Nativism in Late Medieval Norway

Scholars have long regarded nativism – the concerted marginalization of foreigners in preference for natives – as a major factor in Norway’s national movement in the late Middle Ages. While anti-foreign statements and policy reforms introduced by the country’s aristocracy demonstrate the existence and function of nativism in political discourse, historians have exaggerated or misconstrued its role in cases of popular unrest. This article challenges the theory that peasants frequently and ardently resisted foreign officials in the 15th century. Taking the one known case of popular nativism – Amund Sigurdsson’s uprising of 1436–1437 – as reference, it examines another nine well-known incidents of peasant activism in order to determine a similar degree of antipathy toward foreigners. It is argued that while there is very little empirical evidence to support the nativist theory, there is ample material to inspire more focused examination of socio-economic and structural developments, and the role these played in Norway’s turbulent national awakening.     

British hospitality for an unfortunate prince: the Duc de Bordeaux's visit to Britain as an early test of the entente cordiale, 1843–4

In the summer of 1843, Anglo-French relations thawed in the wake of the British and French royal families' meeting at the Château d'Eu in Normandy. Members of both governments began to speak of the good understanding, or entente cordiale, between them, and much of the existing historiography points out that by 1844, what proved to be a fragile arrangement was under some pressure. However, mere months after the Eu visit, another royal visit threatened the entente, that of King Louis Philippe's exiled great-nephew, the Bourbon pretender Henri, Duc de Bordeaux (later known as the Comte de Chambord), to Britain. Owing to Britain's tradition of allowing entry to foreigners, Bordeaux was able to enter Britain freely, whilst the British Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, argued that his visit would have little political consequence. Rather, Bordeaux and his suite intended to make political demonstrations. These activities and Aberdeen's willingness to believe professions to the contrary deeply offended the French government. Aberdeen was eventually forced to admonish Bordeaux and his suite. Although the dispute was amicably resolved, it almost fatally undermined the entente soon after its inception.     

The Politics of Executive Nominations in the Post-Nuclear Senate

In response to an ever more inefficient, intrusive, partisan, and plodding executive nominations process, a variety of increasingly potent reform measures have been recently enacted within Congress. The solutions have ranged from cutting the number of appointments requiring Senate confirmation to reducing the power of the filibuster on most nominations. Although these reforms may speed the nominations process, they may also influence the balance of power between Congress and the presidency by allowing more unilateral and unrestricted appointments. Is Congress conceding confirmation for expediency? In this investigation, I explore recent reforms with respect to the speed and outcomes of the executive nominations process as well as the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches.     

Is a ‘Modi doctrine’ emerging in Indian foreign policy?

Narendra Modi's election as India's prime minister in May 2014 has generated speculation that a new ‘Modi doctrine’ is emerging in Indian foreign policy. This article assesses the evidence for that claim. It argues that a ‘doctrine’ should embody a set of clearly stated principles for foreign policy making. It analyses the main achievements of Modi's policy in the months after his election. It finds that while Modi has brought new energy to the conduct of foreign policy, his approach is essentially pragmatic, and his objectives are similar to those pursued by his two immediate predecessors—Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh.     

Staging Battles: Representations of War in the Theatre and Festivals of the French Revolution

Prefiguring twentieth-century experiments, the French revolutionaries represented the war in which they were engaged after 1792 by staging military spectacles in the theatre and in civic festivals. Both plays and festivals were highly allegorical in nature, representing the war as a conflict between rival ideologies and providing stereotypical caricatures of enemy villains. Military plays won little acclaim from theatre critics, who objected to their implausibility and lack of originality. Audiences limited their enthusiasm to plays that brought romance and patriotism together. Allegorical representations spoke neither to the realities of war nor to the psychological needs of spectators. The involvement of soldiers in staging and witnessing military spectacles, however, underlines their significance in representing and helping to produce the nation-in-arms.

résumé:?Tout comme le font certains mouvements au vingtième siècle, les révolutionnaires français représentent la guerre dans laquelle ils se trouvent engagés au moyen de pièces de théâtre et de fêtes civiques. Dans ces spectacles allégoriques, avec leurs symboles et leurs personnages stéréotypés, la guerre prend l'aspect d'un conflit idéologique. Ces spectacles ne plaisent guère aux critiques dramatiques qui y désapprouvent le manque de vraisemblance et d'originalité. Quant aux spectateurs, eux, ils applaudissent seules les pièces où se trouvent à la fois la sentimentalité et le patriotisme. Les représentations allégoriques, divorcées des réalités de la guerre et sans rapport avec les conflits personnels occasionnés par le patriotisme, ne répondent pas à leurs besoins psychologiques. C'est surtout le fait que les soldats ont participé aux spectacles militaires qui fait que ces derniers doivent être reconnus comme ayant non seulement représenté mais aussi inspiré la nation en armes.