Edward II. His Last Months and his Monument

Abstract

Very little site-oriented dendrochronology has been undertaken in Scotland, possibly because of the absence of a locally based dendrochronological facility until recently. However, timbers found during the excavations of several medieval burghs in the late 1970s and 1980s were saved for future analysis and had been stored in museums around the country. During a project to locate suitable samples fir a Scottish tree-ring database the potential of these assemblages was recognised. Although relatively small assemblages, their analysis has expanded and strengthened the tree-ring database within Scotland, thus facilitating future work. Evidence fir synchronous development in the early burghs in the late 12th century and the nature of the woodland resource at times during the medieval period is presented. An 'event horizon' in the early 10th century, signalled by the birth dates of marry of the dated timbers, has been recognised and possible causes are discussed. The projects reported on here were all funded by Historic Scotland.     

A Weberian approach to the history of ethics: Aquinas and Kant

A distinction between hard-to-shake but rational convictions, on the one hand, and the rationality that calculates causal and logical consequences, on the other hand, can generate questions for the history of ethics. Most moral thinkers draw some such distinction but the contours of the line differ greatly, and, in drawing the line, past moral thinkers tend to be influenced by their own deeply held principles, which in turn tend to reflect their social world. Questions about where the line between values and instrumental calculation are drawn and about the effect on this of the moral thinkers own social world are applied by way of illustration to Thomas Aquinas and Kant. The paper attempts to use Weberian social theory to elucidate a theme in the history of ethics, making every effort to keep the two kinds of theory distinct.     

A Leading Arsenal of Democracy: American Rearmament and the Continental Integration of the Canadian Aircraft Industry, 1948–1953

This article shows how the Royal Navy under the leadership of John Fisher exploited the British Consular system in Germany and Denmark to obtain both open-source and covert intelligence between 1906 and 1914. This structure was initially constructed with the tacit support of the Foreign Office, replacing an earlier intelligence network in France and Russia. The intelligence collected by the consuls reflected the Royal Navy's strategic priorities at the time. The most important subject concerned German coastal defences, a detailed knowledge of which was essential for the Admiralty's offensive littoral strategy. From 1908 Charles Hardinge attempted to restrict the Admiralty's use of its Consular Officers for intelligence purposes, with limited success. The consuls continued to provide essential intelligence for the Royal Navy up until the outbreak of war.