Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?

The Bush administration is trying to persuade itself and everyone else that the ‘global war on terrorism’ (GWoT) will, like the Cold War, be a ‘long war’ requiring sustained mobilization against an implacable foe. It has had some success in projecting this idea, and if it takes root the GWoT could indeed become a durable, dominant, unifying idea that would enable Washington to reassert and legitimize both its special claims as the sole superpower and US leadership of global security. The question is: how likely is this to happen? By looking at the surrounding events and contexts that could support or undermine the elevation of the GWoT to the status of the new Cold War, the author argues that it is not all that likely. Many factors could undermine it, not least that most of the strategies on off er corrode the liberal values that they are supposed to defend.     

The Question of Diminution of Income for Justices and Judges of the Supreme Court and the Inferior Courts of the United States

Selected from a small committee to compose a first draft of a declaration of independence of the American colonies from Great Britain, Thomas Jefferson set pen to paper and began what would be a litany of offenses committed by the Crown against the people of the soon-to-be United States of America. Included in that world-changing document was a passage dealing with the colonial judiciary and its past subjugation to the wishes of George III:     

Does global egalitarianism provide an impractical and unattractive ideal of justice?

In his important new book National responsibility and global justice, David Miller presents a systematic challenge to existing theories of global justice. In particular, he argues that cosmopolitan egalitarianism must be rejected. Such views, Miller maintains, would place unacceptable burdens on the most productive political communities, undermine national self‐determination, and disincentivize political communities from taking responsibility for their fate. They are also impracticable and quite unrealistic, at least under present conditions. Miller offers an alternative account that conceives global justice in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Primary responsibility for securing such rights for an individual lies with his or her state, but in so far as these rights go unprotected, responsibilities for fulfilling them may fall on outsiders. While less ambitious that cosmopolitan egalitarian justice, Miller argues that his own view would nevertheless enable us to articulate what is most morally objectionable about our current world. In this article it is argued that none of Miller's critiques of cosmopolitan egalitarianism is effective, and that while certainly preferable to the status quo, a world governed by Miller's principles is not an attractive ideal.     

A challenge to the reigning theory of the just war

Troubled times often gives rise to great art that reflects those troubles. So too with political theory. The greatest work of twentieth century political theory, John Rawls's A theory of justice, was inspired in various respects by extreme social and economic inequality, racialized slavery and racial segregation in the United States. Arguably the most influential work of political theory since Rawls—Michael Walzer's Just and unjust wars—a sustained and historically informed reflection on the morality of interstate armed conflict—was written in the midst of the Vietnam War. It should be no surprise, then, that the bellicose period of the past 20 years should give rise to a robust new literature in political theory on the morality of armed conflict. It has been of uneven quality, and to some extent episodic, responding to particular challenges—the increased prevalence of asymmetric warfare and the permissibility of preventive or preemptive war—that have arisen as a result of specific events. In the past decade, however, a group of philosophers has begun to pose more fundamental questions about the reigning theory of the morality of armed conflict warfare—just war theory—as formulated by Walzer and others. Jeff McMahan's concise, inventive and tightly argued work Killing in war is without doubt the most important of these challenges to the reigning theory of the just war. This review article discusses McMahan's work, some of the critical attention it has received, and its potential implications for practice.     

Culture and international society

This article investigates a hypothesis drawn from Martin Wight, that a society of states lacking a shared culture, as a result of expansion beyond its original base, will be unstable. This instability hypothesis has been influential in how the English School has presented the history of the expansion of European international society to a global scale. The article starts by offering two models of how a global international society could have come about since the late classical era: a multicultural encounter among several expanding civilizations (polycentric), or the takeover of the system by one centre (monocentric). Using these models as a backdrop, two accounts of the expansion story are developed. The Vanguardist account emphasizes the exceptionalism of European culture, posits a 500‐year period of western domination, sees multiculturalism and the decline of western power as problematic, and tends to pessimism about the future of international society. The Syncretist account emphasizes the permanence of cross‐cultural exchange, posits only a 200‐year period of western dominance, sees culture and international society as evolving together, and is not pessimistic about the stability of international society. These two models and two accounts are then used to assess the possible future of international society. The article argues that culture is less of a problem for international society than Wight, and much of the English School, suppose. The evidence for the substantial success of syncretism is strong and provides considerable stability to most of the likely outcomes. The key problem is not culture, but socio‐political structure. How can what North et al. call natural states and open access orders find shared practices and institutions that do not destabilize international society?