Obedient children and reckless rebels: Jabotinsky's youth politics and the case for authoritarian leadership, 1931–1933

This article traces the pivotal role that ideas about “youth” and “generationhood” played in Vladimir Jabotinsky's political strategy as leader of the Union of Revisionist Zionists and its youth movement, Brit Yosef Trumpeldor (Betar). During the leadership struggle within the movement between 1931 and 1933, Jabotinsky believed that he could draw upon debates sweeping across Europe about the nature of youth, their role in politics, and the challenges of “generational conflict” in order to convince his followers that his increasingly authoritarian behavior was the only mode of leadership available to Zionist leaders in the 1930s. The article demonstrates that Jabotinsky's deliberately ambiguous and provocative constructions of “youth” and “generationhood” within the movement's party literature and in articles addressed to the Polish Jewish public, as well as the innovative ways in which he delimited “youth” from “adult” in his movement's regulations, allowed him to further embrace authoritarian measures within the movement without publicly abandoning his claim to be a firm proponent of democracy.     

HEDONIC PRICING WHEN HOUSING IS ENDOGENOUS: THE VALUE OF ACCESS TO THE TRANS‐ISRAEL HIGHWAY*

Standard hedonic house pricing assumes that house prices are independent of the intangible to be priced. A methodology is proposed in which the supply as well as the demand for housing depends on the intangible. The methodology is applied to value access to the Trans‐Israel Highway (TIH). Using spatial panel data (2002–2008) we show that TIH had two effects on the housing market. It increased house prices in locations with greater access to TIH, and it affected housing construction. Standard hedonic pricing would have underestimated the value of access because it ignores the effects of housing construction on the intangible to be priced. House prices began to increase three years before TIH was inaugurated, but housing construction did not anticipate the inauguration of TIH.     

Shock and friction as explanations for disaster at the Battle of Amiens, 8 August 1918

The assault at Amiens was ‘the black day of the German Army’. British accounts treat the Germans as passive, of no more importance than the terrain, and victory as inevitable. Using German sources, and drawing on statistical ‘historical analysis’ of behaviour in battle, the article argues the frontline defenders panicked when thick fog left them defenceless against the British tanks. By contrast, when the fog lifted, the defence recovered. Although senior German commanders on the spot reacted well, Ludendorff fell into a state of shock, such that he convinced the Kaiser the war must be ended.