EUROPEAN BRIEFING

Much has been made of completing the Single European Market in Europe. Despite movements towards more advanced levels of integration such as currency union, there remains several grey areas in specific industries that are not allowing for open access to the market. These areas include government activities such as electricity and gas along with other industries such as telecommunications. This article sets out to examine whether there is likely to be a free market in these sectors and assesses the progress being made since the introduction of a number of procurement directives post-1998. This will therefore have an influence on land use planning. The article draws on the literature of regulation and industrial organization as well as European integration in order to demonstrate the complexities of these industries and the problems of full compliance with the single market.     

ELECTIVE AFFINITIES AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY

Elective Affinities: Musical Essays on the History of Aesthetic Theory collects a selection of Lydia Goehr's recent essays. In them she traces "a history of attraction and reaction … of music to philosophy, drama, birdsong, crime, film, and nationhood" (ix). Goehr examines the ways that philosophers, the ideas that they present, and works of art display "elective affinities". Her procedure is like that of an art historian who presents parallel slides to reveal visual affinities, even between artists who themselves were unaware of each other. Her analyses are erudite, lucid, and always suggestive, but what I found most admirable in Elective Affinities is Goehr's extraordinarily brave experimentation with a novel form of philosophy-writing, the adumbration of which is the focus of this review. Her book is strange enough to be genuinely magnificent and lastingly influential.     

The Flag Salute Cases Reconsidered

First, my very warmest thanks to the Supreme Court Historical Society for inviting me, to Chief Justice Roberts for his most gracious introduction (which I can only hope will not be retracted silently by the time I finish), and to all of you for coming inside on a glorious spring day to listen to an old professor talk about constitutional law.     

Innovation and precedent in the Kosovo war: the impact of Operation Allied Force on US foreign policy

The 1990s was a period of strategic innovation in US foreign policy. Operation Allied Force in particular represented an important step in the contorted evolution of America's attitude towards the use of force in the post-Cold War period. That operation demonstrated the growing influence of humanitarian concerns and the extent to which America was willing to reconsider Cold War criteria on the prudence and utility of force in support of its foreign policy. In its decision to intervene in Kosovo, the Clinton administration also divided opinion among the military. This, in effect, reduced the premium placed on the counsels of the armed forces and made it easier for the Bush administration subsequently to ignore their advice. Furthermore, having fought the war multilaterally through NATO, Operation Allied Force made America more wary of doing so again. In other words, the intervention set a number of precedents and left a significant legacy for the way in which US foreign policy was pursued in the decade that followed. This legacy is considered in two parts: the first analyses those issues associated with the use of force debate; the second considers how the Kosovo experience affected US attitudes to coalition warfare.     

Pragmatism or what? The future of US foreign policy

This article discusses the intellectual sources of the presidential candidates' foreign policies. In the case of Barack Obama, the article examines the formation of his worldview, his intellectual inspirations, his most significant foreign policy appointments and the diplomatic course he has pursued as president. Mitt Romney's foreign policy views are harder to identify with certainty, but his business and political career—as well as the identity and dispositions of his advisory team—all provide important clues as to the policies he will pursue if elected in November 2012. The article finds much common ground between the two candidates; both are results‐driven pragmatists, attuned to nuance and complexity, who nonetheless believe—in agreement with Robert Kagan—that US geostrategic primacy will continue through the span of the twenty‐first century. The gulf between the candidates on domestic policy is vast, but on foreign policy—Romney's bellicose statements through the Republican primaries served a purpose that has passed—there is little between them.     

Was Iraq an unjust war? A debate on the Iraq war and reflections on Libya*

This article is based on a debate held on 22 March 2011 at Chatham House on ‘Was Iraq an unjust war?’ David Fisher argues that the war fully failed to meet any of the just war criteria. The war was undertaken to disarm Iraq of its WMD but the evidence that it had such weapons was inadequate. There were concerns about the justice of the cause, reinforced by doubts that those initiating military action avowedly on behalf of the UN had the requisite competent authority to do so, given the absence of any international consensus in favour of military action. The doubts were further reinforced by concern that action was being undertaken too soon and not as a last resort. Crucially, no adequate assessment was undertaken before military action was authorized to seek to ensure that the harm likely to result would not outweigh the good achieved. The individual failures mutually reinforced each other, so building up cumulatively to support the conclusion that the war was undertaken without sufficient just cause and without adequate planning how to achieve a just outcome following military action to impose regime change. It thus failed the two key tests that have to be met before a war can be justly undertaken, designed to ensure that military action is only initiated if more good than harm is likely to result. By contrast, current coalition operations in Libya are, so far, just. This is a humanitarian operation undertaken to halt a humanitarian catastrophe that is taking place, with wide international support, including authorization by the UN Security Council. Nigel Biggar argues that the fact that the invasion and occupation of Iraq suffered from grave errors, some of them morally culpable, does not yet establish its overall injustice. All wars are morally flawed, even just ones. Further, even if the invasion were illegal, that need not make it immoral. The authority of moral law trumps that of international law, and where the politics of the Security Council prevent the UN from enforcing the law, unauthorized enforcement could be morally justified. Further still, massive civilian casualties do not by themselves make an unjust war. The decisive considerations are those of just cause, last resort and right intention. Proportionality is not among them, because estimating it is far too uncertain. The persistently atrocious nature of the Saddam Hussein regime satisfies just cause; evidence of collapsing containment grounds last resort; and the Coalition's costly correction of early errors proved the seriousness of its good intentions. In sum the invasion and occupation of Iraq was, despite grave errors, justified. Regarding Libya, Biggar notes the recurrence of conflict over the interpretation of international law. He wonders how those who distinguish sharply between protecting civilians and regime change imagine that dissident civilians are to be ‘kept’ safe while Qadhafi remains in power. Against those who clamour for a clear exit‐strategy, he counsels agility, while urging sensitivity to the limits of our power. What was right to begin may become imprudent to continue.