Shangri-La and Pakistan's Hunza River Valley

Based on James Hilton's 1933 novel Lost Horizon, five themes are identified that might compose the core of Shangri-La's popular image. These themes serve as an organizational framework for examination of Pakistan's Hunza Valley, the so-called "Shangri-La of the Karakorams." It is concluded that as sublime as parts of the valley may be, it is not now and has never been the Utopian place that some would have it. The quest for such a place, however, illustrates the universal conflict between the real and the idealized in nature.     

Cultural Geography of American Foodways: An Annotated Bibliography

Despite recent interest in indigenous knowledge, few studies have linked it with indigenous beliefs system and its role in environmental stewardship. This link is important to cultural geographers interested in the study of small-scale cultural groups and how they relate to the environment. It also helps us understand the cultural dimensions of environmental stewardship and resource conservation. Based on a study of a monkey sanctuary in Ghana, West Africa, this paper argues that indigenous belief systems form an essential part of indigenous knowledge and that they can serve as a very effective tool for the protection of sacred groves and isolated patches of rainforests that have fallen victim to development as a result of increasing globalization, population pressures, and the spread of Christianity. The paper concludes that indigenous beliefs are not just a relic of the past but something that is needed today and may be needed in future for the conservation of natural resources in indigenous societies.     

The Poujadist Movement: A faux 'fascism'

Though short-lived as an electoral force, the Poujadist movement of the 1950s provides a lasting reference point within French political culture. As a term, 'Poujadism' is synonymous with opposition to economic and social change; as a political doctrine, it has proved more resistant to definition. Denounced by some as a resurgent fascism, Poujadism has been classed by most commentators as an extreme-right movement. This article re-examines that interpretation and argues that Poujadism presents a complex and ambiguous picture, embodying two distinct and opposing French political traditions: the revolutionary-republican and the conservative-nationalist. Far from providing a vehicle for fascism, Pierre Poujade resisted attempts to impose an extreme-right ideology on his movement or to harness it for neo-fascist ends, confirming both the highly specific nature of Poujadism and the continued marginality of the French extreme Right a decade on from Vichy.     

General Roatta's war against the partisans in Yugoslavia: 1942

During General Mario Roatta's tenure as commander of the Italian 2nd Army in Yugoslavia, he faced a mounting Communist insurgency. To defeat the partisan forces of Tito, he resorted to proactive politics and a strategy of counter-insurgency. Owing to Italian military weakness and his army's lack of training in guerrilla warfare, Roatta was not averse to enlisting the services of Orthodox Serbs in Croatia, who the previous year had asked for Italian protection after a fearful massacre had been unleashed against them by Mussolini's handpicked ruler in Zagreb, the Croatian Usta?a leader Ante Paveli?. Against the wishes of the Fascist government in Rome, Roatta armed Serbs (called ?etniks) because they agreed to assist the Italian legions in fighting the partisans, their common ideological foe. But as Yugoslavia descended into civil war – one triggered by the Axis invasion – Roatta paid a price for his freelance pro-Serb politicking by alienating Zagreb, irritating the Germans, and dismaying his superiors in Rome. Italian policy was reduced to a tug-of-war between the Fascist empire-builders surrounding Mussolini and the military command in Yugoslavia, and Roatta became enmeshed in a cobweb of intrigues involving Croats, ?etniks and Germans. Apart from political manoeuvring, Roatta, in the ineluctable necessity of defeating the partisans, devised a detailed strategy of counter-insurgency. On 1 March 1942, he circulated a pamphlet entitled ‘3C’ among his commanders that spelled out military reform and draconian measures to intimidate the Slav populations into silence by means of summary executions, hostage-taking, reprisals, internments and the burning of houses and villages. By his reckoning, military necessity knew no choice, and law required only lip service. Roatta's merciless suppression of partisan insurgency was not mitigated by his having saved the lives of both Serbs and Jews from the persecution of Italy's allies Germany and Croatia. Under his watch, the 2nd Army's record of violence against the Yugoslav population easily matched the German. Tantamount to a declaration of war on civilians, Roatta's ‘3C’ pamphlet involved him in war crimes.