CLIMATE CHANGE and RECREATION IN NAHANNI NATIONAL PARK RESERVE

Prospects of global climatic change may present challenging physical, biological and managerial problems for Canadian national parks. A study was undertaken to assess the possible implications of climatic warming on water-based recreation activities of Nahanni National Park Reserve (nnpr). Significant increases in mean annual temperature and moderate increases in precipitation totals are expected for the park under a doubling of co₂. Under such conditions, hydrological changes would have little effect on the execution of river recreation, whereas forest fire and ecological changes would likely ha ve significant impacts on the experience of river recreation. Two complementary management strategies, ecological and visitor monitoring, are proposed to respond to uncertainties associated with environmental change.
Le changement global du climat peut poser de nou veaux problèmes d'ordre physique, biologique et dans l'aménagement des Pares Nationaux Canadiens. Une étude a été entreprise pour étudier les impacts possibles du rechauffement global sur la récréation aquatique dans la réserve nationale Nahanni (nnpr). Une augmentation significative de la température moyenne est accompagnée d'une légère augmentation de la précipitation comme nous l'espérions en cas de doublement de CO₂. if y aura peu d' effets sur l'utilisation des rivières à des fins récréatives. Les feux de forêts ainsi que le changement écologique auront des impacts plus significatifs. Deux stratégies d'aménagement, l'une écologique et l'autre au niveau des visiteurs, sont proposées pour répondre au changement environnemental dans le Pare.     

GEOGRAPHIC SEPARATION AND PATTERNS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION BETWEEN RESIDENTS OF SENIOR CITIZEN APARTMENT BUILDINGS AND THEIR ADULT CHILDREN

In this study, research questions are formulated to investigate the determinants and consequences of the physical distances separating residents of government-assisted senior citizen apartment (SCA) projects and their adult children. Interview survey data were obtained from residents (n= 97) of three SCAS in suburban Winnipeg, Canada, and geographically matching baseline samples of community residents (n= 105). The analysis involves the use of bivariate statistical inferential tests and multiple regression frameworks. The results disclose that (1) greater parent-child separation distances are registered by SCA residents compared to the community elderly; (2) ‘distance of the most recent residential move’ is the most significant predictor of the intergenerational separation distances recorded by SCA residents; (3) spatial proximity is the most significant predictor of social interaction between SCA residents and their children. It is concluded that the results have important implications for (1) developmental models of elderly migration and (2) policies governing the provision of seniors' housing. Dans cette étude, on s'interroge sur les déterminants et les conséquences des distances physiques qui séparent les reéidents des programmes d'habitation pour personnes âgées (SCA) subventionnés par le gouvernement, et leurs enfants adultes. On a recueilli des données d'enquête en faisant des entrevues avec les résidents (n= 97) de trois SCA dans la banlieue de Winnipeg, Canada, et avec des résidents dans la communauté (n= 105) qui font partie des échantillons de référence appariés géographiquement. Pour analyser les données, on a utilisé des tests d'inférence statistique bivariés et des analyses de régression multiple. Les résultats démontrent les faits suivants: (1) les enfants des résidents des SCA sont séparés de leurs parents par une plus grande distance que les enfants des personnes âgées dans la communauté; (2) ? la distance du plus récent déménagement?est le prédicteur le plus important des distances de séparation intergénérationnelle; (3) la proximité spatiale est le prédicteur le plus significatif de l'interaction sociale entre les résidents des SCA et leurs enfants. Ces résultats comportent des conséquences importantes pour le développement des modèles de migration des personnes âgées, aussi bien que pour les politiques qui régissent le logement pour personnes âgées.     

Military doctrine,command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d'être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article's departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy‐makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch's six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975, Part two: January 1972–January 1973

Although anticipated, the North Vietnamese ‘Easter offensive’ against South Vietnam in 1972 created problems for the United States. Having reached a rapprochement with Communist China, President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the attack could have serious repercussions for their attempt to balance it with détente with the Soviet Union, not to mention the US's credibility as a Great Power. They also feared it would damage Nixon's prospects for re‐election in November 1972. Despite opposition from his Defense Secretary, Nixon renewed the bombing of North Vietnam which had been stopped by President Johnson in 1968. This helped to bring the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and after complex negotiations, a draft peace agreement was ready for initialling in October 1972. However, President Thieu of South Vietnam saw significant drawbacks in the agreement and refused to go along with it. The North Vietnamese chose to have one more attempt to win on the battlefield and President Nixon, who had scaled down the bombing when peace seemed closer and won a landslide victory in the presidential election, launched another eleven days of concentrated bombing raids on North Vietnam at the turn of the year. This led to the final agreement initialled on 23 January 1973, which President Thieu reluctantly acceded to. Thieu's reservations were justified, but Nixon realized that, despite his electoral victory, he could not count on the continued support of Congress and the American people for the war. Far from bringing ‘peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’, the January agreement was a fig leaf to cover American withdrawal.     

The Cold War as history

Jonathan Haslam's Russia's Cold War is the latest effort by a western scholar to synthesize new research and findings on the Soviet role in the Cold War. Citing an array of published Russian archival material, Haslam seeks to resuscitate the traditional western Cold War view that the conflict was the inevitable result of communist expansionism. However, the material cited by Haslam does not support such a conclusion and he ignores conflicting evidence and views. The Cold War was a war of choice not necessity, the result of distorted perceptions and calculations by both sides, aided and abetted by generations of ideologically aligned historians.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975. Part one: January 1969–January 1972

Some have suggested that Richard Nixon's narrow victory in the US presidential election of November 1968 was due to his persuading the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) to boycott the Paris peace talks for the settlement of the Vietnam War between the US government, that of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the representatives of the communist guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. This seems doubtful. The new president had abandoned the hawkish stance he had adopted when vice‐president in the Eisenhower administration and was anxious to bring the unpopular war to an end. The question was: how? The president, together with his influential National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, adopted a policy of ‘Vietnamization’, which involved the progressive scaling down of the US military presence and the handing over of responsibility for waging the war to the GVN. At the same time, the president recognized that too precipitate an American withdrawal and, above all, one which took place under the terms of an agreement which was too favourable to the communists, would have a deleterious effect upon its allies and its own position as a Great Power. In order to bring about a satisfactory agreement with the DRV, the US employed a twin strategy: secret talks between Kissinger and senior DRV representatives in Paris, coupled with veiled threats of an escalation of the war if the communists acted unreasonably and occasional displays of military strength, such as the incursion into Cambodia in 1970. Although it seemed, briefly, that there might be a breakthrough in Kissinger's secret negotiations with the DRV later in 1971, they broke down mainly as a result of the communists' insistence that the US in effect dismantle the South Vietnamese government for them. An angry Nixon secretly considered retaliation against the DRV to force it to modify its demands and publicly revealed the existence of the negotiations and much of their content to the American people in a speech on 25 January 1972. At the same time, however, he insisted that Vietnamization would continue.