Policy Learning and Uncertainty: The Case of Pension Reform in Estonia and Latvia

This article addresses the question, under what conditions does the need for urgent solutions to societal problems lead to transferring a policy designed for another political system? The argument developed in the article is based on the theoretical frameworks of learning and historical institutionalism. I have posited that the urgent need for quick solutions to existing policy problems is a catalyst for policy transfer only if there is not enough prior successful experience with self‐designed policy reforms. The theoretical argument is tested using the case of pension reform in Estonia and Latvia, which proves to be difficult to explain with the arguments in the existing policy transfer literature.     

Do Lawyers Get More Votes?

ABSTRACT

In many western democracies, law has been the dominant occupational background of politicians. This raises the question whether lawyers get more votes when they run for election compared to non-lawyers. To our knowledge, this question has not been examined empirically over an extended period of time. Our study aims to fill this lacuna. We collected longitudinal data about the careers of all candidates in Canadian federal elections from 1921 to 2015. Our dataset is composed of about 32,000 observations including the occupation and electoral performance of every candidate who ran for office. Our analysis shows that lawyers do get more votes but that their personal electoral boost is very small.