Containing "Contamination": Cardinal Moran and Fin de Siècle Australian National Identity, 1888–1911

Cardinal Patrick Moran, the Catholic Archbishop of Sydney 1884–1911, believed that Australian Catholicism would flourish with the emergence of the new nation through Federation in 1901, provided that Australians turned away from foreign influences, including anarchism and nihilism. Moran also sought to use Australia to "Christianise" the enormous population of China, and believed that Chinese immigration could make a useful contribution to nation building. As the nineteenth century closed, Moran's aims were also complicated by the more insidious threats represented by a challenge to religious faith by fin de siècle ideas — a modernism manifesting as both a general challenge and a specific doctrinal relativism that might erode the Church's authority, and the threat Moran felt was posed to the development of the liberal Australian state and the Catholic Church by radical political alternatives. Concern that a mood of religious apostasy and secularisation might spread to the Catholic community also influenced Moran's support for the fledgling Australian Labor Party, which Moran believed could develop as an instrument to reinforce a moral and inclusive sense of Australian identity for the Catholic working class. Like his pro-Chinese views, Moran's advocacy of "the rights and duties of labour" was defined by an imagined alliance of evangelism and nation building, stimulated by the fear, as he expressed in 1891, of "an unchristianized world."     

Field Measurements of Wave Characteristics on a Near‐Horizontal Shore Platform,Mahia Peninsula,North Island,New Zealand

Waves are an important process responsible for the initiation and subsequent development of intertidal shore platforms. However, few field studies to date have described wave processes on shore platforms. A field experiment was conducted using an across‐shore array of wave gauges, including a directional sensor, on a near‐horizontal platform at Mahia Peninsula, North Island, New Zealand. Results show that the platform is very efficient in filtering wave energy at gravity wave frequencies (>0.05 Hz), with 40–80% reduction in wave height measured across the 140 m wide platform. By contrast, infragravity waves are present on the platform and increase in magnitude towards the cliff toe. Directional wave analysis indicates that wave reflection is mainly restricted to infragravity wave frequencies, demonstrating the differences in gravity and infragravity wave behaviour on the platform studied. Results indicate that, under fair weather conditions, the role of waves as an agent of cliff toe erosion is likely to be limited at present, although they are probably important for removing sediments accumulated at the cliff toe. The observed increase in infragravity wave energy towards the cliff toe implies that these long‐period waves may be important geomorphic agents on shore platforms.     

Repairing NATO's motors

NATO moves toward its next summit (to be held in Newport, Wales in September 2014) in a mood of anxiety and uncertainty. This is not simply because telling questions are being asked of the alliance in relation to Afghanistan and Ukraine, but because the twin motors which have sustained NATO now show signs of considerable wear and tear. The first of these motors relates to principles of purpose. This encompasses the activities (or purposes) which NATO has consciously pursued in the last 25 years: namely, operations, enlargement, partnership, transatlanticism and security. The second is principles of function: the means, in other words, by which NATO is kept in motion. Here, American leadership, cohesion and trust, burden‐sharing and credibility all matter. These motors are not about to completely break down (NATO has underlying strengths which make that unlikely) but they do need attention. NATO's good health requires it to focus on a series of core tasks—what this article refers to as readiness, reassurance and renewal. These three tasks speak to an agenda of consolidation and preservation, rather than one of task expansion. But this is not a conservative agenda; grasping the nettle of prioritization and focus requires, in itself, a certain foresight and enterprise. Managed successfully, it is an agenda that will preserve and strengthen NATO in what are increasingly troubled times.     

Countering the hegemony of the Irish national canon: the modernist rhetoric of Seán O'Faoláin (1938–50)1

ABSTRACT. The telling and re‐telling of national history has long been recognised in studies of nationalism as one of its key legitimising and mobilising strategies. In this article I illustrate how a rhetorical approach can effectively explore this dynamic and emotive dimension of nationalist ideology by examining the rhetorical strategies in the Irish liberal intellectual, Seán O'Faoláin's, attempts to reconstitute the popular canon of Irish history in the 1930s and 1940s. More specifically, I show that contrary to depictions of O'Faoláin as a European liberal who employed rational argument to undermine and encourage the rejection of Irish nationalism and its emphasis on rhetorical narratives of the past, O'Faoláin's challenge to the Irish national canon reveals that he himself mobilised historical narrative to promote his own modernist version of Irish liberal nationalism and demonstrated in the process that he was one of the most skilful rhetors of his day.     

NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul

NATO has throughout its history been the subject of prognostications of crisis and dissolution. Indeed, the alliance has been written off so many times that crisis as normality has come to typify its development. In the twenty-year history of NATO's post-Cold War development, Operation Allied Force stands midway between the existential moment that was the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the current travails being experienced in Afghanistan. A comparison of NATO's experience in the Balkans and in the Afghan theatre suggests that the view of a NATO perched permanently at the edge of collapse is problematic and misleading. This is not to defend alliance actions as such but rather to suggest that the narrative of crisis and collapse makes for poor analysis and underestimates NATO's proclivity for adaptation and endurance.