Can a preservationist ideology halt the process of creative destruction? Evidence from Salt Spring Island,British Columbia

For more than 50 years, rural municipalities across the developed world have struggled to redefine themselves in the face of declining primary sector employment. In some places, this struggle has led to the creation of landscapes that provide heritage‐seekers with tangible commodities and intangible experiences reflecting a by‐gone past. Recent research suggests that these post‐productivist heritage‐scapes may evolve into leisure‐scapes of mass consumption, if profit or economic growth are the key motives underlying development ( Mitchell and Vanderwerf 2010 ). This article questions whether a dominant ideology of preservation can prevent this scenario. We studied Salt Spring Island, British Columbia: (i) to determine if the island displays the characteristics of a heritage‐scape, (ii) to discover if a preservationist ideology has contributed to its current state, and (iii) to ponder if this state can be maintained, in light of recent regional and provincial discourse. Our analysis reveals that the creation, and maintenance, of this heritage‐scape has been guided largely by public discourse underlain by a preservationist ideology. This prolonged state, however, may be drawing to an end. Recent provincial directives to double tourist revenues suggest that local (and regional) discourse soon may be overshadowed by the province's mandate to promote economic growth. The response of local stakeholders will ultimately dictate the Island's ability to maintain its present state as a post‐productivist heritage‐scape.     

By invitation only: Lord Mountbatten,Prince Philip,and the attempt to create a Commonwealth ‘Bilderberg group’, 1964–66

This article examines the attempt between 1964 and 1966 to create new conference for the Commonwealth modelled on the secretive Euro-American Bilderberg group, and considers the roles of Earl Mountbatten of Burma and the Duke of Edinburgh in the venture. This was the only major initiative on the structure of the Commonwealth to originate with the government of Harold Wilson during its first term in office. Consideration of the scheme was suspended as a result of Rhodesian UDI and was never reopened. Although short-lived, the Bilderberg initiative offers important insights into a number of issues. It suggests that the original Bilderberg group had assumed a considerable importance to senior figures in the Labour Party by 1964. It also illustrates the distinct ambivalence with which members of the British elite viewed the changing nature of the Commonwealth, and points to a desire among some of them to recreate the atmosphere of a more exclusive ‘club’. Above all it sheds light upon the highly idiosyncratic negotiating style of Lord Mountbatten, and suggests a desire on the part of Prince Philip to establish for himself a fully independent role within the Commonwealth.     

Partisan gerrymandering and population instability: Completing the redistricting puzzle

How can partisan mapmakers enact a partisan gerrymander in the presence of risk-averse co-partisan incumbents who wish to keep most of their constituencies intact? Until now the literature on redistricting has focused on how redistricting affects the geography of partisan support, that is, the underlying partisan balance of electoral districts. We posit that this emphasis on partisanship misses half of the story. Partisan mapmakers have another tool at their disposal: the fostering of population instability that may not affect a district's partisan balance. By examining all redistricting plans enacted in 2001–2002, as well as three case studies, we show that partisan mapmakers strategically foster population instability, which poses problems for incumbents in a way that may not be apparent when looking exclusively at the effects of redistricting on partisanship. Our results show how partisan mapmakers simultaneously achieve two goals: enacting an “optimal gerrymander,” which strengthens some opposition-party incumbents, while inducing instability and reducing the personal vote of those same incumbents. We also show that so-called “neutral” redistricting plans are successful in disregarding incumbency. Finally, our results suggest another mechanism that explains why the 2002 congressional elections in the U.S. produced little competition.