明代河南土地丈量综述

有明一代,河南省曾进行了三次土地丈量活动：第一次在明初洪武年间,丈量出的土地数字仅是当时开垦的土地数,不能反映全省实有的土地数量。第二次在明中期嘉靖年间,是在一种错误思想的指导之下进行的,丈量之后又以“符合原额”为宗旨,大量进行了折亩活动,故丈量出的土地数字既不能反映当时河南省的开垦耕种数,也不能反映当时实有的土地数字。第三次是在明中后期万历年间进行的,指导思想明确,法令严格,方法得当,丈量出的土地数字既能反映当时河南省的开垦耕种数,又代表了全省实有的耕地数字。     

从对中国电影的态度看中华文化在海外华人中的传播——对英国华裔青少年的调查分析

论文以英国华裔青少年为例,通过问卷调查,了解中国电影在海外华侨华人中的接收情况,探讨了电影对中华文化在海外华侨华人中传播的作用和效果。论文认为中国电影是华侨华人接触和了解中华文化的重要途径,海外华人对中华文化有强烈的认知渴求,希望从中国电影中获取关于中国"言"、"象"、"意"的多层次、多元认知,他们对历史和当代中国的情况并重,对中国电影的解读体现出其文化间性。电影作为中华文化海外传播的重要窗口,应该增加其内容和形式的多样性,摆脱题材的单一性和对中国的刻板印象,用中国的话语讲好世界的故事,以摆脱文化弱势的处境,彰显中华文化的魅力,让中华文化更好地被华侨华人和世界所接受。     

江苏邳州蘑菇顶D1发掘与相关问题研究

2015年6月,南京博物院、邳州市博物馆联合对江苏省邳州市蘑菇顶D1进行发掘,清理了两座墓葬,推测其时代分别为东汉时期(M1)和春秋战国时期(M2)。墓葬多次遭盗掘,没有出土随葬品,仅在盗洞中发现一些残器。M2应为古徐国大型墓葬;墓底有较小方坑,墓道、墓室为多次分块夯筑,这种墓葬结构与夯筑方式较为独特、少见。这一发现对于徐州地区春秋战国时期墓葬研究,特别是古徐国葬制、葬俗具有重要的意义。     

唐武惠妃墓出土疑似胶结材料的分析研究

为了确定武惠妃墓室内发现的黑色多孔块状物质是否为绘制壁画时使用的胶结材料,联合使用显微镜观察、SEM-EDS、Raman、FTIR和GC-FID多种分析方法对该物质进行了显微结构观察、元素组成及物质组成分析。结果表明,该物质虽已炭化,但内部仍可见一些较新鲜的胶料残留,其成分为动物胶,并在其中发现了少量红色朱砂颜料残留。通过古文献记载和以往研究成果讨论了结果的可靠性。该研究不仅丰富了唐代墓葬壁画绘制技艺的考古学研究,更可为后期文物保护材料和工艺的选择提供借鉴。     

基于海量点云数据的大雁塔三维重建

古建筑三维重建已成为历史遗迹保护与修复的重要内容。为了探讨三维激光扫描数据的获取流程、数据处理方法,以三维激光扫描获取的大雁塔海量点云数据为例,研究了古建筑三维重建中点云数据获取与处理的详细过程。联合Cyclone、AutoCAD和3D-Max软件的优点构建了大雁塔真实的横面、剖面、立面模型,其中重点研究了海量点云数据在Cyclone软件中分块建模的方法。结果表明:将拼接好的大雁塔海量点云数据分块建模,不仅加快了数据处理的速度,而且符合精度要求。在点云数据拼接时采用标靶拼接和同名点拼接相结合及测站间两两拼接之后再整体拟合平差的方法,减少了拼接中的误差,使每站拼接误差都不超过3cm。在建模过程中的墙体拟合是上万个点云经过平差计算得到,精度高达2mm。最后在3D-Max软件中组合、渲染和贴图,真实地构建了大雁塔三维立体模型。为古建筑数字化存档和后期的修缮工作提供了重要的依据。     

The Father's Success and the Son's Failure: Explaining the Growth of Lebanon's Resistance to Syria's Invisible Occupation

