Richard Lionheart: bad king, bad crusader?

This paper analyzes the impact of King Richard Lionheart of England during his tenure as leader of the Third Crusade. It examines crusade policy and the significance of Richard's decisions to deviate from it. The lack of control which both the Church and normative crusading precedents had over him becomes apparent. Richard's failure to take Jerusalem leads to the conclusion that his self-centred, puerile interests in personal adventures destroyed the chance for success of the Third Crusade, and thus prolonged warfare. Most wars have some sort of peace as the ultimate goal. The Third Crusade is no exception, but Richard subverted the goal of peace by turning away from a siege of Jerusalem and toward various other adventures, for example, attacks on Egyptian holdings, border skirmishes, the conquest of Cyprus from the Byzantines. Still, the Lionheart's legend persists from his day to our own to extol chivalrous virtues and courageous action. This paper presents the other side of the coin in the hope of approaching a more balanced, accurate portrayal of Richard's crusade leadership and of the ends of crusade ideology which he undermined.     

For Whom is the Rural Economy Resilient? Initial Effects of Drought in Western Sudan

This discussion piece addresses two recent debates: entitlement theory and the resilience of rural systems. The authors find that in western Sudan entitlement theory provides a specific and useful framework for understanding the nature of the crisis confronting the society. Arguments about the resilience of rural systems, however, need to be more closely examined and will depend on site-specific factors. The rural economy and society of western Sudan were not found to be resilient.     

RESPONSIBLE ACTION AND THE PROBLEM OF REIFICATION

This paper elaborates a “personal,” as opposed to an institutional, view of administrative responsibility. The idea of personal responsibility is better suited for appreciating the cognitive, conceptual, and interpersonal dynamics of policy processes than is the institutional view of responsibility as accountability. From the perspective of personal responsibility, the primary impediment to responsible action by policy makers, policy analysts, and administrators is not that they may act in ways that are ethically or morally wrong. Rather, the problem is that such actors may either not perceive that important choices are available to them or, when choices are perceived, their moral, as opposed to their instrumental, content may not be appreciated. Responsible action should thus be seen as a conceptual or cognitive issue, not simply one of adherence to or departure from institutionally objectivated standards of correctness. Inability to appreciate the moral nature of action may be explained by the cognitive tendency to reify policy making and administrative institutions, roles, rules, and situations.