Structure and Agency in the Holocaust: Daniel J. Goldhagen and His Critics

A striking aspect of the so-called "Goldhagen debate" hasbeen the bifurcated reception Hitler's Willing Executioners hasreceived: the enthusiastic welcome of journalists and the public was as warm as the impatientdismissal of most historians was cool. This article seeks to transcend the current impasse byanalyzing the underlying issues of Holocaust research at stake here. It argues that a "deepstructure" necessarily characterizes the historiography of the Holocaust, comprising atension between its positioning in "univeralism" and"particularism" narratives. While the former conceptualizes the Holocaust as anabstract human tragedy and explains its occurrence in terms of processes common to modernsocieties, the latter casts its analysis in ethnic and national categories: the Holocaust as anexclusively German and Jewish affair. These narratives possess important implications for thebalance of structure and human agency in the explanation of the Holocaust: where theuniversalism narrative emphasizes the role of impersonal structures in mediating human action,the particularism narrative highlights the agency of human actors. Although historical accountsusually combine these narratives, recent research on the Holocaust tends in the universalistdirection, and this bears on the sensitive issue of responsibility for the Holocaust byproblematizing the common-sense notion of the perpetrators' intention and responsibility.Goldhagen is responding to this trend, but by retreating to the particularism narrative andemploying an inadequate definition of intention, he fails to move the debate forward. It is time torethink the concept of intention in relation to events like the Holocaust.     

Essentialism and Historicism in Danto's Philosophy of Art

Arthur C. Danto has long defended essentialism in the philosophy of art, yet he has been interpreted by many as a historicist. This essentialism/historicism conflict in the interpretation of his work reflects the same conflict both within his thought and, more importantly, within modern art itself. Danto's strategy for resolving this conflict involves, among other things, a Bildungsroman of modern art failing to discover its essence, an essentialist definition of art provided by philosophy which is indemnified against history, and a thesis about the end of art once it has been defined. Is this strategy successful, or does it result, as I argue, in a philosophical disenfranchisement of art of precisely the type that Danto himself has criticized?