In the 15‐year period since the Syrian military entry into Lebanon on June 1, 1976, allegedly to put an end to the civil war that broke out there a year earlier, Syria firmly solidified its control of the country, as evidenced by the signing of the “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon,” on May 22, 1991, which granted Syria a special status. Yet, 14 years later, on April 24, 2005, the Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon. This article seeks to explain this relatively rapid decline in Syria's standing in Lebanon by examining the strategies of the two Syrian rulers who indirectly controlled this country during those years. It examines what was right in Hafiz al‐Asad's strategy in Lebanon, and what did not work in Bashar's policy. In 2000, the year of Hafiz al‐Asad's death, Syria's status in Lebanon seemed unshakable: 1) Lebanon's president (Emile Lahoud) acted as Damascus's puppet; 2) Hezbollah, the Shi‘a militia Hezbollah largely accepted Syria's authority while it simultaneously tightened its control over southern Lebanon and also began gaining popularity in the rest of the country; and 3) finally the politics of the noble families, which had characterized Lebanon since its establishment, began to gradually give way to a politics where a political figure is measured by the level of his connections to the country's power base in Damascus. Yet, merely five years later, Syria was under immense pressure to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. This suggests that we must look at the difference between the strategies of Hafiz al‐Asad and his son Bashar for controlling Lebanon to better understand the rapid deterioration in Syria's standing in the country. We argue that the difference in the degree of anti‐Syrian pressures from Lebanon's society and political elements between the two tenures is largely rooted in the different strategies that the two Syrian presidents adopted for informally ruling Lebanon. We identify three main areas where Bashar al‐Asad made mistakes due to his failure to continue his father's methods. First, Bashar put all his cards on Hezbollah, thus antagonizing all the other groups which resented that Shi‘a dominance. Second, in stark contrast to his father, Bashar distanced himself from the regular management of Lebanon's ethnic politics. Hafiz al‐Asad made sure that all the leaders of the different ethnic groups would visit Damascus and update him on their inter‐ethnic conflicts, and then he would be the one who would either arbitrate between them or, for expediency reasons, exacerbate these feuds. Once the ethnic leaders had to manage without Damascus, they learned to get along, making him far less indispensable for the running of the country. Finally, Bashar, unlike his father, did not make a real effort to gain international and regional legitimacy (or at least de‐facto acceptance) for Syria's continued control over Lebanon. Most conspicuously, while Hafiz participated in the First Gulf War against Iraq, his son supported Sunni rebels who fought against the United States‐led coalition forces there. This foreign acquiescence was significant since the Lebanese felt they had a backing when they demanded Syria's withdrawal in 2005. These different strategic approaches of the two rulers meant that the father's policies wisely laid the ground for some of the most controversial measures which were needed as part of any attempt to monopolize control over another country, such as Lebanon (assassinating popular but too independent‐minded Lebanese presidents/prime ministers or extending tenures of loyalist ones), whereas the son's policies myopically failed to do so properly. Indeed, the article will show that while both the father and the son took these same controversial measures, the responses of the Lebanese were completely different. Admittedly, some historical developments increased the Lebanese propensity to rise up against Syria, and these meant that Bashar did in fact face a harder task than his father in maintaining Syria's informal occupation. The Israeli withdrawal from its so‐called “security zone” in south Lebanon meant that one justification for the Syrian presence was gone. More importantly, the risk of renewed eruption of the civil war (which in turn had meant for many years a greater willingness by the locals to tolerate the Syrian presence which prevented the war's resumption) declined significantly due to a variety of processes that could not have been halted even with better “management” of the interethnic strife from Damascus (i.e., making sure that the ethnic groups remained in deep conflict with each other). Nevertheless, as we will show, Bashar's mistakes played a crucial role in bringing the rival ethnic groups together by making Damascus their joint enemy.     

Wealthy-gentry politics: How are capitalists in China chosen for the ‘Houses’?

Choosing individual private entrepreneurs to be members of the People's Congress (PC) or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is one of the most important mechanisms for ‘cooperative capitalism’ in China. This article aims to answer two questions: First, what are the differences between factors for winning a seat at the PC and a seat at the CPPCC, respectively? Second, is there any difference between factors that have a significant impact on winning a seat at the county-township level and the prefecture-and-above level of the PC or CPPCC? Based on empirical findings, I have coined the term ‘wealthy-gentry politics’ to conceptualise the fact that behaving as a member of the socially responsible ‘gentry’ plays an increasingly significant role at the higher level and in the PC compared to the lower level and the CPPCC, while economic wealth is just a threshold and party membership is not a guarantee.

挑选私营企业家个体进入两会是中国“合作型资本主义”的一个最重要机制。本文回答两个问题。1）获得人大代表的因素与获得政协委员的因素有何区别？2）获得县镇级两会代表和地级以上两会代表的影响因素是否有区别？ 根据实证研究,笔者发明“财—绅政治”的概念来描述一个事实：负有社会责任的社会贤达在高一级的人大较之低一级的政协发挥了越来越大的作用,财富仅仅是门槛,党籍也不起决定性作用。     

陕西唐宋石窟寺与汉地木构佛寺建筑群体对比研究

本文以陕西唐宋时期的石窟寺建筑为主要研究对象,从典型石窟寺建筑实例入手,与汉地木构佛寺建筑群体进行对比、分析,主要从以下几点进行研究：一、对比分析陕西唐宋石窟寺与汉地木构佛寺建筑的营建背景：二、进行陕西省内唐宋时期石窟寺与汉地木构佛寺在建筑群外环境的对比研究;三、进行陕西省内唐宋时期石窟寺与汉地木构佛寺在建筑群形态发展方面的对比研究。通过上述的研究方法,探讨出：陕西唐宋石窟寺在营建背景、建筑选址、建筑构成、建筑布局方面的发展规律及特点。     

早期章门弟子与"民俗学运动"的兴起

章门弟子是一个曾在中国近代思想史上风云一时、举足轻重的学术文化群体。它的阵容十分庞大,然而就其中坚主体而言,无疑是章太炎始终念念不忘的早期弟子。他们不仅著述宏富、造诣精深,而且均先后执教于国内各知名大学,有些人还长期执掌某一研究机构或文化团体。缘此,他们能有机会充分阐扬学术观点与文化主张,并在社会上产生了巨大的反响,从而有力推动了中国现代学术转型。这其中,“民俗学运动”的兴起便是一个不可忽视的重要环节,本文即拟就此展开详论。