problem of the powers of the President of the Republic has not been solved. Berlusconi's own preference for a popularly elected president and his unsolved conflict of interests indicate that the political and institutional transition in Italy is not yet over.     

The Mafia misunderstood – again

Abstract

Observers who have investigated Alleanza Nazionale's relationship to historical fascism have mostly relied on programmatic documents as well as Gianfranco Fini's speeches and interviews. This article tackles the same question by considering the visual propaganda produced by the party from its launch in 1994 to its merger with Silvio Berlusconi's Popolo della Libertà in March 2009. An examination of the logos, the portraits of Fini and other imagery that feature on posters, brochures, websites and the party daily Secolo d'Italia shows that they frequently refer, albeit mostly covertly, to the iconographies of fascism. The contemporary visual sources used by Alleanza Nazionale and the strategies adopted to present a modern and respectable image are also explored. The article argues that much of the propaganda of Alleanza Nazionale incorporates two levels of meaning: an overt and moderate one, which addressed the general public, and a concealed one celebrating ideas and values of the Ventennio, which aimed to reassure a hard-core of activists that the party had not betrayed its original identity.     

A bridge in times of confrontation: Italy and Russia in the context of EU and NATO enlargements

Abstract

How might the continuous changes in the standing orders of the Camera dei Deputati between 1861 and 1922 be explained? To answer this question, the text investigates the political events associated with standing order reforms. Two results are emphasized. On the one hand, and contrary to common views, the study shows that the reforms were not casual or episodic, but resulted from different sets of political pressure, internal or external to the parliamentary ambit. This fact, on the other hand, draws attention to the need to go deeper into the question of the institutional evolution of the liberal parliament, chiefly with regard to relations among institutional actors.     

The man who never was? The Italian transition and 2008 election

Abstract

The implications for the co-called Italian transition of the 2008 election initially seemed significant – but have since become increasingly uncertain as Berlusconi's conflict of interests has risen higher up the political agenda. This underscores the pertinence of asking about the sense in which the notion of ‘transition’ is actually applicable to the Italian case at all – bearing in mind that it describes a process now supposedly underway for some 17 years; and bearing in mind that its end point can seemingly not be identified (though by definition ‘transition’ implies movement between two points). Discovering if the term applies to the Italian case and if so whether 2008 has brought its conclusion nearer requires exploring if the political protagonists that have emerged from the election as the most significant players – the Popolo della Libertà and the Partito Democratico – have sufficient commonality of view, sufficient desire and sufficient power to complete a process of constitutional overhaul. The evidence suggests that while they have the view and the desire, there are significant limitations on their power. The election might potentially have been a watershed in the so-called Italian transition in the broader sense of system performance, aside from formal constitutional change. Here too, however, the evidence points away from the idea that 2008 represents a real sea change – though the chances seem good that it will come to be perceived as such.     

Resisting Bodies: Narratives of Italian Partisan Women

The second part of 2015 Pulitzer Prize winning author David I. Kertzer's interview with the Italian political leader Romano Prodi covers the period from the fall of Prodi's first government in 1998. Starting with the causes of the 1998 crisis, the discussion follows Prodi's subsequent career as President of the European Commission (1999–2004), the introduction of the Euro, the expansion of the EU, and the attempts to introduce a new European constitution, before moving to the second Prodi government (2006–08). Describing his subsequent role as UN Special Envoy for the Sahel and his candidacy in the 2013 Italian presidential elections, Italy's former Prime Minister reflects more widely on the current state of European and Italian politics.     

Surfing and trying to keep afloat: The political communication process in a highly fragmented coalition led by a ‘Great Mediator’

This article analyses the experience of the second Prodi government from the standpoint of its political communication. The opening part contextualises the case by placing it within the broader framework of coalition governments generally, and briefly outlines the critical elements that, in Italy, prevent any majority from making a genuinely strategic use of communication in the policy-making process. The second part focuses on Prodi's poor communication, highlighting both its limits and the attempts at improvement made by the leader and his staff in 2007. Finally, the third part examines the journalistic coverage of the centre-left majority and considers the trend in public approval for the premier and the government, emphasising the problems that emerged on each side.     

