USES OF GAME THEORY TO EXPLAIN THE SALT PROCESS

Negotiations in international relations must be analyzed not only in terms of the substance of policy which is of relevance to the negotiating process, but also with regard to the negotiating process itself. This paper focuses on the negotiating process leading up to the SALT I agreements of 1972. Through the insights of game theory we can better understand the difficulties inherent in reaching accords in nuclear arms negotiations.     

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF FIXED INPUT COEFFICIENTS UNDER AGGREGATION*

ABSTRACT A fixed input coefficient is traditionally interpreted as the additional input from one sector that is required for an additional unit of output in another sector. It is shown that this ratio of increments is, in general, not fixed under aggregation. A tight upper and lower bound for its variation are derived. A necessary and sufficient condition for the ratio to be fixed is obtained. As a consequence, adopting the common assumption of fixed input coefficients implies that additional assumptions at any subaggregate level are required. Similar results are given for the Leontief inverse, whose typical element is usually interpreted as the additional output in one sector that is required for an additional unit of final demand in another sector.     

A Challenge to Presidential Wars: Smith v. Obama

From World War II to the present time, presidents have exceeded constitutional and statutory authority in exercising the war power. In doing so, they violate the rule of law, the principle of self-government, and the system of checks and balances. The U.S. Constitution expressly rejected the British model that placed with the Executive exclusive authority over external affairs, including taking the country from a state of peace to one of war. The Framers assigned that power solely to Congress. A lawsuit filed in 2016, Smith v. Obama, asked a federal district court to decide whether President Obama may engage in war without receiving express authority from Congress.