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1.
The headscarf continues to be a highly charged political issue in Turkey where it is often understood through the prism of the opposition between so-called Islamists versus secularists. My work brings together feminist scholarship on the politics of everyday space and recent rethinking of the categories of secularism and religion. I begin by situating this politicized debate in the everyday material contexts of the public square, the street, and the mall. By introducing popular culture (notably the film Büşra) and my own fieldwork on the veil, I argue that the headscarf represents the intersection of politics of place and individual agency in a way that renders ideological debates contingent on everyday practices. Reducing the headscarf to a sign of Islamism fails to take into account the ever-shifting meanings of this object across time and space. The differences within and between the everyday urban sites I examine reveal much more complex, often contradictory, and discontinuous geographies of secularism and Islam. This analysis reveals a multiplicity that belies attempts to delineate clearly bounded spaces, subjects, and ideologies, one that is intimate and political. 相似文献
2.
Michelle E. GarceauAuthor Vitae 《Journal of Medieval History》2011,37(2):197-214
Bells were an inescapable part of fourteenth-century urban life. They signalled the hours of the day and times for prayers; they warned of tempests and enemy armies; they heralded masses, funerals, and deaths. The pealing of bells brought men, women, and children together, choreographing communal behaviour in time and space. Bells echoed the vox Domini, calling out the deaths of holy men and women, celebrating the working of miracles. The ubiquitous presence of bells reflected the omnipresence of God in the medieval world. Their echoes transformed private moments into collective experiences, elevating the mundane into the miraculous. Scholars have rarely examined the religious aspects of bells, looking instead at their more practical side, especially their utilisation as markers of time and the allegedly concurrent rise of mercantile culture. This article approaches bells from the viewpoints of those men and women who heard them and wanted them rung. Focusing on sources from Christian clerics, we see that medieval men rang the bells with clear, but many possible, purposes in mind. By marking time and prayers, Christian church bells helped to create and facilitate communities within dioceses, spurring and choreographing their actions. During funerals, bells broadcast private moments, giving them communal significance. The transformative, creative function of bells is clearest in their role in miracles. In Manresa, the vision experienced by a few became a community affair when the church bells gathered the people; the bells transformed an ordinary day into one where the people, as a community, received divine favour. Finally, with the deaths of holy persons, the tolling of bells transformed private, even anonymous deaths, into moments of wonder as God’s hand touched the world.The pealing of bells defined Christian communities in the Mediterranean and, at the same time as rulers and elites throughout the region were seeking to control minority groups, those same groups were seeking to exercise control over the sounds within their own communities. Through the pealing of bells, churchmen across Catalunya sought to direct the thoughts and prayers of their listeners. When the Christian clerics of Catalunya rang their churches’ bells, they had specific aims in mind, yet, as the evidence demonstrates, the pealing of the bells never meant just one thing. This article demonstrates that there is much more to understanding medieval bells than knowing ‘for whom the bell tolls’; we have to look at the listeners as much as the ringers in order to understand their cultural significance in medieval Europe. This article is a first step in how such a study could be begun. 相似文献
3.
Piro Rexhepi 《History & Anthropology》2019,30(4):477-489
ABSTRACTLooking at the architectures of governance that have characterized the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), this essay explores the ways in which imperial inventories of colonial institutions come to influence and arbitrate contemporary debates over what constitutes legitimate practices of Islam in Bosnia–Herzegovina and Austria. Examining the larger political context in which these debates emerge, including the criminalization of Muslim communities that refuse to submit to the authority of state-sanctioned Islamic religious institutions, I detail the ways in which colonial histories are recruited to curate a homogenized, continuous representational mandate for Muslim communities and practices in Austria and BiH. Attending to nostalgic invocations of the late Habsburg governance of Islam and Muslims, I argue that these discourses serve to legitimate specific Muslim institutions and actors in Austria and BiH that privilege the Habsburg legacy through the exclusion of outlawed/illegal Muslim communities and practices in both countries. 相似文献
4.
Johan Mathew 《The Journal of imperial and commonwealth history》2017,45(6):942-968
In the aftermath of the First World War, British officials were forced to contend with a threat that seemed to undermine their empire from India to Egypt. The anti-colonial revolts that spread across the world in this moment were caused by many factors from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to far more local concerns. However, many British officials imagined these contemporaneous revolts to be caused by a pan-Islamic conspiracy. The threat of pan-Islam was inflated in the minds of these officials in large part because it fundamentally contradicted their conception of how politics should be ordered on a global scale. This article suggests that the spectre of pan-Islam helped to crystallise a methodological nationalism in imperial policies over Muslim populations. The amorphous spatiality of pan-Islam redoubled a growing commitment to bounded national spaces as a natural unit of political activity. To those officials obsessed with pan-Islam, it was so frightening precisely because it questioned the spatial paradigm through which they understood the world. Other officials saw pan-Islam as a minor nuisance, because they believe that such transnational politics could not possibly survive in a world inherently ordered into contiguous nations. The threat of pan-Islam helped to push both sets of officials into a methodological nationalism, but some saw nationalism as inevitable while others feared that Islam was a compelling threat to a European-dominated inter-national order. 相似文献
5.
