Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?

The Bush administration is trying to persuade itself and everyone else that the ‘global war on terrorism’ (GWoT) will, like the Cold War, be a ‘long war’ requiring sustained mobilization against an implacable foe. It has had some success in projecting this idea, and if it takes root the GWoT could indeed become a durable, dominant, unifying idea that would enable Washington to reassert and legitimize both its special claims as the sole superpower and US leadership of global security. The question is: how likely is this to happen? By looking at the surrounding events and contexts that could support or undermine the elevation of the GWoT to the status of the new Cold War, the author argues that it is not all that likely. Many factors could undermine it, not least that most of the strategies on off er corrode the liberal values that they are supposed to defend.     

The Question of Diminution of Income for Justices and Judges of the Supreme Court and the Inferior Courts of the United States

Selected from a small committee to compose a first draft of a declaration of independence of the American colonies from Great Britain, Thomas Jefferson set pen to paper and began what would be a litany of offenses committed by the Crown against the people of the soon-to-be United States of America. Included in that world-changing document was a passage dealing with the colonial judiciary and its past subjugation to the wishes of George III:     

Does global egalitarianism provide an impractical and unattractive ideal of justice?

In his important new book National responsibility and global justice, David Miller presents a systematic challenge to existing theories of global justice. In particular, he argues that cosmopolitan egalitarianism must be rejected. Such views, Miller maintains, would place unacceptable burdens on the most productive political communities, undermine national self‐determination, and disincentivize political communities from taking responsibility for their fate. They are also impracticable and quite unrealistic, at least under present conditions. Miller offers an alternative account that conceives global justice in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Primary responsibility for securing such rights for an individual lies with his or her state, but in so far as these rights go unprotected, responsibilities for fulfilling them may fall on outsiders. While less ambitious that cosmopolitan egalitarian justice, Miller argues that his own view would nevertheless enable us to articulate what is most morally objectionable about our current world. In this article it is argued that none of Miller's critiques of cosmopolitan egalitarianism is effective, and that while certainly preferable to the status quo, a world governed by Miller's principles is not an attractive ideal.