Are We “Ensnared in the System of Heritage” Because We Don’t Want to Escape?

This paper explores why heritage practitioners continue to embrace the objective security of positivism, building on Sharon Veale’s (cited in Sullivan 2015:114) observation that we are “ensnared in the system of heritage, rather than in understanding and unravelling the social processes of its making.” Specifically, built heritage conservation/CRM practice is too standardized and motivated primarily by speed, efficiency, and compliance; the field is not innovative or flexible; and heritage/CRM practitioners and scholars do not engage with each other. The field needs to recognize that the regulatory environment is a fundamental barrier in bridging theory and practice and in integrating tangible and intangible approaches. Lastly, understanding heritage requires a transdisciplinary approach that is altogether absent in most aspects of theory and practice. Possible solutions to these issues will be offered, including the idea of reenvisioning the nature of “heritage conservation.”     

The Double‐Edged Sword of Public‐Resource Dependence: The Impact of Public Resources on Autonomy and Legitimacy in Korean Cultural Nonprofit Organizations

As governments and nonprofit organizations build close partnerships for the provision of public services, they become interdependent in many ways. In particular, nonprofits' public‐resource dependence has significant implications for their behavior and decisions. By examining Korean cultural nonprofit organizations (CNPOs), this article posits a theoretical framework for the impact of public‐resource dependence on nonprofits' organizational autonomy and legitimacy. The empirical results of national survey data of Korean cultural nonprofits suggest that public‐resource dependence has a dual effect, reducing managerial autonomy while enhancing institutional legitimacy. Korean CNPOs seem to be constrained by public funding granted by both local governments and the central government, particularly in goal setting, resource allocations, and program choices. However, public funding also helps nonprofits earn institutional legitimacy through its reputation and recognition effects.     

State budget outcomes and Australian state politics revisited: The impact of parties

This research note reviews work by Gerritscn on budget outputs in Australian States, and more specifically on the explanatory significance of Labor and non‐Labor parties in office. It also extends his work by introducing a comparative dimension across time. This consists of comparison of the findings for the period Gerritsen saidied (1979/80–1982/83) with a later period (1985/86–1987/88) to assess the impact of partisan change in Slate governments on their relative budget efforts. The findings offer more support for the partisanship hypothesis than Gerritsen's allowed, by virtue of the findings for Western Australia and Tasmania. It concludes that though budget efforts are structured by a number of factors, partisanship nevertheless appears a potent explanatory variable.     

Moderating Local Capacity: Exploring EO 12372's Intergovernmental Review Effects on Federal Grant Awards

This article asks whether the Reagan Executive Order (EO) 12372 matters for intergovernmental fiscal relations today. To address this question, federal grant receipts from programs that are, and programs that are not, covered by EO 12372 are compared by examining the differential effects of political and local administrative capacity on each. Grant receipts are examined by coding federal grant award data from 1993 to 2003 using Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance reference numbers. In the case state, Kentucky, Area Development Districts are the regional functionaries for the state single point of contact clearinghouse, by virtue of which status they review proposals for federal funding originating in, or affecting, their districts. Since federal award decisions take clearinghouse information into account on grant programs covered by EO 12372, differences in the effects of local capacity on receipt of grants covered and not covered by the EO are expected. Methodology used in this post‐only analysis is pooled cross‐sectional time series analysis with panel corrected standard errors. Results focus attention on the differential effects of government administrative and political capacity as they apply to federal grants covered, and not covered, by the EO.