Size and Executive-Legislative Relations in Australian Parliaments

In parliamentary systems of government, size of parliament (in absolute terms and, especially, relative to the parliamentary executive) is an important, but often underemphasised, aspect of constitutional design. An analysis is provided of change in the size of national and sub-national parliaments and ministries in one parliamentary democracy, Australia, during the twentieth century. The ratio of executive to non-executive members of parliament has grown dramatically in all Australian parliaments, due to differences in incentives to increase the sizes of parliament and the executive. It is argued that this process has contributed to the weakening of parliaments and limited the potential for parliamentary reform. A proposal for institutional redesign is brieflly discussed.     

The limited capacity of management to rescue UK defence policy: a review and a word of caution

Political and media attention in the UK is devoted to three interrelated aspects of defence: policy, the management of defence resources and military operations. This article argues that the 1998 Strategic Defence Review placed excessive reliance on anticipated improvements in the management of defence resources to render Labour's defence policies affordable. The field of attempted defence management improvements is surveyed and it is concluded that no final answers were generated on the key issues of the division of tasks among uniformed personnel, civil servants and the private sector, or on whether defence should be run largely on a capability basis or on single service lines. Given the demonstrated similarity between the government's concepts of the UK's role in the world in the Strategic Defence Review (1998) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) (2010), there is a clear danger that the SDSR also relies too much on efficiency savings. By reference to the inherent complications of defence management and to three strands of management thought (complexity management, wicked problems and principal–agent theory), the article argues that some inefficiency will always be present. It suggests that the Clausewitzian concept of friction, accepted as pertinent to the area of military operations, might also be applied to efforts to generate military capability. It concludes that defence reviews should not be based on assumptions about efficiency savings and that students of international security and defence need to pay attention to both the volume of resources going into defence and the mechanisms by which they are managed.     

A NIGERIAN TIN TRADE IN ANTIQUITY?

Summary: Eighteen hundred miles due south of Carthage, across the Sahara, lies one of the richest sources of tin in the modern world. Here, the Bauchi region of northern Nigeria contains extensive deposits of alluvial cassiterite. This is a singularly important geological feature, since stream tin, as it is more commonly known, was the only tin ore profitably available in antiquity (Muhly, 1973: 248). This paper, as the title implies, is concerned with the question of whether Carthage received tin from this particular area of West Africa.¹ There are certain considerations that suggest such a possibility, but the evidence is tantalizingly nebulous, making answers both inconclusive and speculative.