In Memoriam William Wells Newell,Died at Wayland,Massachusetts, 21st January, 1907

CELTIC MYTH AND ARTHURIAN ROMANCE. By ROGER SHERMAN LOOMIS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. 9″x5?″. Pp. xii+371. 30s. Reviewed by Eleanor Hull.

BÉALOIDEAS : The Journal of the Folk-Lore of Ireland Society. Published by the Society at Room 78, University College, Dublin, 1927. Volume I, Parts i and ii. Pp. 205. 8vo. Ann. sub. 7s. 6d. Reviewed by Eleanor Hull.

LIA FÁIL. Dublin: 89 Talbot Street. Large 8vo. 5s. per vol. Reviewed by Eleanor Hull.

“THE PACK OF AUTOLYCUS,” or Strange and terrible news of Ghosts, Apparitions, Monstrous Births, Showers of Wheat, Judgments of God, and other Prodigious and Fearful happenings as told in Broadside Ballads of the years 1624–1693. Edited by HYDER EDWARD ROLLINS. Cambridge (Harvard) University Press, 1927. 4to. Pp. xvii+270. Ill. 2is. Reviewed by M. Gaster.

DIE HELLENISTISCHEN MYSTERIENRELIGIONEN nach ihren Grundgedanken und Wirkungen. By R. REITZENSTEIN. 3rd ed. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1927. 8vo. Pp. viii+438. 16s. Reviewed by M. Gaster.

THE NEGRO AND HIS SONGS. A Study of Typical Negro Songs in the South. By HOWARD W. ODUM and GUY B. JOHNSON. Chapel Hill, Carolina, U.S.A.: Univ. of North Carolina Press (Oxford Univ. Press), 1925. 9″ x 5?″. Pp. xii. + 306. 18s. 6d. Reviewed by A. R. Wright.

FOLK BELIEFS OF THE SOUTHERN NEGRO. By NEWBELL NILES PUCKETT. Chapel Hill, Carolina, U.S.A.: Univ. of North Carolina Press (Oxford Univ. Press), 1926. 9″x5?″. 9 ill. Pp. xvi+644. 22s. 6d. Reviewed by A. R. Wright.     

Congress as Principal: Exploring Bicameral Differences in Agent Oversight

Previous theoretical and empirical work suggests differences in the way the congressional chambers approach the responsibility of agent control. The Senate should, the literature hypothesizes, exercise greater and qualitatively more systematic, substantive, and preemptive oversight of agents than does the House. Yet little research on congressional oversight has focused upon bicameral differences in principal behavior. This paper begins to fill the void by examining House and Senate oversight of the Federal Reserve. Specifically, I look at three types of oversight activity: monitoring of, and signaling to, the agent, and the principal's alteration of its contract with the agent. Utilizing original data and a variety of statistical methods, I show that there exist few, if any, quantitative and qualitative differences in House and Senate behavior. I then discuss theoretical reasons for my unexpected findings.