Ideology and Television in the Eastern Arab World: 1956–1990

This article deals primarily with the relationship between ideology and television from 1956 to 1990 in the Eastern Arab world. It allows us to see what kinds of ideological ideas circulate through television, why they are constructed, and when they are being challenged. It examines why and how television promotes ideology and disseminates political messages. It takes into account different ideological perspectives. This article is a type of qualitative analysis that focuses on why governments seek to attain hegemony over television and how television has been used successfully as a tool of ideological propaganda and subservience.     

Israel and Post‐Mubarak Egypt: Perils of Historical Analogy

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has perceived the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 as a replica of Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. Drawing on the apparent similarities between the two revolutions—both made against dictators who reigned over secular, Western‐oriented regimes advocating coexistence with Israel, and both having Islamists as the best‐organized opposition force—Netanyahu appears to have concluded that the outcome for Israel would be the same: the advent of an aggressive Islamist regime in Cairo that would initiate a larger conflict. Based on this historical analogy, the Netanyahu government has adopted policies that are meant to help Israel defend against the potential deterioration in relations with Egypt. However, looking at Iran 1979 to draw on lessons about Egypt 2011 is misleading and does not take into account the significant differences that would rather lead Egypt to preserve the peace. This article analyzes Netanyahu's employment of this historical analogy and examines other appropriate lessons that Israel could draw from Iran's Islamic revolution, and proposes that Israel should instead engage the Egyptian revolution and reach a peace deal with the Palestinians so that it avoids misperception and maintains the Egyptian–Israeli peace.