Ian Chalmers 《亚洲研究评论》2017,41(3):331-351
While Indonesia’s efforts at countering violent extremism have enjoyed some successes, a section of its Islamist community remains committed to militant jihadism. The return from overseas of hundreds of militants linked to ISIS means that there is now a greater need than ever for interventions to prevent radicalisation – and for programs to reintegrate militants back into society. Drawing on 20 selected interviews with former jihadists, this article asks how successful official efforts have been at disengaging those convicted under Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law from violent extremism. A significant minority remain welded to a militant mindset: “committed jihadists” who are likely to reoffend. Some former jihadists have “disengaged provisionally” but remain vulnerable: they have only disengaged for tactical or practical reasons. Yet some have also begun to disengage emotionally. While they may not disavow completely the use of force, these “provisionally deradicalised” activists have moved closer to that minority of interviewees who are “fully deradicalised”. Using this four-part typology of the pathways by which some militant jihadists have disengaged but others have not, this article finds that disengagement is a gradual process shaped by social networks. Consequently, it is suggested that a variety of methods be used to promote disengagement both before and after inmates leave prison. 相似文献
6.
Lyn Parker 《亚洲研究评论》2017,41(3):441-458
This article examines the experience of Muslim female students in high schools in Bali. Since the religion of the majority of the population of Bali is Balinese Hinduism, these young women are part of a Muslim minority – unusual in Indonesia. Data were obtained through interviews and ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2010. Interviewees were mainly Muslim students, but teachers and Muslim parents were also consulted. Some of the students are a minority within a state senior high school, and some attend a private Islamic school in Denpasar. Interviewees identified choice of school and the wearing of the jilbab (Islamic head-scarf) as issues for them in their everyday lives. The Islamic school is (mis-)perceived as a morally safe environment by parents. The state school does not allow the wearing of the jilbab, showing the limits of multiculturalism in Bali. While the jilbab should express piety and morality, there is some hypocrisy among some young jilbab-wearing women. Some young women have internalised the Balinese objection to poor Muslim immigrants, and feel inferior when they wear the jilbab. The data suggest that their female sex/gender flags their unequal Muslim-minority status in ways that Muslim-minority men do not experience. 相似文献
7.
Richard Eves 《History & Anthropology》2013,24(1):85-138
Today, dramatic improvements in transportation and social communications are forging dense transnational networks. People, cultures and societies that were previously isolated from one another are now coming into regular contact. This abolition of temporal and spatial constraints affects both the social and cultural spheres: globalization provides a common context that attenuates differences among ways of life. After reviewing the major social theories on cultural globalization, this article focuses on religions within cultural globalization and describes the similarities between Islam and other major religious traditions, as they interplay with globalization. 相似文献
8.
Samina Yasmeen 《Australian Journal of International Affairs》2013,67(2):157-175
This article focuses on the dominant and parallel struggles that have been carried out in Pakistan in terms of its Islamic identity since 9/11. It argues that the Pakistan government has legitimised and explained its partnership with the US government in countering terrorism through a discourse that makes use of Islamic symbols. The Islamists have engaged in a similar process, arguing for jihad against the enemies of Islam. Simultaneously, a tension has persisted between liberal/progressive and orthodox notions of being a Pakistani Muslim, which has been reflected in, for example, the debate on the blasphemy law in Pakistan. It is important that strategies to strengthen Pakistan also creatively empower groups subscribing to liberal/progressive ideas so as to succeed in the struggle against militancy in the long term. The argument is developed in three parts, starting with a discussion of opposing views on Pakistan's identity and the place of Islam as the context for the Pakistan government's participation in the War on Terror. The second part explores features of the opposing discourses adopted by Islamabad and jihadi groups. The third part discusses the parallel tensions between alternative understandings of Pakistan's Islamic identity at the societal level with reference to the blasphemy law. The concluding section suggests a carefully crafted approach to assisting Pakistan at this stage in its history that could also respond to the subordinate tensions. 相似文献
9.
Christian C. Sahner 《Iranian studies》2019,52(1-2):61-83
The Gizistag Abāli? is a ninth- or tenth-century Pahlavi text, recording a debate which took place at the court of al-Ma?mūn between a Zoroastrian priest and a heretical dualist. This article, the first in-depth study of this important work, examines the text in its broader Islamicate environment. It argues that the narrative itself is probably fictional, but reflects a real historical phenomenon, namely the interreligious debates which took place among Zoroastrians, Muslims, Christians, and Jews during the ?Abbasid period. It argues that the text is a unique Zoroastrian example of a literary genre that was common among Christians at the time, namely, “the monk in the emir’s majlis.” By comparing the Gizistag Abāli? to these Christian texts, it explores why Zoroastrians generally did not launch explicit polemics against Islam, comparable to those of other non-Muslim communities. It seems that Zoroastrian authors were more concerned with explaining their own doctrines than critiquing the beliefs of others. This is curious considering the large numbers of Zoroastrians who were converting to Islam at the time. Finally, the article proposes new ways of refining the way we read Pahlavi texts, by analyzing them alongside the literatures of other religious communities in the early Islamic empire. 相似文献
10.
Serdar Kaya 《政策研究杂志》2019,47(3):793-818
This study examines church–state relations in Europe, and analyzes their influence on anti‐immigrant attitudes. The literature explains this relationship primarily with religious demographics, or state privileges for the majority faith. Alternately, this study focuses on the status of the majority religion. It argues that, in countries with a national church, citizens are more likely to consider the institutionalization of a new religion to be occurring at the expense of the national heritage, and react negatively. To test that hypothesis, the study focuses on Muslim immigrants in Europe, and builds an index that gauges the extent to which European states institutionalize Islam. Then, employing multilevel regression analysis, it investigates how the institutionalization of Islam influences anti‐Muslim prejudice in different contexts of church–state regimes. Individual‐level data come from the latest wave of the European Values Study, and cover 31 countries. Findings indicate that, in European countries with a national church, institutionalization of Islam increases anti‐Muslim prejudice. In countries without a national church, however, institutionalization leads to tolerance. These results confirm the continuing relevance of religion on the national level in Europe, despite the decline in individual religiosity. 相似文献