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Jean-Pierre Cléro Bertrand Vergely Marie-Jeanne Königson-Montain Robert Theis Henri Olivier Jean Bernhardt Étienne François Jean-Christophe Goddard Michel Espagne Anne Lagny Peter Schöttler Patrie Sicard Edmond Oritgues Barbara de Negroni Thierry Wanegffelen Marie-Luce Demonet-Launay Mireille Harbert François Laplanche Antony McKenna Carl Aderhold Geneviève Hasenohr Patrick Gautier Dalché Joël Cornette Jean-François Baillon Monique Cotiret Jacques Le Brun Chantal Grell Vincent Milliot Perrine Simon-Nahum Éric Brian 《Revue de synthèse / Centre international de synthèse》1992,113(1-2):189-269
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Thierry Martin 《Revue de synthèse / Centre international de synthèse》2001,122(2-4):455-471
In a decisive article about the birth of the calculus of probabilities (1970), Ernest Coumet recalled Cournot's formula: the delay concerning the birth of the theory of chance is «a pure effect of chance». We suggest here submitting this judgement to the critical examination not of history but of Cournot's very thought; his philosophy of history and his representation of the history of science in the xviith century seems, at first, to denounce beforehand such a decisive judgement. To render an account of what can then appear on his part to be an inconsistency or even a blindness, we formulate the hypothesis that this statement constitutes an artefact of his internal conception of the history of science and scientific revolutions. In that sense, the article constitutes an illustration of theoretical necessity and of the difficulties of mathematical history as well. 相似文献
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BUSINESS TAX INTERACTIONS AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH CASE 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
ABSTRACT. We study the business tax ("taxe professionnelle") behavior of the intermediate level (department) of local government in France and test in the same model the two hypotheses that department tax rates are explained by upper tier (region) tax rates and by tax rates chosen by other departments. We first reject the hypothesis of tax interactions between departments and regions, the two upper levels of local governments. Second, we provide evidence that business tax interactions among departments are significant. Including the vertical dimension in the estimated model does not lead to a decrease in the horizontal tax interactions parameter, nor to its nonsignificance. 相似文献
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