The Italian national elections of 13 May 2001

As expected and long predicted by all the surveys, Silvio Berlusconi's Casa delle LibertÀ won the Italian national elections of 13 May 2001. The four coalition partners had significantly different results. Forza Italia became the largest Italian party while both the National Alliance and the White Flower lost votes but kept almost the same number of seats as in 1996, and were anyway happy to return to the government. The Northern League shared this kind of success, but lost heavily in terms of votes – falling below the 4 per cent threshold – and seats. In spite of its five years of good government, the Olive Tree/Centre-Left coalition was defeated. This article argues that the defeat was due to three major factors. First, the Olive Tree had broken its promise of one government, one Prime Minister, one programme of reforms. Second, it forfeited the advantage of incumbency by choosing Francesco Rutelli as its prime ministerial candidate, using an opaque procedure. Third, because of the differences of opinion among the various partners, the Olive Tree/Centre-Left could not capitalize either on its systemic reforms, that is joining the Euro and the reconstruction of a viable economic system, or on its piecemeal reforms. The list led by Rutelli, the Daisy, did relatively well. The real losers were the Left Democrats who, because of their organizational decline and political confusion, plummeted to their lowest percentage ever. Now Berlusconi has the chance to prove that he can not only win the elections, but also, in spite of his immense conflict of interests, govern the country. Come atteso e da lungo tempo previsto da tutti i sondaggi, la Casa delle LibertÀ di Silvio Berlusconi ha vinto le elezioni italiane del 13 maggio 2001. I suoi quattro alleati hanno ottenuto risultati diversi. Forza Italia è diventata il più forte partito italiano, mentre sia Alleanza Nazionale che il Biancofiore hanno perduto voti, pur mantenendo all'incirca lo stesso numero di seggi rispetto al 1996, ma sono comunque felici di ritornare al governo. La Lega Nord è egualmente soddisfatta per questo, nonostante abbia perso pesantemente in termini di seggi e di voti, non raggiungendo la soglia del 4 per cento. Questo articolo indica come, nonostante i suoi cinque anni di buon governo, la coalizione Ulivo/centro-sinistra sia stata sconfitta per tre fondamentali fattori. Primo, l'Ulivo non ha saputo mantenere le promesse fatte in campagna elettorale: un governo unico e un Primo ministro per tutto il corso della legislatura, e un programma di riforme. Secondo, ha sciupato il vantaggio derivante dall'essere il governo in carica scegliendo in maniera opaca il suo candidato alla presidenza del Consiglio Francesco Rutelli. Terzo, a causa delle differenze di opinione fra i diversi alleati, l'Ulivo/centro-sinistra non ha saputo sfruttare nè le sue riforme sistemiche, come la partecipazione italiana nell'Euro e il risanamento economico, né le riforme specifiche. La Margherita, lista guidata da Rutelli, ha avuto un buon successo, mentre i Democratici di Sinistra sono i veri perdenti poichè, in preda a confusione politica e organizzativa, sono piombati al loro pi basso livello percentuale di sempre. Adesso, Berlusconi ha la possibilitÀ di provare che non è soltanto capace di vincere le elezioni, ma anche, nonostante l'immenso conflitto di interessi determinato dalla sua posizione imprenditoriale, di governare il paese.     

Berlusconi,strong government and the Italian state

Over the past decade, state capacity has increased at all levels, including that of central government, and the emergence of effective government in Italy has proved popular. A second trend has been the reassertion of party government since 1996. Given these two trends, the large parliamentary majority obtained by Silvio Berlusconi's alliance, the Casa delle LibertÀ, might be expected to result in strong party government. In fact, Berlusconi's triumph offers something more and something less than party government, challenging Italian democracy. Nevertheless, as a consolidated democracy, Italy should be able to withstand such a challenge. One stable, democratic outcome to Italy's political transformation would be the consolidation of a Schumpeterian model of democracy. This would require the anomalies of the right's accumulation of powers to be resolved, a process which the left could promote by accepting that strong democratic government is a public good, and by organizing itself to challenge Berlusconi by campaigning to provide Italy with such government through parliamentary competition.