The pearls and pitfalls of skull trephination as described in the Hippocratic treatise "On Head Wounds"

The purpose of our current study is to describe the guidelines regarding trephination as suggested in the Hippocratic writer's book, "Peri ton en cephali traumaton" ("On Head Wounds"). The ancient Greek text was reviewed as well as two English translations. The Hippocratic author described the indications, timing, and techniques of trephination for patients with head injury. He emphasized that attention should be paid to the details of the employed technique. He also commented on the difference of skull thickness at different anatomical sites and also between different age groups. The Hippocratic recommendations provided details for the performance of trephination by the ancient Greek physicians that are still considered important in modern neurosurgery.     

Productive Relations in the Northeast and the Rest‐of‐Brazil Regions in 1995: Decomposition and Synergy in Input‐Output Systems

Using a set of interregional input‐output tables built by Guilhoto (1998) for 1995 for two Brazilian regions (Northeast and rest of the economy), the methodology developed by Sonis, Hewings, and Miyazawa (1997) is applied in the construction of a series of linkages such that it is possible to examine, through the nature of the internal and external interdependencies, the structure of trading relationships between the two regions. The methodology uses a partitioned input‐output system and exploits techniques that produce left and right matrix multipliers of the Leontief Inverse. This procedure facilitates the classification of the types of synergetic interactions within a preset pairwise hierarchy of economic linkages subsystems. In general, the results show that the Northeast region has a greater dependence on the rest of the economy region than the rest of the economy has on the Northeast region, and at the same time the rest of the economy region seems to be more developed as it presents a more complex productive structure than the Northeast region.     

Why the General said No

Based upon recently published volumes of French diplomatic documents, this review article examines the course of the negotiations for British entry into the European Economic Community from 1961 to 1963 and the reasons why France vetoed Britains application. It is clear that even before the British government launched its application, the French government was aware of the threat it posed to the cohesion of the Community and to French interests. It therefore pursued tactics of delay. The British, who were in a hurry to join, vainly sought to convince the French of their conversion to the Gaullist conception of a con–federal Europe that would be independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States, even dangling the prospect of nuclear cooperation before President de Gaulle. The latter's position inside France was relatively weak until he won a referendum on the direct election of the president in October 1962 and his party triumphed in the legislative elections the following month. De Gaulle then felt secure enough to tell Prime Minister Macmillan quite bluntly at their Rambouillet meeting on 15–16 December 1962 that he did not believe that Britain was ready for EEC membership. He had thus already made up his mind to exclude Britain before the Nassau agreement between President Kennedy and Mr Macmillan in which the former agreed to supply Britain with Polaris nuclear missiles, although this agreement confirmed his belief that Britain was excessively dependent upon the United States. Although economic questions—particularly those relating to the system of agricultural support and to Britain's request for special concessions to Australia, Canada and New Zealand—did play an important part in de Gaulle's decision, it is clear that political factors were uppermost in his mind. He did not want either a diluted Community or one in which there was a possible rival to French leadership.