Time-Averaging Slows Down Rates of Change in the Archaeological Record

Measuring the pace of cultural change, and understanding its determinants is a fundamental goal of anthropological research. The archaeological record is the main source of information about the pace of cultural change, but it is an imperfect one, as taphonomic loss and mixing distort rate measurements. Here, I focus on the impact of time-averaging on rate measurements. Time-averaging arises when archaeological materials associated with activities and events that took place at different points in time are mixed into the same unit, whether because of depositional processes, disturbance factors, or because archaeologists lump together archaeological contexts when creating analytical units. I use analytical models to show how time-averaging can slow down the observed rates of change under two general modes of cultural change: random drift and directional change. I test this prediction using empirical rates of change from the archaeological record of North America. I show that empirical rates of change are indeed inversely correlated with the duration of time-averaging and provide a range estimate for this correlation.     

Genealogical narrative and self-knowledge in Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men

SUMMARY

Why did Rousseau cast the substance of the Second Discourse in the form of a genealogy? In this essay the author attempts to work out the relation between the literary form (genealogical narrative, as the author calls it) of the Discourse's two main parts and the content. A key thesis of Rousseau's text concerns our lack of self-knowledge, indeed, our ignorance of our ignorance. The author argues that in a number of ways genealogical narrative is meant to respond to that lack. In the course of his discussion he comments on Rousseau's puzzling remarks in the Second Discourse about his expository method. Further, given the thesis that we lack self-knowledge, Rousseau owes us an account of his genesis as self-knowing genealogist. He attempts to do so in part through his narrative of the ‘illumination of Vincennes’. The author examines that narrative as well, reading it and the Discourse in light of each other. Can Rousseau resolve the problems of self-reference that the philosophical use of genealogy often leads to? The article discusses this complex metaphilosophical problem, along with views about the value of genealogical accounts, in light of recent work by Robert Guay, John Kekes, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Frederick Neuhouser, among others.